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trenches. Ferdinand pressed close on his flying enemy, whose rear sustained some annoyance from the Spanish *ginetes*, in its passage through the defiles of the sierras. The retreat, however, was conducted in too good order to allow any material loss to be inflicted on the French, who succeeded at length in sheltering themselves under the cannon of Narbonne, up to which place they were pursued by their victorious foe. Several places on the frontier, as Leocate, Palme, Sigean, Roquefort, and others, were abandoned to the Spaniards, who pillaged them of whatever was worth carrying off; without any violence, however, to the persons of the inhabitants, whom, as a Christian population, if we are to believe Martyr, Ferdinand refused even to make prisoners.²⁴

The Spanish monarch made no attempt to retain these acquisitions; but having dismantled some of the towns, which offered most resistance, returned loaded with the spoils of victory to his own domin-

²⁴ Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 54. — Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 11. — Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 264. — Carbajal, *Anales*, MS., año 1503. — Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS., cap. 198. — Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. pp. 408, 409. — Gonzalo Ayora, *Cartas*, carta 11. — Oviedo, *Quincuagenas*, MS., dial. de Deza.

Peter Martyr seems to have shared none of Isabella's scruples in regard to bringing the enemy to battle. On the contrary, he indulges in a most querulous strain of sarcasm against the Catholic king for his remissness in this par-

ticular. "Quare elucescente die moniti nostri de Gallorum discessu ad eos, at sero, concurrerunt. Rex Perpiniani agebat, ad millia passuum sex non brevia, uti nosti. Propterea sero id actum, venit concitato cursu, at sero. Ad hostes itur, at sero. Cernunt hostium acies, at sero, at a longe. Distabant jam milliaria circiter duo. Ergo sero Phryges sapuerunt. Cujus hæc culpa, tu scrutator aliunde; mea est, si nescis. Maximam dedit ea dies, quæ est, si nescis, calendarum Novembrium sexta, Hispanis ignominiam, et aliquando jacturam illis pariet collachrymandam." Letter to the cardinal of Santa Cruz, epist. 262.

ions. "Had he been as good a general as he was a statesman," says a Spanish historian, "he might have penetrated to the centre of France."²⁵ Ferdinand, however, was too prudent to attempt conquests, which could only be maintained, if maintained at all, at an infinite expense of blood and treasure. He had sufficiently vindicated his honor by meeting his foe so promptly, and driving him triumphantly over the border; and he preferred, like a cautious prince, not to risk all he had gained by attempting more, but to employ his present successes as a vantage-ground for entering on negotiation, in which at all times he placed more reliance than on the sword.

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In this, his good star still further favored him. The armada, equipped at so much cost by the French king at Marseilles, had no sooner put to sea, than it was assailed by furious tempests, and so far crippled, that it was obliged to return to port without even effecting a descent on the Spanish coast.

These accumulated disasters so disheartened Louis the Twelfth, that he consented to enter into negotiations for a suspension of hostilities; and an armistice was finally arranged, through the mediation of his pensioner Frederic, ex-king of Naples, between the hostile monarchs. It ex-

Truce with
France.

²⁵ Aleson, *Annales de Navarra*, tom. v. p. 113.

Oviedo, who was present in this campaign, seems to have been of the same opinion. At least he says, "If the king had pursued vigorously, not a Frenchman would

have lived to carry back the tidings of defeat to his own land." If we are to believe him, Ferdinand desisted from the pursuit at the earnest entreaty of Bishop Deza, his confessor. *Quincuagenas*, MS.

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tended only to their hereditary dominions; Italy and the circumjacent seas being still left open as a common arena, on which the rival parties might meet, and settle their respective titles by the sword. This truce, first concluded for five months, was subsequently prolonged to three years. It gave Ferdinand, what he most needed, leisure, and means to provide for the security of his Italian possessions, on which the dark storm of war was soon to burst with tenfold fury.²⁶

The unfortunate Frederic, who had been drawn from his obscurity to take part in these negotiations, died in the following year. It is singular that the last act of his political life should have been to mediate a peace between the dominions of two monarchs, who had united to strip him of his own.

The results of this campaign were as honorable to Spain, as they were disastrous and humiliating

Reflections
on the cam-
paign.

²⁶ Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 55. — Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 11. — Peter Martyr, Opus. Epist., epist. 264. — Lanuza, Historias, tom. i. cap. 17. — Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16. — Machiavelli, Legazione Prima a Roma, let. 27.

Mons. Varillas notices as the

weak side of Louis XII., "une démangeaison de faire la paix à contre temps, dont il fut travaillé durant toute sa vie." (Politique de Ferdinand, liv. 1, p. 148.) A statesman shrewder than Varillas, De Retz, furnishes, perhaps, the best key to this policy, in the remark, "Les gens foibles ne plient jamais quand ils le doivent."

Impediments to
historic ac-
curacy.

Those, who have not themselves had occasion to pursue historical inquiries, will scarcely imagine on what loose grounds the greater part of the narrative is to be built. With the exception of a few lead-

ing outlines, there is such a mass of inconsistency and contradiction in the details, even of contemporaries, that it seems almost as hopeless to seize the true aspect of any particular age as it would be to

to Louis the Twelfth, who had seen his arms baffled on every point, and all his mighty apparatus of fleets and armies dissolve, as if by enchantment, in less time than it had been preparing. The immediate success of Spain may no doubt be ascribed, in a considerable degree, to the improved organization and thorough discipline introduced by the sovereigns into the national militia, at the close of the Moorish war, without which it would have been scarcely possible to concentrate so promptly on a distant point such large masses of men, all well equipped and trained for active service. So soon was the nation called to feel the effect of these wise provisions.

transfer to the canvass a faithful likeness of an individual from a description simply of his prominent features.

