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nibal,<sup>16</sup> in a battle, which, though fought with far greater numbers, was not so decisive in its consequences as that which the same scenes were to witness in a few hours. The coincidence is certainly singular; and one might almost fancy that the actors in these fearful tragedies, unwilling to deface the fair haunts of civilization, had purposely sought a more fitting theatre in this obscure and sequestered region.

Distress of  
the troops.

The weather, although only at the latter end of April, was extremely sultry; the troops, notwithstanding Gonsalvo's orders on crossing the river Ofanto, the ancient Aufidus, had failed to supply themselves with sufficient water for the march; parched with heat and dust, they were soon distressed by excessive thirst; and, as the burning rays of the noontide sun beat fiercely on their heads, many of them, especially those cased in heavy armour, sunk down on the road, fainting with exhaustion and fatigue. Gonsalvo was seen in every quarter, administering to the necessities of his men, and striving to reanimate their drooping

<sup>16</sup> Neither Polybius (lib. 3, sec. 24, et seq.), nor Livy (Hist. lib. 22, cap. 43-50.), who give the most circumstantial narratives of the battle, are precise enough to enable us to ascertain the exact spot in which it was fought. Strabo, in his topographical notices of this part of Italy, briefly alludes to "the affair of Cannæ" (*τὰ πρὸς Κάννας*), without any description of the scene of action. (Geog., lib. 6, p. 285.) Cluverius fixes the site of the ancient Cannæ on the right bank of

the Aufidus, the modern Ofanto, between three and four miles below Canusium; and notices the modern hamlet of nearly the same name, Canne, where common tradition recognises the ruins of the ancient town. (Italia Antiqua, lib. 4, cap. 12, sec. 8.) D'Anville makes no difficulty in identifying these two, (Géographie Ancienne, Abrégée, tom. i. p. 208.) having laid down the ancient town in his maps in the direct line, and about midway, between Barleta and Cerignola.

spirits. At length, to relieve them, he commanded that each trooper should take one of the infantry on his crupper, setting the example himself by mounting a German ensign behind him on his own horse.

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In this way, the whole army arrived early in the afternoon before Cerignola, a small town on an eminence about sixteen miles from Barleta, where the nature of the ground afforded the Spanish general a favorable position for his camp. The sloping sides of the hill were covered with vineyards, and its base was protected by a ditch of considerable depth. Gonsalvo saw at once the advantages of the ground. His men were jaded by the march; but there was no time to lose, as the French, who, on his departure from Barleta, had been drawn up under the walls of Canosa, were now rapidly advancing. All hands were put in requisition, therefore, for widening the trench, in which they planted sharp-pointed stakes; while the earth which they excavated enabled them to throw up a parapet of considerable height on the side next the town. On this rampart he mounted his little train of artillery, consisting of thirteen guns, and behind it drew up his forces in order of battle.<sup>17</sup>

Encamps before Cerignola.

<sup>17</sup> Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 253-255. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 5, p. 303. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 75, 76. — Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 27. — Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 256. — Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, fol. 16, 17.

Giovio says, that he had heard Fabrizio Colonna remark more than once, in allusion to the intrench-

ments at the base of the hill, "that the victory was owing, not to the skill of the commander, nor the valor of the troops, but to a mound and a ditch." This ancient mode of securing a position, which had fallen into disuse, was revived after this, according to the same author, and came into general practice among the best captains of the age. Ubi supra.

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II.Nemours  
pursues.

Before these movements were completed in the Spanish camp, the bright arms and banners of the French were seen glistening in the distance amid the tall fennel and cane-brakes with which the country was thickly covered. As soon as they had come in view of the Spanish encampment, they were brought to a halt, while a council of war was called, to determine the expediency of giving battle that evening. The duke of Nemours would have deferred it till the following morning, as the day was already far spent, and allowed no time for reconnoitring the position of his enemy. But Ives d'Allègre, Chandieu, the commander of the Swiss, and some other officers, were for immediate action, representing the importance of not balking the impatience of the soldiers, who were all hot for the assault. In the course of the debate, Allègre was so much heated as to throw out some rash taunts on the courage of the viceroy, which the latter would have avenged on the spot, had not his arm been arrested by Louis d'Ars. He had the weakness, however, to suffer them to change his cooler purpose, exclaiming, "We will fight to-night, then; and perhaps those who vaunt the loudest will be found to trust more to their spurs, than their swords;" a prediction bitterly justified by the event.<sup>18</sup>

While this dispute was going on, Gonsalvo gained time for making the necessary disposition of his

<sup>18</sup> Brantôme, *Cœuvres*, tom. ii. pp. 395, 396.—Gaillard, *Rivalité*, disc. 8.—Garnier, *Histoire de* tom. iv. p. 244.—St. Gelais, *Hist. France*, (Paris, 1783-8,) tom. v. de Louys XII., p. 171.

troops. In the centre he placed his German auxiliaries, armed with their long pikes, and on each wing the Spanish infantry under the command of Pedro Navarro, Diego de Paredes, Pizarro, and other illustrious captains. The defence of the artillery was committed to the left wing. A considerable body of men-at-arms, including those recently equipped from the spoils of Ruvo, was drawn up within the intrenchments, in a quarter affording a convenient opening for a sally, and placed under the orders of Mendoza and Fabrizio Colonna, whose brother Prospero and Pedro de la Paz took charge of the light cavalry, which was posted without the lines to annoy the advance of the enemy, and act on any point, as occasion might require. Having completed his preparations, the Spanish general coolly waited the assault of the French.

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forces.