Much of the difficulty might seem to be removed, now that we are on the luminous and beaten track of Italian history; but, in fact, the vision is rather dazzled than assisted by the numerous cross lights thrown over the path, and the infinitely various points of view from which every object is contemplated. Besides the local and party prejudices which we had to encounter in the contemporary Spanish historians, we have now a host of national prejudices, not less unfavorable to truth; while the remoteness of the scene of action necessarily begets a thousand additional inaccuracies in the gossiping and credulous chroniclers of France and Spain.

The mode in which public negotiations were conducted at this period, interposes still further embarrassments in our search after truth. They were regarded as the personal concerns of the sovereign, in

which the nation at large had no right to interfere. They were settled, like the rest of his private affairs, under his own eye, without the participation of any other branch of the government. They were shrouded, therefore, under an impenetrable secrecy, which permitted such results only to emerge into light as suited the monarch. Even these results cannot be relied on as furnishing the true key to the intentions of the parties. The science of the cabinet, as then practised, authorized such a system of artifice and shameless duplicity, as greatly impaired the credit of those official documents which we are accustomed to regard as the surest foundations of history.

The only records which we can receive with full confidence are the private correspondence of contemporaries, which, from its very nature, is exempt from most of the restraints and affectations incident more or less to every work destined for the public eye. Such communications, indeed, come like

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But the results of the campaign are, after all, less worthy of notice as indicating the resources of the country, than as evidence of a pervading patriotic feeling, which could alone make these resources available. Instead of the narrow local jealousies, which had so long estranged the people of the separate provinces, and more especially those of the rival states of Aragon and Castile, from one another, there had been gradually raised up a common national sentiment, like that knitting together the constituent parts of one great commonwealth. At the first alarm of invasion on the frontier of Aragon, the whole extent of the sister kingdom, from the green valleys of the Guadalquivir up to the rocky fastnesses of the Asturias, responded to the call, as to that of a common country, sending

the voice of departed years; and when, as in Martyr's case, they proceed from one whose acuteness is combined with singular opportunities for observation, they are of inestimable value. Instead of exposing to us only the results, they lay open the interior workings of the machinery, and we enter into all the shifting doubts, passions, and purposes, which agitate the minds of the actors. Unfortunately, the chain of correspondence here, as in similar cases, when not originally designed for historical uses, necessarily suffers from occasional breaks and interruptions. The scattered gleams which are thrown over the most prominent points, however, shed so strong a light, as materially to aid us in groping our way through the darker and more perplexed passages of the story.

Speculative
writers.

The obscurity, which hangs over the period, has not been dispelled

by those modern writers, who, like Varillas, in his well-known work, *Politique de Ferdinand le Catholique*, affect to treat the subject philosophically, paying less attention to facts than to their causes and consequences. These ingenious persons, seldom willing to take things as they find them, seem to think that truth is only to be reached by delving deep below the surface. In this search after more profound causes of action, they reject whatever is natural and obvious. They are inexhaustible in conjectures and fine-spun conclusions, inferring quite as much from what is not said or done, as from what is. In short, they put the reader as completely in possession of their hero's thoughts on all occasions, as any professed romance-writer would venture to do. All this may be very agreeable, and to persons of easy faith, very satisfactory; but it is not history,

forth, as we have seen, its swarms of warriors, to repel the foe, and roll back the tide of war upon his own land. What a contrast did all this present to the cold and parsimonious hand with which the nation, thirty years before, dealt out its supplies to King John the Second, Ferdinand's father, when he was left to cope single-handed with the whole power of France, in this very quarter of Roussillon. Such was the consequence of the glorious *union*, which brought together the petty and hitherto discordant tribes of the Peninsula under the same rule; and, by creating common interests and an harmonious principle of action, was silently preparing them for constituting one great nation,—one and indivisible, as intended by nature.

and may well remind us of the astonishment somewhere expressed by Cardinal de Retz at the assurance of those, who, at a distance from the scene of action, pretended to lay open all the secret springs of policy, of which he himself, though a principal party, was ignorant.

No prince, on the whole, has suffered more from these unwarrantable liberties, than Ferdinand the Catholic. His reputation for shrewd policy, suggests a ready key to whatever is mysterious and otherwise inexplicable in his government; while it puts writers like Gaillard and Varillas constantly on the scent after the most secret and subtle sources of action, as if there were always something more to be detected, than readily meets the eye. Instead of judging him by

the general rules of human conduct, every thing is referred to deep laid stratagem; no allowance is made for the ordinary disturbing forces, the passions and casualties of life; every action proceeds with the same wary calculation that regulates the moves upon a chess-board; and thus a character of consummate artifice is built up, not only unsupported by historical evidence, but in manifest contradiction to the principles of our nature. The part of our subject embraced in the present chapter, has long been debatable ground between the French and Spanish historians; and the obscurity which hangs over it has furnished an ample range for speculation to the class of writers above alluded to, which they have not failed to improve.

CHAPTER XIV.

ITALIAN WARS.—CONDITION OF ITALY.—FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES ON THE GARIGLIANO.

1503.

Melancholy State of Italy.—Great Preparations of Louis.—Gonsalvo repulsed before Gaeta.—Armies on the Garigliano.—Bloody Passage of the Bridge.—Anxious Expectation of Italy.—Critical Situation of the Spaniards.—Gonsalvo's Resolution.—Heroism of Paredes and Bayard.

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Melancholy
condition of
Italy.

WE must now turn our eyes towards Italy, where the sounds of war, which had lately died away, were again heard in wilder dissonance than ever. Our attention, hitherto, has been too exclusively directed to mere military manœuvres to allow us to dwell much on the condition of this unhappy land. The dreary progress of our story, over fields of blood and battle, might naturally dispose the imagination to lay the scene of action in some rude and savage age; an age, at best, of feudal heroism, when the energies of the soul could be roused only by the fierce din of war.