The duke of Nemours had marshalled his forces in a very different order. He distributed them into three battles or divisions, stationing his heavy horse, composing altogether, as Gonsalvo declared, "the finest body of cavalry seen for many years in Italy," under the command of Louis d'Ars, on the right. The second and centre division, formed somewhat in the rear of the right, was made up of the Swiss and Gascon infantry, headed by the brave Chandieu; and his left, consisting chiefly of his light cavalry, and drawn up, like the last, somewhat in the rear of the preceding, was intrusted to Allègre.<sup>19</sup>

The French  
forces.

<sup>19</sup> *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, rorum, fol. 253-255. — *Ulloa, Vi-*  
cap. 76. — *Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Vi-* ta di Carlo V., fol. 17.

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II.Battle of  
Cerignola.1503.  
April 28.

It was within half an hour of sunset when the duke de Nemours gave orders for the attack, and, putting himself at the head of the gendarmerie on the right, spurred at full gallop against the Spanish left. The hostile armies were nearly equal, amounting to between six and seven thousand men each. The French were superior in the number and condition of their cavalry, rising to a third of their whole force; while Gonsalvo's strength lay chiefly in his infantry, which had acquired a lesson of tactics under him, that raised it to a level with the best in Europe.

As the French advanced, the guns on the Spanish left poured a lively fire into their ranks, when a spark accidentally communicating with the magazine of powder, the whole blew up with a tremendous explosion. The Spaniards were filled with consternation; but Gonsalvo, converting the misfortune into a lucky omen, called out, "Courage, soldiers, these are the beacon lights of victory! We have no need of our guns at close quarters."

Death of  
Nemours.

In the mean time, the French van under Nemours, advancing rapidly under the dark clouds of smoke, which rolled heavily over the field, were unexpectedly brought up by the deep trench, of whose existence they were unapprized. Some of the horse were precipitated into it, and all received a sudden check, until Nemours, finding it impossible to force the works in this quarter, rode along their front in search of some practicable passage. In doing this, he necessarily exposed his flank to the fatal aim of the Spanish arquebusiers. A shot

from one of them took effect on the unfortunate young nobleman, and he fell mortally wounded from his saddle.

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At this juncture, the Swiss and Gascon infantry, briskly moving up to second the attack of the now disordered horse, arrived before the intrenchments. Undismayed by this formidable barrier, their commander, Chandieu, made the most desperate attempts to force a passage; but the loose earth freshly turned up afforded no hold to the feet, and his men were compelled to recoil from the dense array of German pikes, which bristled over the summit of the breast-work. Chandieu, their leader, made every effort to rally and bring them back to the charge; but, in the act of doing this, was hit by a ball, which stretched him lifeless in the ditch; his burnished arms, and the snow-white plumes above his helmet, making him a conspicuous mark for the enemy.

All was now confusion. The Spanish arquebusiers, screened by their defences, poured a galling fire into the dense masses of the enemy, who were mingled together indiscriminately, horse and foot, while, the leaders being down, no one seemed capable of bringing them to order. At this critical moment, Gonsalvo, whose eagle eye took in the whole operations of the field, ordered a general charge along the line; and the Spaniards leaping their intrenchments, descended with the fury of an avalanche on their foes, whose wavering columns, completely broken by the violence of the shock, were seized with a panic, and fled, scarcely offering

Rout of the  
French.

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any resistance. Louis d'Ars, at the head of such of the men-at-arms as could follow him, went off in one direction, and Ives d'Allègre, with his light cavalry, which had hardly come into action, in another; thus fully verifying the ominous prediction of his commander. The slaughter fell most heavily on the Swiss and Gascon foot, whom the cavalry under Mendoza and Pedro de la Paz rode down and cut to pieces without sparing, till the shades of evening shielded them at length from their pitiless pursuers.<sup>20</sup>

Prospero Colonna pushed on to the French encampment, where he found the tables in the duke's tent spread for his evening repast; of which the Italian general and his followers did not fail to make good account. A trifling incident, that well illustrates the sudden reverses of war.

The Great Captain passed the night on the field of battle, which, on the following morning, presented a ghastly spectacle of the dying and the dead. More than three thousand French are computed by the best accounts to have fallen. The loss of the Spaniards, covered as they were by their defences, was inconsiderable.<sup>21</sup> All the enemy's

<sup>20</sup> *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 75. — *Garnier, Hist. de France*, tom. v. pp. 396, 397. — *Fleurange, Mémoires*, chap. 5, apud *Petitot, Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xvi. — *Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, ubi sup. — *Guicciardini, Istoria*, tom. i. pp. 303, 304. — *St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII.*, pp. 171, 172. — *Brantôme, Œuvres*, tom. ii. disc. 8.

<sup>21</sup> *Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 255. — *Garibay, Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 15. — *Bernal-*

*dez, Reyes Católicos, MS.*, cap. 180. — *Peter Martyr, Opus Epist.*, epist. 256. — *Fleurange, Mémoires*, chap. 5.

No account, that I know of, places the French loss so low as 3,000; *Garibay* raises it to 4,500, and the French *maréchal de Fleurange* rates that of the Swiss alone at 5,000; a round exaggeration, not readily accounted for, as he had undoubted access to the best means of information. The Spaniards

artillery, consisting of thirteen pieces, his baggage, and most of his colors fell into their hands. Never was there a more complete victory, achieved too within the space of little more than an hour. The body of the unfortunate Nemours, which was recognised by one of his pages from the rings on the fingers, was found under a heap of slain, much disfigured. It appeared that he had received three several wounds, disproving, if need were, by his honorable death the injurious taunts of Allègre. Gonsalvo was affected even to tears at beholding the mutilated remains of his young and gallant adversary, who, whatever judgment may be formed of his capacity as a leader, was allowed to have all the qualities which belong to a true knight. With him perished the last scion of the illustrious house of Armagnac. Gonsalvo ordered his remains to be conveyed to Barleta, where they were laid in the cemetery of the convent of St. Francis, with all the honors due to his high station.<sup>22</sup>

The Spanish commander lost no time in following up his blow, well aware that it is quite as difficult to improve a victory as to win one. The French had rushed into battle with too much precipitation

Pursuit of  
the enemy.

were too well screened to sustain much injury, and no estimate makes it more than a hundred killed, and some considerably less. The odds are indeed startling, but not impossible; as the Spaniards were not much exposed by personal collision with the enemy, until the latter were thrown into too much disorder to think of any thing but escape. The more than usual confusion and discrepancy in the vari-

ous statements of the particulars of this action may probably be attributed to the lateness of the hour, and consequently imperfect light, in which it was fought.