Far otherwise, however; the tents of the hostile armies were now pitched in the bosom of the most lovely and cultivated regions on the globe; inhabited by a people, who had carried the various arts of policy and social life to a degree of excellence elsewhere unknown; whose natural resources had been

augmented by all the appliances of ingenuity and industry; whose cities were crowded with magnificent and costly works of public utility; into whose ports every wind that blew wafted the rich freights of distant climes; whose thousand hills were covered to their very tops with the golden labors of the husbandman; and whose intellectual developement showed itself, not only in a liberal scholarship far outstripping that of their contemporaries, but in works of imagination, and of elegant art more particularly, which rivalled the best days of antiquity. The period before us, indeed, the commencement of the sixteenth century, was that of their meridian splendor, when Italian genius, breaking through the cloud which had temporarily obscured its early dawn, shone out in full effulgence; for we are now touching on the age of Machiavelli, Ariosto, and Michael Angelo, — the golden age of Leo the Tenth.

It is impossible, even at this distance of time, to contemplate without feelings of sadness the fate of such a country, thus suddenly converted into an arena for the bloody exhibitions of the gladiators of Europe; to behold her trodden under foot by the very nations on whom she had freely poured the light of civilization; to see the fierce soldiery of Europe, from the Danube to the Tagus, sweeping like an army of locusts over her fields, defiling her pleasant places, and raising the shout of battle, or of brutal triumph under the shadow of those monuments of genius, which have been the delight and despair of succeeding ages. It was the old story of the Goths and Vandals acted over again. Those more refined

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arts of the cabinet, on which the Italians were accustomed to rely, much more than on the sword, in their disputes with one another, were of no avail against these rude invaders, whose strong arm easily broke through the subtle webs of policy, which entangled the movements of less formidable adversaries. It was the triumph of brute force over civilization, — one of the most humiliating lessons by which Providence has seen fit to rebuke the pride of human intellect.¹

The fate of Italy inculcates a most important lesson. With all this outward show of prosperity, her political institutions had gradually lost the vital principle, which could alone give them stability or real value. The forms of freedom, indeed, in most instances, had sunk under the usurpation of some aspiring chief. Everywhere patriotism was lost in the most intense selfishness. Moral principle was at as low an ebb in private, as in public life. The hands, which shed their liberal patronage over genius and learning, were too often red with blood. The courtly precincts, which seemed the favorite haunt of the Muses, were too often the Epicurean sty of brutish sensuality; while the head of the church itself, whose station, exalted over that of every worldly potentate, should have raised him at

1 "O pria sì cara al ciel del mondo parte,
Che l'acqua cigne, e 'l sasso orrido serra;
O lieta sopra ogn' altra e dolce terra,
Che 'l superbo Appennin segna e diparte:
Che val omal, se 'l buon popol di Marte
Ti lascio del mar donna e de la terra?
Le genti a te già serve, or ti fan guerra,
E pongon man ne le tue treccie sparte.
Lasso nè manca de' tuoi figli ancora,
Chi le più strane a te chiamando insieme
La spada sua nel tuo bel corpo adopre.
Or son queste simili a l' antich' opre?"

O pur coel pietate e Dio s' onora?
Ahi secol duro, ahi tralignato seme."
Bembo, Rime; Son. 108.

This exquisite little lyric, inferior to none other which had appeared on the same subject since the "Italia mia" of Petrarch, was composed by Bembo at the period of which we are treating.

least above their grosser vices, was sunk in the foulest corruptions that debase poor human nature. Was it surprising then, that the tree, thus cankered at heart, with all the goodly show of blossoms on its branches, should have fallen before the blast, which now descended in such pitiless fury from the mountains?

Had there been an invigorating national feeling, any common principle of coalition among the Italian states; had they, in short, been true to themselves, they possessed abundant resources in their wealth, talent, and superior science, to have shielded their soil from violation. Unfortunately, while the other European states had been augmenting their strength incalculably by the consolidation of their scattered fragments into one whole, those of Italy, in the absence of some great central point round which to rally, had grown more and more confirmed in their original disunion. Thus, without concert in action, and destitute of the vivifying impulse of patriotic sentiment, they were delivered up to be the spoil and mockery of nations, whom in their proud language they still despised as barbarians; an impressive example of the impotence of human genius, and of the instability of human institutions, however excellent in themselves, when unsustained by public and private virtue.²

The great powers, who had now entered the lists,

² The philosophic Machiavelli discerned the true causes of the calamities, in the corruptions of his country; which he has exposed, with more than his usual boldness and bitterness of sarcasm, in the seventh book of his "Arte della Guerra."

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Italian
states.

created entirely new interests in Italy, which broke up the old political combinations. The conquest of Milan enabled France to assume a decided control over the affairs of the country. Her recent reverses in Naples, however, had greatly loosened this authority; although Florence and other neighbouring states, which lay under her colossal shadow, still remained true to her. Venice, with her usual crafty policy, kept aloof, maintaining a position of neutrality between the belligerents, each of whom made the most pressing efforts to secure so formidable an ally. She had, however, long since entertained a deep distrust of her French neighbour; and, although she would enter into no public engagements, she gave the Spanish minister every assurance of her friendly disposition towards his government.³ She intimated this still more unequivocally, by the supplies she had allowed her citizens to carry into Barleta during the late campaign, and by other indirect aid of a similar nature during the present;

³ Lorenzo Suarez de la Vega filled the post of minister at the republic during the whole of the war. His long continuance in the office at so critical a period, under so vigilant a sovereign as Ferdinand, is sufficient warrant for his ability. Peter Martyr, while he admits his talents, makes some objections to his appointment, on the ground of his want of scholarship. "Nec placet quod hunc elegeritis hac tempestate. Maluisssem namque virum, qui Latinam calleret, vel saltem intelligeret, linguam; hic tantum suam patriam vernaculam novit; prudentem esse alias, atque

inter ignaros literarum satis esse gnarum, Rex ipse mihi testatus est. Cupissem tamen ego, quæ dixi." (See the letter to the Catholic queen, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 246.) The objections have weight undoubtedly, the Latin being the common medium of diplomatic intercourse at that time. Martyr, who on his return through Venice from his Egyptian mission took charge for the time of the interests of Spain, might probably have been prevailed on to assume the difficulties of a diplomatic station there himself. See also Part II., Chapter 11, note 7, of this History.

for all which she was one day to be called to a heavy reckoning by her enemies.