<sup>22</sup> Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. p. 277. — Giovio, *Vite Illust. Virorum*, fol. 255. — Ferreras, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. pp. 248, 249. — Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, fol. 17. — Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS., cap. 181.



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to agree on any plan of operations, or any point on which to rally in case of defeat. They accordingly scattered in different directions, and Pedro de la Paz was despatched in pursuit of Louis d'Ars, who threw himself into Venosa,<sup>23</sup> where he kept the enemy at bay for many months longer. Paredes kept close on the scent of Allègre, who, finding the gates shut against him wherever he passed, at length took shelter in Gaeta on the extreme point of the Neapolitan territory. There he endeavoured to rally the scattered relics of the field of Cerignola, and to establish a strong position, from which the French, when strengthened by fresh supplies from home, might recommence operations for the recovery of the kingdom.

The day after the battle of Cerignola the Spaniards received tidings of another victory, scarcely less important, gained over the French in Calabria, the preceding week.<sup>24</sup> The army sent out under Portocarrero had reached that coast early in March; but, soon after its arrival, its gallant commander fell ill and died.<sup>25</sup> The dying general named Don Fer-

<sup>23</sup> It was to this same city of Venusium that the rash and unfortunate Varro made his retreat, some seventeen centuries before, from the bloody field of Cannæ. Liv. Hist. lib. 22, cap. 49.

<sup>24</sup> Giovio Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 255. — Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 256. — Crónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 80.

Friday, says Guicciardini, alluding no doubt to Columbus's discoveries, as well as these two victories, was observed to be a lucky day to the Spaniards; according to

Gaillard, it was regarded from this time by the French with more superstitious dread than ever. Istoria, tom. i. p. 304. — Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 348.

<sup>25</sup> Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 8, 24. — Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 250.

The reader may perhaps recollect the distinguished part played in the Moorish war by Luis Portocarrero, lord of Palma. He was of noble Italian origin, being descended from the ancient Genoese

D'Aubigny  
defeated.

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nando de Andrada as his successor; and this officer, combining his forces with those before in the country under Cardona and Benavides, encountered the French commander D'Aubigny in a pitched battle, not far from Seminara, on Friday, the 21st of April. It was near the same spot on which the latter had twice beaten the Spaniards. But the star of France was on the wane; and the gallant old officer had the mortification to see his little corps of veterans completely routed after a sharp engagement of less than an hour, while he himself was retrieved with difficulty from the hands of the enemy by the valor of his Scottish guard.<sup>26</sup>

Submission  
of Naples.

The Great Captain and his army, highly elated with the news of this fortunate event, which annihilated the French power in Calabria, began their march on Naples; Fabrizio Colonna having been first detached into the Abruzzi to receive the submission of the people in that quarter. The tidings of the victory had spread far and wide; and, as Gonsalvo's army advanced, they beheld the ensigns of Aragon floating from the battlements of the towns upon their route, while the inhabitants came forth to greet the conqueror, eager to testify their

house of Boccanegra. The Great Captain and he had married sisters; and this connexion probably recommended him, as much as his military talents, to the Calabrian command, which it was highly important should be intrusted to one, who would maintain a good understanding with the commander-in-chief; a thing not easy to secure among the haughty nobility of Castile.

<sup>26</sup> Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 255. — Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 256. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 80. — Varillas, *Histoire de Louis XII.* (Paris, 1688,) tom. i. pp. 289–292.

See the account of D'Aubigny's victories at Seminara, in Part II. Chapters 2 and 11, of this History.

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devotion to the Spanish cause. The army halted at Benevento; and the general sent his summons to the city of Naples, inviting it in the most courteous terms to resume its ancient allegiance to the legitimate branch of Aragon. It was hardly to be expected, that the allegiance of a people, who had so long seen their country set up as a mere stake for political gamblers, should sit very closely upon them, or that they should care to peril their lives on the transfer of a crown, which had shifted on the heads of half a dozen proprietors in as many successive years.<sup>27</sup> With the same ductile enthusiasm, therefore, with which they greeted the accession of Charles the Eighth or Louis the Twelfth, they now welcomed the restoration of the ancient dynasty of Aragon; and deputies from the principal nobility and citizens waited on the Great Captain at Acerra, where they tendered him the keys of the city, and requested the confirmation of their rights and privileges.

Triumphant  
entry of Gon-  
salvo.

Gonsalvo, having promised this in the name of his royal master, on the following morning, the 14th of May, 1503, made his entrance in great state into the capital, leaving his army without the walls. He was escorted by the military of the city under a royal canopy borne by the deputies. The streets were strewed with flowers, the edifices dec-

<sup>27</sup> Since 1494 the sceptre of Naples had passed into the hands of no less than seven princes, Ferdinand I., Alfonso II., Ferdinand II., Charles VIII., Frederic III., Louis

XII., Ferdinand the Catholic. No private estate in the kingdom in the same time had probably changed masters half so often.

orated with appropriate emblems and devices, and wreathed with banners emblazoned with the united arms of Aragon and Naples. As he passed along, the city rung with the acclamations of countless multitudes who thronged the streets; while every window and housetop was filled with spectators, eager to behold the man, who, with scarcely any other resources than those of his own genius, had so long defied, and at length completely foiled the power of France.

On the following day a deputation of the nobility and people waited on the Great Captain at his quarters, and tendered him the usual oaths of allegiance for his master, King Ferdinand, whose accession finally closed the series of revolutions which had so long agitated this unhappy country.<sup>28</sup>

The city of Naples was commanded by two strong fortresses still held by the French, which, being well victualled and supplied with ammunition, showed no disposition to surrender. The Great Captain determined, therefore, to reserve a small corps for their reduction, while he sent forward the main body of his army to besiege Gaeta. But the Spanish infantry refused to march until the heavy arrears, suffered to accumulate through the negligence of the Government, were discharged; and Gonsalvo, afraid of awakening the mutinous spirit which he had once found it so difficult to quell, was

Fortresses  
of Naples.

<sup>28</sup> Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. p. 304. — Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 4. — Ferreras, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. p. 250. — Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii. pp. 552, 553. — Muratori, *Annali d'Italia*, tom. xiv. p. 40. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 81. — Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, fol. 18.

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obliged to content himself with sending forward his cavalry and German levies, and to permit the infantry to take up its quarters in the capital, under strict orders to respect the persons and property of the citizens.

He now lost no time in pressing the siege of the French fortresses, whose impregnable situation might have derided the efforts of the most formidable enemy in the ancient state of military science. But the reduction of these places was intrusted to Pedro Navarro, the celebrated engineer, whose improvements in the art of mining have gained him the popular reputation of being its inventor, and who displayed such unprecedented skill on this occasion, as makes it a memorable epoch in the annals of war.<sup>29</sup>

Under his directions, the small tower of St. Vincenzo having been first carried by a furious cannonade, a mine was run under the outer defences of the great fortress called Castel Nuovo. On the 21st of May, the mine was sprung; a passage was opened over the prostrate ramparts, and the assailants, rushing in with Gonsalvo and Navarro at their head, before the garrison had time to secure the drawbridge, applied their ladders to the walls of the castle and succeeded in carrying the place by escalade, after a desperate struggle, in

<sup>29</sup> The Italians, in their admiration of Pedro Navarro, caused medals to be struck, on which the invention of mines was ascribed to him. (Marini, apud Daru, Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. p. 351.) Although not actually the inventor,

his glory was scarcely less, since he was the first who discovered the extensive and formidable uses to which they might be applied in the science of destruction. See Part I. Chapter 13, note 23, of this History.

Castel Nuovo  
stormed.

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which the greater part of the French were slaughtered. An immense booty was found in the castle. The Angevin party had made it a place of deposit for their most valuable effects, gold, jewels, plate, and other treasures, which, together with its well-stored magazines of grain and ammunition, became the indiscriminate spoil of the victors. As some of these, however, complained of not getting their share of the plunder, Gonsalvo, giving full scope in the exultation of the moment to military license, called out gayly, "Make amends for it, then, by what you can find in my quarters!" The words were not uttered to deaf ears. The mob of soldiery rushed to the splendid palace of the Angevin prince of Salerno, then occupied by the Great Captain, and in a moment its sumptuous furniture, paintings, and other costly decorations, together with the contents of its generous cellar, were seized and appropriated without ceremony by the invaders, who thus indemnified themselves at their general's expense for the remissness of government.

After some weeks of protracted operations, the remaining fortress, Castel d' Uovo, as it was called, opened its gates to Navarro; and a French fleet, coming into the harbour, had the mortification to find itself fired on from the walls of the place it was intended to relieve. Before this event, Gonsalvo, having obtained funds from Spain for paying off his men, quitted the capital and directed his march on Gaeta. The important results of his victories were now fully disclosed. D'Aubigny, with the wreck of the forces escaped from Seminara, had

Nearly all  
the kingdom  
reduced.

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surrendered. The two Abruzzi, the Capitanate, all the Basilicate, except Venosa, still held by Louis d'Ars, and indeed every considerable place in the kingdom, had tendered its submission, with the exception of Gaeta. Summoning, therefore, to his aid Andrada, Navarro, and his other officers, the Great Captain resolved to concentrate all his strength on this point, designing to press the siege, and thus exterminate at a blow the feeble remains of the French power in Italy. The enterprise was attended with more difficulty than he had anticipated.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 30, 31, 34, 35. — *Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, fol. 255-257. — *Garibay, Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 15. — *Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos*, MS., cap. 183. — *Guicciardini, Istoria*, lib. 6, pp. 307-309. — *Ulloa, Vita di Car-*

*lo V.*, fol. 18, 19. — *Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine*, tom. iii. p. 271. — *Summonte, Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii. p. 554. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 84, 86, 87, 93, 95. — *Sismondi, Hist. des Français*, tom. xv. pp. 407-409.

## CHAPTER XIII.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE. — UNSUCCESSFUL INVASION OF SPAIN. — TRUCE.

1503.

Ferdinand's Policy examined. — First Symptoms of Joanna's Insanity. — Isabella's Distress and Fortitude. — Efforts of France. — Siege of Salsas. — Isabella's Levies. — Ferdinand's Successes. — Reflections on the Campaign.

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Treaty of  
Lyons.