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The disposition of the papal court towards the French monarch was still less favorable; and it took no pains to conceal this after his reverses in Naples. Soon after the defeat of Cerignola, it entered into correspondence with Gonsalvo de Cordova; and, although Alexander the Sixth refused to break openly with France, and sign a treaty with the Spanish sovereigns, he pledged himself to do so, on the reduction of Gaeta. In the mean time, he freely allowed the Great Captain to raise such levies as he could in Rome, before the very eyes of the French ambassador. So little had the immense concessions of Louis, including those of principle and honor, availed to secure the fidelity of this treacherous ally.⁴

With the emperor Maximilian, notwithstanding repeated treaties, he was on scarcely better terms. That prince was connected with Spain by the matrimonial alliances of his family, and no less averse to France from personal feeling, which, with the majority of minds, operates more powerfully than motives of state policy. He had, moreover, always regarded the occupation of Milan by the latter as an infringement, in some measure, of his imperial rights. The Spanish government, availing itself of these feelings, endeavoured through its minister,

Of the emperor.

⁴ Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 38, 48. — *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 6, p. 311, ed. Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, tom. iii. 1645. — Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, pp. lib. 6. — Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. p. 347. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 6, p. 311, ed. 1645. — Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, pp. 77, 81.

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Don Juan Manuel, to stimulate Maximilian to the invasion of Lombardy. As the emperor, however, demanded, as usual, a liberal subsidy for carrying on the war, King Ferdinand, who was seldom incommoded by a superfluity of funds, preferred reserving them for his own enterprises, to hazarding them on the Quixotic schemes of his ally. But, although the negotiations were attended with no result, the amicable dispositions of the Austrian government were evinced by the permission given to its subjects to serve under the banners of Gonzalvo, where indeed, as we have already seen, they formed some of his best troops.⁵

But while Louis the Twelfth drew so little assistance from abroad, the heartiness with which the whole French people entered into his feelings at this crisis, made him nearly independent of it, and, in an incredibly short space of time, placed him in a condition for resuming operations on a far more formidable scale than before. The preceding failures in Italy he attributed in a great degree to an overweening confidence in the superiority of his own troops, and his neglect to support them with the necessary reinforcements and supplies. He now provided against this by remitting large sums to Rome, and establishing ample magazines of grain and military stores there, under the direction of commissaries for the maintenance of the army. He equipped without loss of time a large armament

⁵ Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 55. — Coxe, History of the House of Austria, (London, 1807,) vol. i. chap. 23.

at Genoa, under the marquis of Saluzzo, for the relief of Gaeta, still blockaded by the Spaniards. He obtained a small supply of men from his Italian allies, and subsidized a corps of eight thousand Swiss, the strength of his infantry; while the remainder of his army, comprehending a fine body of cavalry and the most complete train of artillery, probably, in Europe, was drawn from his own dominions. Volunteers of the highest rank pressed forward to serve in an expedition, to which they confidently looked for the vindication of the national honor. The command was intrusted to the maréchal de la Trémouille, esteemed the best general in France; and the whole amount of force, exclusive of that employed permanently in the fleet, is variously computed from twenty to thirty thousand men.⁶

In the month of July, the army was on its march across the broad plains of Lombardy, but, on reaching Parma, the appointed place of rendezvous for the Swiss and Italian mercenaries, was brought to a halt, by tidings of an unlooked-for event, the death of Pope Alexander the Sixth. He expired on the 18th of August, 1503, at the age of seventy-two, the victim, there is very little doubt, of poison

Death of Alexander VI.
1503.

⁶ Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 78. — St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., pp. 173, 174. — Varillas, Hist. de Louis XII., tom. i. pp. 386, 387. — Mémoires de la Trémouille, chap. 19, apud Petitot, Collection des Mémoires, tom. xiv. — Muratori, Annali d'Italia, tom. xiv. anno 1503.

Historians, as usual, differ wide-

ly in their estimates of the French numbers. Guicciardini, whose moderate computation of 20,000 men is usually followed, does not take the trouble to reconcile his sum total with the various estimates given by him in detail, which considerably exceed that amount. Istoria, pp. 308, 309, 312.

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he had prepared for others; thus closing an infamous life by a death equally infamous. He was a man of undoubted talent, and uncommon energy of character. But his powers were perverted to the worst purposes, and his gross vices were unredeemed, if we are to credit the report of his most respectable contemporaries, by a single virtue. In him the papacy reached its lowest degradation. His pontificate, however, was not without its use; since that Providence, which still educes good from evil, made the scandal, which it occasioned to the Christian world, a principal spring of the glorious Reformation.⁷

The death of this pontiff occasioned no particular disquietude at the Spanish court, where his immoral life had been viewed with undisguised reprobation, and made the subject of more than one pressing remonstrance, as we have already seen. His public course had been as little to its satisfaction; since, although a Spaniard by birth, being a native of Valencia, he had placed himself almost

⁷ Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 81. — Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, lib. 6.