THE events noticed in the preceding chapter glided away as rapidly as the flitting phantoms of a dream. Scarcely had Louis the Twelfth received the unwelcome intelligence of Gonsalvo de Cordova's refusal to obey the mandate of the archduke Philip, before he was astounded with the tidings of the victory of Cerignola, the march on Naples, and the surrender of that capital, as well as of the greater part of the kingdom, following one another in breathless succession. It seemed as if the very means, on which the French king had so confidently relied for calming the tempest, had been the signal for awakening all its fury, and bringing it on his devoted head. Mortified and incensed at being made the dupe of what he deemed a perfidious policy, he demanded an explanation of the archduke, who was still in France. The latter, vehemently protesting his own innocence, felt, or affected to feel so sensibly the ridiculous and, as it



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appeared, dishonorable part played by him in the transaction, that he was thrown into a severe illness, which confined him to his bed for several days.<sup>1</sup> Without delay, he wrote to the Spanish court in terms of bitter expostulation, urging the immediate ratification of the treaty made pursuant to its orders, and an indemnification to France for its subsequent violation. Such is the account given by the French historians.

The Spanish writers, on the other hand, say, that, before the news of Gonsalvo's successes reached Spain, King Ferdinand refused to confirm the treaty sent him by his son-in-law, until it had undergone certain material modifications. If the Spanish monarch hesitated to approve the treaty in the doubtful posture of his affairs, he was little likely to do so, when he had the game entirely in his own hands.<sup>2</sup>

He postponed an answer to Philip's application, willing probably to gain time for the Great Captain to strengthen himself firmly in his recent acquisitions. At length, after a considerable interval, he despatched an embassy to France, announcing his final determination never to ratify a treaty made in contempt of his orders, and so clearly detrimental to his interests. He endeavoured, however, to gain further time by spinning out the negotiation, hold-

<sup>1</sup> St. Gelais seems willing to accept Philip's statement, and to consider the whole affair of the negotiation as "one of Ferdinand's old tricks," "l'ancienne cautele de celuy qui en sçavoit bien faire d'autres." Hist. de Louys XII., p. 172.

<sup>2</sup> Idem, ubi supra. — Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. p. 410. — Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. pp. 238, 239. — Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 23. — Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 15. — Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 233.

ing up for this purpose the prospect of an ultimate accommodation, and suggesting the reestablishment of his kinsman, the unfortunate Frederic, on the Neapolitan throne, as the best means of effecting it. The artifice, however, was too gross even for the credulous Louis; who peremptorily demanded of the ambassadors the instant and absolute ratification of the treaty, and, on their declaring it was beyond their powers, ordered them at once to leave his court. "I had rather," said he, "suffer the loss of a kingdom, which may perhaps be retrieved, than the loss of honor, which never can." A noble sentiment, but falling with no particular grace from the lips of Louis the Twelfth.<sup>3</sup>

The whole of this blind transaction is stated in so irreconcilable a manner by the historians of the different nations, that it is extremely difficult to draw any thing like a probable narrative out of them. The Spanish writers assert that the public commission of the archduke was controlled by strict private instructions;<sup>4</sup> while the French, on the other hand, are either silent as to the latter, or represent them to have been as broad and unlimited

His policy  
examined.

<sup>3</sup> Garnier, Hist. de France, tom. v. p. 388. — Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 3. — Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. p. 300, ed. 1645. — Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 9.

It is amusing to see with what industry certain French writers, as Gaillard and Varillas, are perpetually contrasting the *bonne foi* of Louis XII. with the *méchanceté* of Ferdinand, whose secret intentions,

even, are quoted in evidence of his hypocrisy, while the most objectionable acts of his rival seem to be abundantly compensated by some fine sentiment like that in the text.

<sup>4</sup> Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 10. — Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 2. — Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. pp. 690, 691. — et al.

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as his credentials.<sup>5</sup> If this be true, the negotiations must be admitted to exhibit, on the part of Ferdinand, as gross an example of political jugglery and falsehood, as ever disgraced the annals of diplomacy.<sup>6</sup>

But it is altogether improbable, as I have before remarked, that a monarch so astute and habitually cautious should have intrusted unlimited authority, in so delicate a business, to a person whose discretion, independent of his known partiality for the French monarch, he held so lightly. It is much more likely that he limited, as is often done, the full powers committed to him in public, by private instructions of the most explicit character; and that the archduke was betrayed by his own vanity, and perhaps ambition (for the treaty threw the immediate power into his own hands), into arrangements unwarranted by the tenor of these instructions.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Seyssel, *Hist. de Louys XII.*, p. 61. — St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.*, p. 171. — Gaillard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. p. 239. — Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. p. 387. — D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.*, part. 2, chap. 32.

<sup>6</sup> Varillas regards Philip's mission to France as a *coup de maître* on the part of Ferdinand, who thereby rid himself of a dangerous rival at home, likely to contest his succession to Castile on Isabella's death, while he employed that rival in outwitting Louis XII. by a treaty which he meant to disavow. (*Politique de Ferdinand*, liv. 1, pp. 146 — 150.) The first of these imputations is sufficiently disproved by the fact that Philip quitted Spain in opposition to the pressing remonstrances of the king, queen, and

cortes, and to the general disgust of the whole nation, as is repeatedly stated by Gomez, Martyr, and other contemporaries. The second will be difficult to refute and still harder to prove, as it rests on a man's secret intentions, known only to himself. Such are the flimsy cobwebs of which this political dreamer's theories are made. *Truly chateaux en Espagne.*

<sup>7</sup> Martyr, whose copious correspondence furnishes the most valuable commentary, unquestionably, on the proceedings of this reign, is provokingly reserved in regard to this interesting matter. He contents himself with remarking in one of his letters, that "the Spaniards derided Philip's negotiations as of no consequence, and indeed altogether preposterous, considering

If this were the case, the propriety of Ferdinand's conduct in refusing the ratification depends on the question how far a sovereign is bound by the acts of a plenipotentiary, who departs from his private instructions. Formerly, the question would seem to have been unsettled. Indeed, some of the most respectable writers on public law in the beginning of the seventeenth century maintain, that such a departure would not justify the prince in withholding his ratification; deciding thus, no doubt, on principles of natural equity, which appear to require, that a principal should be held responsible for the acts of an agent, coming within the scope of his powers, though at variance with his secret orders, with which the other contracting party can have no acquaintance or concern.\*

The inconvenience, however, arising from adopting a principle in political negotiations, which must necessarily place the destinies of a whole nation in the hands of a single individual, rash or incompetent, it may be, without the power of interference or supervision on the part of the government, has led to a different conclusion in practice; and it is now generally admitted by European writers, not merely that the exchange of ratifications is essen-

the attitude assumed by the nation at that very time for maintaining its claims by the sword; and he dismisses the subject with a reflection, that seems to rest the merits of the case more on might than right. "Exitus, qui judex est rerum æternus; loquatur. Nostri regno potentiuntur majori ex parte." (Opus Epist., epist. 257.) This reserve of Martyr might be construed unfavorably for Ferdinand, were it not

for the freedom with which he usually criticizes whatever appears really objectionable to him in the measures of the government.

\* Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, lib. 2, cap. 11, sec. 12; lib. 3, cap. 22, sec. 4.—Gentilis, *De Jure Belli*, lib. 3, cap. 14, apud Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Juris Publici*, lib. 2, cap. 7.

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tial to the validity of a treaty, but that a government is not bound to ratify the doings of a minister, who has transcended his private instructions.<sup>9</sup>

But whatever be thought of Ferdinand's good faith in the early stages of this business, there is no doubt that, at a later period, when his position was changed by the success of his arms in Italy, he sought only to amuse the French court with a show of negotiation, in order, as we have already intimated, to paralyze its operations and gain time for securing his conquests. The French writers inveigh loudly against this crafty and treacherous policy; and Louis the Twelfth gave vent to his own indignation in no very measured terms. But, however we may now regard it, it was in perfect accordance with the trickish spirit of the age; and the French king resigned all right of rebuking his antagonist on this score, when he condescended to become a party with him to the infamous partition treaty, and still more when he so grossly violated it. He had voluntarily engaged with his Spanish rival in the game, and it afforded no good ground of complaint, that he was the least adroit of the two.

Joanna's  
desponden-  
cy.

While Ferdinand was thus triumphant in his schemes of foreign policy and conquest, his domestic life was clouded with the deepest anxiety, in consequence of the declining health of the queen,

<sup>9</sup> Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Juris Publici*, lib. 2, cap. 7. — Mably, *Droit Publicque*, chap. 1. — Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. 2, chap. 12. — Martens, *Law of Nations*, trans., book 2, chap. 1.

Bynkershoek, the earliest of these writers, has discussed the question with an amplitude, perspicuity, and fairness, unsurpassed by any who have followed him.

and the eccentric conduct of his daughter, the infant Joana. We have already seen the extravagant fondness with which that princess, notwithstanding her occasional sallies of jealousy, doated on her young and handsome husband.<sup>10</sup> From the hour of his departure she had been plunged in the deepest dejection, sitting day and night with her eyes fixed on the ground, in uninterrupted silence, or broken only by occasional expressions of petulant discontent. She refused all consolation, thinking only of rejoining her absent lord, and "equally regardless," says Martyr, who was then at the court, "of herself, her future subjects, and her afflicted parents."<sup>11</sup>

On the 10th of March, 1503, she was delivered of her second son, who received the baptismal name of Ferdinand, in compliment to his grandfather.<sup>12</sup> No change, however, took place in the mind of the unfortunate mother, who from this time was wholly occupied with the project of returning to Flanders. An invitation to that effect, which she received from her husband in the month of November, determined her to undertake the journey, at all hazards,

<sup>10</sup> Philip is known in history by the title of "the Handsome," implying that he was, at least, quite as remarkable for his personal qualities, as his mental.

<sup>11</sup> Opus Epist., epist. 253. — Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. pp. 235, 238. — Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 44.

<sup>12</sup> Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1503. — Gomez, De Rebus Gestis, fol. 45, 46.

He was born at Alcalá de Henares. Ximenes availed himself

of this circumstance to obtain from Isabella a permanent exemption from taxes for his favorite city, which his princely patronage was fast raising up to contest the palm of literary precedence with Salamanca, the ancient "Athens of Spain." The citizens of the place long preserved, and still preserve, for aught I know, the cradle of the royal infant, in token of their gratitude. Robles, Vida de Ximenez, p. 127.

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notwithstanding the affectionate remonstrances of the queen, who represented the impracticability of traversing France, agitated, as it then was, with all the bustle of warlike preparation, or of venturing by sea at this inclement and stormy season.

First symptoms of her insanity.

One evening, while her mother was absent at Segovia, Joanna, whose residence was at Medina del Campo, left her apartment in the castle, and sallied out, though in dishabille, without announcing her purpose to any of her attendants. They followed, however, and used every argument and entreaty to prevail on her to return, at least for the night, but without effect; until the bishop of Burgos, who had charge of her household, finding every other means ineffectual, was compelled to close the castle gates, in order to prevent her departure.

The princess, thus thwarted in her purpose, gave way to the most violent indignation. She menaced the attendants with her utmost vengeance for their disobedience, and, taking her station on the barrier, she obstinately refused to reënter the castle, or even to put on any additional clothing, but remained cold and shivering on the spot till the following morning. The good bishop, sorely embarrassed by the dilemma to which he found himself reduced, of offending the queen by complying with the mad humor of the princess, or the latter still more, by resisting it, despatched an express in all haste to Isabella, acquainting her with the affair, and begging instructions how to proceed.

The queen hastens to her.