The little ceremony with which Alexander's remains were treated, while yet scarcely cold, is the best commentary on the general detestation in which he was held. "Lorsque Alexandre," says the pope's *maître des cérémonies*, "rendit le dernier soupir, il n'y avait dans sa chambre que l'évêque de Rieti, le dataire et quelques palefreniers. Cette chambre fut aussitôt pillée. La face du cadavre devint noire; la langue s'enfla au point qu'elle remplissait la bouche

qui resta ouverte. La bière dans laquelle il fallait mettre le corps se trouva trop petite; on l'y enfonça à coups de poings. Les restes du pape insultés par ses domestiques furent portés dans l'église de St. Pierre, sans être accompagnés de prêtres ni de torches, et on les plaça en dedans de la grille du chœur pour les dérober aux outrages de la populace." Notice de Burchard, apud Brequigny, Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi, (Paris, 1787-1818,) tom. i. p. 120.

wholly at the disposal of Louis the Twelfth, in return for the countenance afforded by that monarch to the iniquitous schemes of his son, Cæsar Borgia.

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The pope's death was attended with important consequences on the movements of the French. Louis's favorite minister, Cardinal D'Amboise, had long looked to this event as opening to him the succession to the tiara. He now hastened to Italy, therefore, with his master's approbation, proposing to enforce his pretensions by the presence of the French army, placed, as it would seem, with this view at his disposal.

Electioneer-
ing intrigues.

The army, accordingly, was ordered to advance towards Rome, and halt within a few miles of its gates. The conclave of cardinals, then convened to supply the vacancy in the pontificate, were filled with indignation at this attempt to overawe their election; and the citizens beheld with anxiety the encampment of this formidable force under their walls, anticipating some counteracting movement on the part of the Great Captain, which might involve their capital, already in a state of anarchy, in all the horrors of war. Gonsalvo, indeed, had sent forward a detachment of between two and three thousand men, under Mendoza and Fabrizio Colonna, who posted themselves in the neighbourhood of the city, where they could observe the movements of the enemy.⁸

At length Cardinal D'Amboise, yielding to pub-

⁸ Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 82. — Ammirato, Istorie, Fiorentine, tom. iii. lib. 28. — Zurita, Anales, tom. Roma, Let. 1, 3, et al. — Bembo, v. lib. 5, cap. 47. — Istoria Viniziana, tom. iii. lib. 6. —

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lic feeling, and the representations of pretended friends, consented to the removal of the French forces from the neighbourhood, and trusted for success to his personal influence. He over-estimated its weight. It is foreign to our purpose to detail the proceedings of the reverend body, thus convened to supply the chair of St. Peter. They are displayed at full length by the Italian writers, and must be allowed to form a most edifying chapter in ecclesiastical history.⁹ It is enough to state, that, on the departure of the French, the suffrages of the conclave fell on an Italian, who assumed the name of Pius the Third, and who justified the policy of the choice by dying in less time than his best friends had anticipated; — within a month after his elevation.¹⁰

Sept. 22.

Julius II.
Oct. 31.

The new vacancy was at once supplied by the election of Julius the Second, the belligerent pontiff who made his tiara a helmet, and his crosier a sword. It is remarkable, that, while his fierce, inexorable temper left him with scarcely a personal friend, he came to the throne by the united suffrages of each of the rival factions, of France, Spain, and, above all, Venice, whose ruin in return he made the great business of his restless pontificate.¹¹

⁹ Guicciardini, in particular, has related them with a circumstantiality which could scarcely have been exceeded by one of the conclave itself. *Istoria*, lib. 6, pp. 316–318.

¹⁰ Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, lib. 6. — *Ammirato*, *Istorie Fiorentine*, tom. iii. lib. 28.

The election of Pius was extremely grateful to queen Isabella,

who caused Te Deums and thanksgivings to be celebrated in the churches, for the appointment of “so worthy a pastor over the Christian fold.” See Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 265.

¹¹ Machiavelli, *Legazione Prima a Roma*, let. 6. — Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, lib. 7.

No sooner had the game, into which Cardinal D'Amboise had entered with such prospects of success, been snatched from his grasp by the superior address of his Italian rivals, and the election of Pius the Third been publicly announced, than the French army was permitted to resume its march on Naples, after the loss, — an irreparable loss, — of more than a month. A still greater misfortune had befallen it, in the mean time, in the illness of Trémouille, its chief; which compelled him to resign the command into the hands of the marquis of Mantua, an Italian nobleman, who held the second station in the army. He was a man of some military experience, having fought in the Venetian service, and led the allied forces, with doubtful credit indeed, against Charles the Eighth at the battle of Fornovo. His elevation was more acceptable to his own countrymen than to the French; and in truth, however competent to ordinary exigencies, he was altogether unequal to the present, in which he was compelled to measure his genius with that of the greatest captain of the age.¹²

The Spanish commander, in the mean while, was detained before the strong post of Gaeta, into which Ives d'Allègre had thrown himself, as already noticed, with the fugitives from the field of Cerignola, where he had been subsequently reinforced by four thousand additional troops under the marquis of Saluzzo. From these circumstances,

Gonsalvo
repulsed be-
fore Gaeta.

¹² Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. pp. 435-438. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 6, p. 316. — Buonacorsi, *Diario*, p. 83. — St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.*, p. 173.

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as well as the great strength of the place, Gonsalvo experienced an opposition, to which, of late, he had been wholly unaccustomed. His exposed situation in the plains, under the guns of the city, occasioned the loss of many of his best men, and, among others, that of his friend Don Hugo de Cardona, one of the late victors at Seminara, who was shot down at his side, while conversing with him. At length, after a desperate but ineffectual attempt to extricate himself from his perilous position, by forcing the neighbouring eminence of Mount Orlando, he was compelled to retire to a greater distance, and draw off his army to the adjacent village of Castellone, which may call up more agreeable associations in the reader's mind, as the site of the Villa Formiana of Cicero.¹³ At this place he was still occupied with the blockade of Gaeta, when he received intelligence, that the French had crossed the Tiber, and were in full march against him.¹⁴

Strength of
his forces.

While Gonsalvo lay before Gaeta, he had been intent on collecting such reinforcements as he could from every quarter. The Neapolitan division under Navarro had already joined him, as well as the victorious legions of Andrada from Calabria. His strength was further augmented by the arrival of between two and three thousand troops, Span-

¹³ Cicero's country seat stood midway between Gaeta and Mola, the ancient Formiæ, about two miles and a half from each. (Cluverius, *Ital. Antiq.*, lib. 3, cap. 6.) The remains of his mansion and of his mausoleum may still be discerned, on the borders of the old

Appian way, by the classical and credulous tourist.

¹⁴ *Giovo, Vita Illust. Virorum*, fol. 258, 259. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 2, cap. 95. — *Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V.*, fol. 19. — *Peter Martyr, Opus Epist.*, epist. 261.

ish, German, and Italian, which the Castilian minister, Francisco de Roxas, had levied in Rome; and he was in daily hopes of a more important accession from the same quarter, through the good offices of the Venetian ambassador. Lastly, he had obtained some additional recruits, and a remittance of a considerable sum of money, in a fleet of Catalan ships lately arrived from Spain. With all this, however, a heavy amount of arrears remained due to his troops. In point of numbers he was still far inferior to the enemy; no computation swelling them higher than three thousand horse, two of them light cavalry, and nine thousand foot. The strength of his army lay in his Spanish infantry, on whose thorough discipline, steady nerve, and strong attachment to his person, he felt he might confidently rely. In cavalry, and still more in artillery, he was far below the French, which, together with his great numerical inferiority, made it impossible for him to keep the open country. His only resource was to get possession of some pass or strong position, which lay in their route, where he might detain them, till the arrival of further reinforcements should enable him to face them on more equal terms. The deep stream of the Garigliano presented such a line of defence as he wanted.¹⁵

¹⁵ Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 33, 43, 44, 48, 57. — *Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 258, 259. — *Sismondi, Hist. des Français*, tom. xv. p. 417. — *Garibay, Compendio*, tom. ii.

lib. 19, cap. 16. — *Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. pp. 252–257. — *Mariana, Hist. de España*, lib. 26, cap. 5.

The Castilian writers do not state the sum total of the Spanish force,

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San Ger-
mano.

On the 6th of October, therefore, the Great Captain broke up his camp at Castellone, and, abandoning the whole region north of the Garigliano to the enemy, struck into the interior of the country, and took post at San Germano, a strong place on the other side of the river, covered by the two fortresses of Monte Casino¹⁶ and Rocca Secca. Into this last he threw a body of determined men under Villalba, and waited calmly the approach of the enemy.

It was not long before the columns of the latter were descried in full march on Ponte Corvo, at a few miles' distance only on the opposite side of the Garigliano. After a brief halt there, they traversed the bridge before that place, and advanced confidently forward in the expectation of encountering little resistance from a foe so much their inferior. In this they were mistaken; the garrison of Rocca Secca, against which they directed their arms, handled them so roughly, that, after in vain endeavouring to carry the place in two desperate assaults, the Marquis of Mantua resolved to abandon the attempt altogether, and, recrossing the river, to seek a more practicable point for his purpose lower down.¹⁷

which is to be inferred only from the scattered estimates, careless and contradictory as usual, of the various detachments which joined it.

¹⁶ The Spaniards carried Monte Casino by storm, and with sacrilegious violence plundered the Benedictine monastery of all its costly plate. They were compelled, however, to respect the bones of the

martyrs, and other saintly relics; a division of spoil probably not entirely satisfactory to its reverend inmates. Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonzalvi*, fol. 262.

¹⁷ *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 2, cap. 102. — Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, fol. 21. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 6, pp. 326, 327. — Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist.

Keeping along the right bank, therefore, to the southeast of the mountains of Fondi, he descended nearly to the mouth of the Garigliano, the site, as commonly supposed, of the ancient Minturnæ.¹⁸

The place was covered by a fortress called the Tower of the Garigliano, occupied by a small Spanish garrison, who made some resistance, but surrendered on being permitted to march out with the honors of war. On rejoining their countrymen under Gonsalvo, the latter were so much incensed that the garrison should have yielded on any terms, instead of dying on their posts, that, falling on them with their pikes, they massacred them all to a man. Gonsalvo did not think proper to punish this outrage, which, however shocking to his own feelings, indicated a desperate tone of resolution, which he felt he should have occasion to tax to the utmost in the present exigency.¹⁹

The ground now occupied by the armies was low and swampy, a character which it possessed in ancient times; the marshes on the southern side being supposed to be the same in which Marius concealed himself from his enemies during his proscription.²⁰

267.—Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 188.

¹⁸ The remains of this city, which stood about four miles above the mouth of the Liris, are still to be seen on the right of the road. In ancient days it was of sufficient magnitude to cover both sides of the river. See Strabo, Geographia, lib. 5, p. 233, (Paris, 1629, with Casaubon's notes,) p. 110.

¹⁹ Crónica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 107.—Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, fol. 263.