The queen, who was staying, as has been said, at Segovia, about forty miles distant, alarmed at the

intelligence, sent the king's cousin, the admiral Henriquez, together with the archbishop of Toledo, at once to Medina, and prepared to follow as fast as the feeble state of her health would permit. The efforts of these eminent persons, however, were not much more successful than those of the bishop. All they could obtain from Joanna was, that she would retire to a miserable kitchen in the neighbourhood, during the night; while she persisted in taking her station on the barrier as soon as it was light, and continued there, immovable as a statue, the whole day. In this deplorable state she was found by the queen on her arrival; and it was not without great difficulty that the latter, with all the deference habitually paid her by her daughter, succeeded in persuading her to return to her own apartments in the castle. These were the first unequivocal symptoms of that hereditary taint of insanity, which had clouded the latter days of Isabella's mother, and which, with a few brief intervals, was to shed a deeper gloom over the long-protracted existence of her unfortunate daughter.<sup>13</sup>

The conviction of this sad infirmity of the princess gave a shock to the unhappy mother, scarcely less than that which she had formerly been called to endure in the death of her children. The sorrows, over which time had had so little power, were opened afresh by a calamity, which naturally filled her with the most gloomy forebodings for the fate

Isabella's  
distress.

<sup>13</sup> Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 56. epist. 268. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey* Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis*, fol. 46.



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of her people, whose welfare was to be committed to such incompetent hands. These domestic griefs were still further swelled at this time by the death of two of her ancient friends and counsellors, Juan Chacon, adelantado of Murcia,<sup>14</sup> and Gutierre de Cardenas, grand commander of Leon.<sup>15</sup> They had attached themselves to Isabella in the early part of her life, when her fortunes were still under a cloud; and they afterwards reaped the requital of their services in such ample honors and emoluments as royal gratitude could bestow, and in the full enjoyment of her confidence, to which their steady devotion to her interests well entitled them.<sup>16</sup>

But neither the domestic troubles which pressed so heavily on Isabella's heart, nor the rapidly declining state of her own health, had power to blunt



Her illness  
and fortitude.

<sup>14</sup> "Espejo de bondad," *mirror of virtue*, as Oviedo styles this cavalier. He was always much regarded by the sovereigns, and the lucrative post of *contador mayor*, which he filled for many years, enabled him to acquire an immense estate, 50,000 ducats a year, without imputation on his honesty. *Quincuagenas*, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 2.

<sup>15</sup> The name of this cavalier, as well as that of his cousin, Alonso de Cardenas, grand master of St. James, have become familiar to us in the Granadine war. If Don Gutierre made a less brilliant figure than the latter, he acquired, by means of his intimacy with the sovereigns, and his personal qualities, as great weight in the royal councils as any subject in the kingdom. "Nothing of any importance," says Oviedo, "was done without his advice." He was

raised to the important posts of *comendador de Leon*, and *contador mayor*, which last, in the words of the same author, "made its possessor a second king over the public treasury." He left large estates, and more than five thousand vassals. His eldest son and heir was created duke of Maqueda. *Quincuagenas*, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 2, dial. 1.

<sup>16</sup> Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 255. — Gomez de Rebus *Gestis*, fol. 45. — For some further account of these individuals see Part I. Chapter 14, note 10.

Martyr thus panegyricizes the queen's fortitude under her accumulated sorrows. "Sentit, licet constantissima sit, et supra feminam prudens, has alapas fortunæ sævientis regina, ita concussa fluctibus undique, veluti vasta rupes, maris in medio." *Opus Epist.*, loc. cit.

the energies of her mind, or lessen the vigilance with which she watched over the interests of her people. A remarkable proof of this was given in the autumn of the present year, 1503, when the country was menaced with an invasion from France.

The whole French nation had shared the indignation of Louis the Twelfth, at the mortifying result of his enterprise against Naples; and it answered his call for supplies so promptly and liberally, that, in a few months after the defeat of Cerignola, he was able to resume operations, on a more formidable scale than France had witnessed for centuries. Three large armies were raised, one to retrieve affairs in Italy, a second to penetrate into Spain, by the way of Fontarabia, and a third to cross into Roussillon, and get possession of the strong post of Salsas, the key of the mountain passes in that quarter. Two fleets were also equipped in the ports of Genoa and Marseilles, the latter of which was to support the invasion of Roussillon by a descent on the coast of Catalonia. These various corps were intended to act in concert, and thus, by one grand, simultaneous movement, Spain was to be assailed on three several points of her territory. The results did not correspond with the magnificence of the apparatus.<sup>17</sup>

The army destined to march on Fontarabia was placed under the command of Alan d'Albret, father

The French  
invade  
Spain.

<sup>17</sup> Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. 300, 301. — *Mémoires de La Trémoille*, chap. 19, apud Petitot, *Collection des Mémoires*, tom. xiv. — Ferreras, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. pp. 235–238. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. pp.

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of the king of Navarre, along the frontiers of whose dominions its route necessarily lay. Ferdinand had assured himself of the favorable dispositions of this prince, the situation of whose kingdom, more than its strength, made his friendship important; and the lord d'Albret, whether from a direct understanding with the Spanish monarch, or fearful of the consequences which might result to his son from the hostility of the latter, detained the forces intrusted to him, so long among the bleak and barren fastnesses of the mountains, that at length, exhausted by fatigue and want of food, the army melted away without even reaching the enemy's borders.<sup>18</sup>

The force directed against Roussillon was of a more formidable character. It was commanded by the *maréchal de Rieux*, a brave and experienced officer, though much broken by age and bodily infirmities. It amounted to more than twenty thousand men. Its strength, however, lay chiefly in its numbers. It was, with the exception of a few thousand *lansquenets* under William de la Marck,<sup>19</sup> made up of the *arrière-ban* of the kingdom, and the undisciplined militia from the great towns of

<sup>18</sup> Aleson, *Annales de Navarre*, tom. v. pp. 110-112.