²⁰ The marshes of Minturnæ lay between the city and the mouth of the Liris. (Cluverius, Ital. Antiq. lib. 3, cap. 10, sec. 9.) The Spanish army encamped, says Guicciardini, "in a place called by Livy from its vicinity to Sessa, *aque Sinuessane*, being perhaps the marshes in which Marius hid himself." (Istoria, lib. 6.) The historian makes two blunders in a breath. 1st. *Aque Sinuessane* was a name derived not from Sessa, the ancient Suessa Aurunca, but from the ad-

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Its natural humidity was greatly increased, at this time, by the excessive rains, which began earlier and with much more violence than usual. The French position was neither so low, nor so wet as that of the Spaniards. It had the advantage, moreover, of being supported by a well-peopled and friendly country in the rear, where lay the large towns of Fondi, Itri, and Gaeta; while their fleet, under the admiral Préjan, which rode at anchor in the mouth of the Garigliano, might be of essential service in the passage of the river.

In order to effect this, the marquis of Mantua prepared to throw a bridge across, at a point not far from Trajetto. He succeeded in it, notwithstanding the swollen and troubled condition of the waters,²¹ in a few days, under cover of the artillery, which he had planted on the bank of the river, and which from its greater elevation entirely commanded the opposite shore.

Passage of
the bridge.

The bridge was constructed of boats belonging to the fleet, strongly secured together and covered with planks. The work being completed, on the

jacent Sinnessa, a town about ten miles southeast of Minturnæ. (Comp. Livy, lib. 22, cap. 14, and Strabo, lib. 5, p. 233.) 2d. The name did not indicate marshes, but natural hot springs, particularly noted for their salubrity. "Salubritate harum aquarum," says Tacitus in allusion to them (Annales, lib. 12), and Pliny notices their medicinal properties more explicitly. Hist. Naturalis, lib. 31, cap. 2.

²¹ This does not accord with Horace's character of the Garigliano, the ancient Liris, as the "taciturnus amnis," (Carm. lib. i. 30),

and still less with that of Silius Italicus,

"Liris . . . qui fonte quieto
Dissimulat cursum, et nullo mutabilis
imbre
Perstringit tacitas gemmanti gurgite ripas."

Punica, lib. 4.

Indeed, the stream exhibits at the present day the same soft and tranquil aspect celebrated by the Roman poets. Its natural character, however, was entirely changed at the period before us, in consequence of the unexampled heaviness and duration of the autumnal rains.

6th of November the army advanced upon the bridge, supported by such a lively cannonade from the batteries along the shore, as made all resistance on the part of the Spaniards ineffectual. The impetuosity with which the French rushed forward was such, as to drive back the advanced guard of their enemy, which, giving way in disorder, retreated on the main body. Before the confusion could extend further, Gonsalvo, mounted *à la ginete*, in the manner of the light cavalry, rode through the broken ranks, and rallying the fugitives, quickly brought them to order. Navarro and Andrada, at the same time, led up the Spanish infantry, and the whole column charging furiously against the French, compelled them to falter, and at length to fall back on the bridge.

The struggle now became desperate, officers and soldiers, horse and foot, mingling together, and fighting hand to hand, with all the ferocity kindled by close personal combat. Some were trodden under the feet of the cavalry, many more were forced from the bridge, and the waters of the Garigliano were covered with men and horses, borne down by the current, and struggling in vain to gain the shore. It was a contest of mere bodily strength and courage, in which skill and superior tactics were of little avail. Among those who most distinguished themselves, the name of the noble Italian, Fabrizio Colonna, is particularly mentioned. An heroic action is recorded also of a person of inferior rank, a Spanish *alferez*, or standard-bearer, named Illescas. The right hand of this man was shot away by a cannon-

Desperate
resistance.

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ball. As a comrade was raising up the fallen colors, the gallant ensign resolutely grasped them, exclaiming that "he had one hand still left." At the same time, muffling a scarf round the bleeding stump, he took his place in the ranks as before. This brave deed did not go unrewarded, and a liberal pension was settled on him, at Gonsalvo's instance.

During the heat of the *mêlée*, the guns on the French shore had been entirely silent, since they could not be worked without doing as much mischief to their own men as to the Spaniards, with whom they were closely mingled. But, as the French gradually recoiled before their impetuous adversaries, fresh bodies of the latter rushing forward to support their advance necessarily exposed a considerable length of column to the range of the French guns, which opened a galling fire on the further extremity of the bridge. The Spaniards, notwithstanding "they threw themselves into the face of the cannon," as the marquis of Mantua exclaimed, "with as much unconcern as if their bodies had been made of air instead of flesh and blood," found themselves so much distressed by this terrible fire, that they were compelled to fall back; and the van, thus left without support, at length retreated in turn, abandoning the bridge to the enemy.²²

²² Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 188. — Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 14. — Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16. — Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 269. — Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 262-264. — Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 22. — Machiavelli, Legazione Prima a Roma, let. 11, Nov. 10. — let. 16, Nov. 13. — let. 17. — Chronica del Gran Capitan, lib. 2, cap. 106. — Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. pp. 440, 441.

This action was one of the severest which occurred in these wars. Don Hugo de Moncada, the veteran of many a fight by land and sea, told Paolo Giovio, that "he had never felt himself in such imminent peril in any of his battles, as in this."²³ The French, notwithstanding they remained masters of the contested bridge, had met with a resistance, which greatly discouraged them; and, instead of attempting to push their success further, retired that same evening to their quarters on the other side of the river. The tempestuous weather, which continued with unabated fury, had now broken up the roads, and converted the soil into a morass, nearly impracticable for the movements of horse, and quite so for those of artillery, on which the French chiefly relied; while it interposed comparatively slight obstacles to the manœuvres of infantry, which constituted the strength of the Spaniards. From a consideration of these circumstances, the French commander resolved not to resume active operations, till a change of weather, by restoring the roads, should enable him to do so with advantage. Meanwhile he constructed a redoubt on the Spanish extremity of the bridge, and threw a body of troops into it, in order to command the pass, whenever he should be disposed to use it.²⁴

While the hostile armies thus lay facing each other, the eyes of all Italy were turned to them, in

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The French resume their quarters.