The king of Navarre promised to oppose the passage of the French, if attempted, through his dominions; and, in order to obviate any distrust on the part of Ferdinand, sent his daughter Margaret to reside at the court of Castile, as a pledge for his fidelity. Ferreras, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. p. 235.

<sup>19</sup> Younger brother of Robert, third duke of Bouillon. (D'Auton,

*Hist. de Louys XII.*, part. 2, pp. 103, 186.) The reader will not confound him with his namesake, the famous "boar of Ardennes,"—more familiar to us now in the pages of romance than history,—who perished ignominiously some twenty years before this period, in 1484, not in fight, but by the hands of the common executioner at Utrecht. Duclos, *Hist. de Louis XI.*, tom. ii. p. 379.

Languedoc. With this numerous array the French marshal entered Roussillon without opposition, and sat down before Salsas on the 16th of September, 1503.

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The old castle of Salsas, which had been carried without much difficulty by the French in the preceding war, had been put in a defensible condition at the commencement of the present, under the superintendance of Pedro Navarro, although the repairs were not yet wholly completed. Ferdinand, on the approach of the enemy, had thrown a thousand picked men into the place, which was well victualled and provided for a siege; while a corps of six thousand was placed under his cousin, Don Frederic de Toledo, duke of Alva, with orders to take up a position in the neighbourhood, where he might watch the movements of the enemy, and annoy him as far as possible by cutting off his supplies.<sup>20</sup>

Siege of  
Salsas.

Ferdinand, in the mean while, lost no time in enforcing levies throughout the kingdom, with which he might advance to the relief of the beleaguered fortress. While thus occupied, he received such accounts of the queen's indisposition as induced him to quit Aragon, where he then was, and hasten by rapid journeys to Castile. The accounts were probably exaggerated; he found no cause for immediate alarm on his arrival, and Isa-

Isabella's  
exertions.

<sup>20</sup> Gonzalo Ayora, Capitan de la Guardia Real, *Cartas al Rey*, Don Fernando, (Madrid, 1794,) carta 9. — Aleson, *Annales de Navarra*, tom. v. pp. 112, 113. — Garnier, *Hist. de France*, tom. v. p. 407. — Zurita, *Anales*, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 51. — Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 11.

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bella, ever ready to sacrifice her own inclinations to the public weal, persuaded him to return to the scene of operations, where his presence at this juncture was so important. Forgetting her illness, she made the most unwearied efforts for assembling troops without delay to support her husband. The grand constable of Castile was commissioned to raise levies through every part of the kingdom, and the principal nobility flocked in with their retainers from the farthest provinces, all eager to obey the call of their beloved mistress. Thus strengthened, Ferdinand, whose head-quarters were established at Girona, saw himself in less than a month in possession of a force, which, including the supplies of Aragon, amounted to ten or twelve thousand horse, and three or four times that number of foot. He no longer delayed his march, and about the middle of October put his army in motion, proposing to effect a junction with the duke of Alva, then lying before Perpignan, at a few leagues' distance from Salsas.<sup>21</sup>

Isabella, who was at Segovia, was made acquainted by regular expresses with every movement of the army. She no sooner learned its departure from Gerona than she was filled with disquietude

<sup>21</sup> Gonzalo Ayora, *Cartas*, cap. 9. — Zurita, *Anales*, ubi supra. — Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS., cap. 197, 198. — Carbajal, *Anales*, MS., año 1503. — Sandoval, *Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.*, tom. i. p. 8.

The most authentic account of the siege of Salsas is to be found in the correspondence of Gonzalo Ayora, dated in the Spanish camp.

This individual, equally eminent in letters and arms, filled the dissimilar posts of captain of the royal guard and historiographer of the crown. He served in the army at this time, and was present at all its operations. Pref. ad *Cartas de Ayora*; and Nic. Antonio, *Bibliotheca Nova*, tom. i. p. 551.

at the prospect of a speedy encounter with the enemy, whose defeat, whatever glory it might reflect on her own arms, could be purchased only at the expense of Christian blood. She wrote in earnest terms to her husband, requesting him not to drive his enemies to despair by closing up their retreat to their own land, but to leave vengeance to Him, to whom alone it belonged. She passed her days, together with her whole household, in fasting and continual prayer, and, in the fervor of her pious zeal, personally visited the several religious houses of the city, distributing alms among their holy inmates, and imploring them humbly to supplicate the Almighty to avert the impending calamity.<sup>22</sup>

The prayers of the devout queen and her court found favor with Heaven.<sup>23</sup> King Ferdinand reached Perpignan on the 19th of October, and on that same night the French marshal, finding himself unequal to the rencontre with the combined forces of Spain, broke up his camp, and, setting fire to his tents, began his retreat towards the frontier, having consumed nearly six weeks since first opening

Ferdinand's  
successes.

<sup>22</sup> Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 263.

The loyal captain, Ayora, shows little of this Christian vein. He concludes one of his letters with praying, no doubt most sincerely, "that the Almighty would be pleased to infuse less benevolence into the hearts of the sovereigns, and incite them to chastise and humble the proud French, and strip them of their ill-gotten possessions, which, however repugnant to their own godly inclinations, would tend

greatly to replenish their coffers, as well as those of their faithful and loving subjects." See this graceless petition in his *Cartas*, carta 9, p. 66.

<sup>23</sup> "Exaudivit igitur sanctæ reginæ religiosorumque ac virginum preces summus Altitonans." (Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 263.) The learned Theban borrows an epithet more familiar to Greek and Roman, than to Christian ears.