Anxious expectation of Italy.

²³ Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 264.

²⁴ Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 6, pp. 327, 328. — Giovio, *Vitæ Il-*

lust. Virorum, fol. 262. — Machiavelli, *Legazione Prima a Roma*, let.

29. — Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. pp. 443-445.

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anxious expectation of a battle, which should finally decide the fate of Naples. Expresses were daily despatched from the French camp to Rome, whence the ministers of the different European powers transmitted the tidings to their respective governments. Machiavelli represented at that time the Florentine republic at the papal court, and his correspondence teems with as many floating rumors and speculations as a modern gazette. There were many French residents in the city, with whom the minister was personally acquainted. He frequently notices their opinions on the progress of the war, which they regarded with the most sanguine confidence, as sure to result in the triumph of their own arms, when once fairly brought into collision with the enemy. The calmer and more penetrating eye of the Florentine discerns symptoms in the condition of the two armies of quite a different tendency.²⁵

Gonsalvo
strengthens
his position.

It seemed now obvious, that victory must declare for that party which could best endure the hardships and privations of its present situation. The local position of the Spaniards was far more unfavorable than that of the enemy. The Great Captain, soon after the affair of the bridge, had drawn off his forces to a rising ground about a mile from

²⁵ Legazione Prima a Roma, let. 9, 10, 18.

The French showed the same confidence from the beginning of hostilities. One of that nation having told Suarez, the Castilian minister at Venice, that the marshal de la Trémouille said, "He would

give 20,000 ducats, if he could meet Gonsalvo de Cordova in the plains of Viterbo;" the Spaniard smartly replied, "Nemours would have given twice as much not to have met him at Cerignola." Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 36.

the river, which was crowned by the little hamlet of Cintura, and commanded the route to Naples. In front of his camp he sunk a deep trench, which, in the saturated soil, speedily filled with water; and he garnished it at each extremity with a strong redoubt. Thus securely intrenched, he resolved patiently to await the movements of the enemy.

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The situation of the army, in the mean time, was indeed deplorable. Those who occupied the lower level were up to their knees in mud and water; for the excessive rains, and the inundation of the Garigliano had converted the whole country into a mere quagmire, or rather standing pool. The only way in which the men could secure themselves was by covering the earth as far as possible with boughs and bundles of twigs; and it was altogether uncertain how long even this expedient would serve against the encroaching element. Those on the higher grounds were scarcely in better plight. The driving storms of sleet and rain, which had continued for several weeks without intermission, found their way into every crevice of the flimsy tents and crazy hovels, thatched only with branches of trees, which afforded a temporary shelter to the troops. In addition to these evils, the soldiers were badly fed, from the difficulty of finding resources in the waste and depopulated regions in which they were quartered,²⁶ and badly paid, from the negligence, or

Great distress of the army.

²⁶ This barren tract of uninhabited country must have been of very limited extent; for it lay in the Campania Felix, in the neighbourhood of the cultivated plains of

Sessa, the Massican mountain, and Falernian fields, — names, which call up associations, that must live while good poetry and good wine shall be held in honor.

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perhaps poverty, of King Ferdinand, whose inadequate remittances to his general exposed him, among many other embarrassments, to the imminent hazard of disaffection among the soldiery, especially the foreign mercenaries, which nothing, indeed, but the most delicate and judicious conduct on his part could have averted.²⁷

Gonsalvo's
resolution.

In this difficult crisis, Gonsalvo de Cordova retained all his usual equanimity, and even the cheerfulness, so indispensable in a leader who would infuse heart into his followers. He entered freely into the distresses and personal feelings of his men, and, instead of assuming any exemption from fatigue or suffering on the score of his rank, took his turn in the humblest tour of duty with the meanest of them, mounting guard himself, it is said, on more than one occasion. Above all, he displayed that inflexible constancy, which enables the strong mind in the hour of darkness and peril to buoy up the sinking spirits around it. A remarkable instance of this fixedness of purpose occurred at this time.

Remarkable
instance
of it.

The forlorn condition of the army, and the indefinite prospect of its continuance, raised a natural apprehension in many of the officers, that, if it did not provoke some open act of mutiny, it would in all probability break down the spirits and constitu-

²⁷ Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 28, cap. 5. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 6, p. 323. — Machiavelli, *Legazione Prima a Roma*, let. 44. — Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, fol. 22. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 107, 108. —

The Neapolitan conquests, it will be remembered, were undertaken exclusively for the crown of Aragon, the revenues of which were far more limited than those of Castile.

tion of the soldiers. Several of them, therefore, among the rest Mendoza and the two Colonnas, waited on the commander-in-chief, and, after stating their fears without reserve, besought him to remove the camp to Capua, where the troops might find healthy and commodious quarters, at least until the severity of the season was mitigated; before which, they insisted, there was no reason to anticipate any movement on the part of the French. But Gonsalvo felt too deeply the importance of grappling with the enemy, before they should gain the open country, to be willing to trust to any such precarious contingency. Besides, he distrusted the effect of such a retrograde movement on the spirits of his own troops. He had decided on his course after the most mature deliberation; and, having patiently heard his officers to the end, replied in these few but memorable words; "It is indispensable to the public service to maintain our present position; and be assured, I would sooner march forward two steps, though it should bring me to my grave, than fall back one, to gain a hundred years." The decided tone of the reply, relieved him from further importunity.²⁸

There is no act of Gonsalvo's life, which on the whole displays more strikingly the strength of his character. When thus witnessing his faithful followers drooping and dying around him, with the consciousness that a word could relieve them from

²⁸ Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS., cap. 188. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 2, cap. 108. — Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 16. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 6, p. 328. — Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 58.