

PART
II.

sail, large and small, and carried forces amounting to six hundred horse and four thousand foot, picked men, many of them drawn from the hardy regions of the north, which had been taxed least severely in the Moorish wars.¹⁴

Fleet fitted
out under
Gonsalvo de
Cordova.

The command of the whole was intrusted to the Great Captain, Gonsalvo of Cordova, who since his return home had fully sustained the high reputation, which his brilliant military talents had acquired for him abroad. Numerous volunteers, comprehending the noblest of the young chivalry of Spain, pressed forward to serve under the banner of this accomplished and popular chieftain. Among them may be particularly noticed, Diego de Mendoza, son of the grand cardinal, Pedro de la Paz,¹⁵ Gonzalo Pizarro, father of the celebrated adventurer of Peru, and Diego de Paredes, whose personal prowess and feats of extravagant daring furnished many an incredible legend for chronicle and romance. With this gallant armament the Great Captain weighed anchor in the port of Malaga, in May, 1500, designing to touch at Sicily before proceeding against the Turks.¹⁶

¹⁴ Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, tom. iii. lib. 5, p. 324. — Ulloa, *Vita et Fatti dell' Invittissimo Imperatore Carlo V.*, (Venetia, 1606,) fol. 2. — Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 7. — Giovio, *Vita Illustr. Virorum*, tom. i. p. 226. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 11. — Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 10, sec. 13.

¹⁵ This cavalier, one of the most valiant captains in the army, was so diminutive in size, that, when

mounted, he seemed almost lost in the high demipeak war-saddle then in vogue; which led a wag, according to Brantôme, when asked if he had seen Don Pedro de Paz pass that way, to answer, that "he had seen his horse and saddle, but no rider." *Cœuvres*, tom. i. disc. 9.

¹⁶ Ferreras, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. p. 217. — Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS., cap. 161. — Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 9.

Meanwhile, the negotiations between France and Spain, respecting Naples, were brought to a close, by a treaty for the equal partition of that kingdom between the two powers, ratified at Granada, November 11th, 1500. This extraordinary document, after enlarging on the unmixed evils flowing from war, and the obligation on all Christians to preserve inviolate the blessed peace bequeathed them by the Saviour, proceeds to state that no other prince, save the kings of France and Aragon, can pretend to a title to the throne of Naples; and as King Frederic, its present occupant, has seen fit to endanger the safety of all Christendom by bringing on it its bitterest enemy the Turks, the contracting parties, in order to rescue it from this imminent peril, and preserve inviolate the bond of peace, agree to take possession of his kingdom and divide it between them. It is then provided, that the northern portion, comprehending the Terra di Lavoro and Abruzzo, be assigned to France, with the title of King of Naples and Jerusalem, and the southern, consisting of Apulia and Calabria, with the title of Duke of those provinces, to Spain. The *dogana*, an important duty levied on the flocks of the Capitanate, was to be collected by the officers of the Spanish government, and divided equally with France. Lastly, any inequality between the respective territories was to be so adjusted, that the revenues accruing to each of the parties should be precisely equal. The treaty was to be kept profoundly secret, until preparations were com-

PART
II.

pleted for the simultaneous occupation of the devoted territory by the combined powers.¹⁷

Such were the terms of this celebrated compact, by which two European potentates coolly carved out and divided between them the entire dominions of a third, who had given no cause for umbrage, and with whom they were both at that time in perfect peace and amity. Similar instances of political robbery (to call it by the coarse name it merits) have occurred in later times; but never one founded on more flimsy pretexts, or veiled under a more detestable mask of hypocrisy. The principal odium of the transaction has attached to Ferdinand, as the kinsman of the unfortunate king of Naples. His conduct, however, admits of some palliatory considerations, that cannot be claimed for Louis.

The Aragonese nation always regarded the bequest of Ferdinand's uncle Alfonso the Fifth in favor of his natural offspring as an unwarrantable and illegal act. The kingdom of Naples had been won by their own good swords, and, as such, was the rightful inheritance of their own princes. Nothing but the domestic troubles of his dominions had prevented John the Second of Aragon, on the decease of his brother, from asserting his claim by arms. His son, Ferdinand the Catholic, had hitherto acquiesced in the usurpation of the bastard branch of his house only from similar causes. On the accession of the present monarch, he had made some

Ground of
Ferdinand's
claim.

¹⁷ See the original treaty, apud Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, tom. iii. pp. 445, 446.

demonstrations of vindicating his pretensions to Naples, which, however, the intelligence he received from that kingdom induced him to defer to a more convenient season.¹⁸ But it was deferring, not relinquishing his purpose. In the mean time, he carefully avoided entering into such engagements, as should compel him to a different policy by connecting his own interests with those of Frederic; and with this view, no doubt, rejected the alliance, strongly solicited by the latter, of the duke of Calabria, heir apparent to the Neapolitan crown, with his third daughter, the infanta Maria. Indeed, this disposition of Ferdinand, so far from being dissembled, was well understood by the court of Naples, as is acknowledged by its own historians.¹⁹

It may be thought, that the undisturbed succession of four princes to the throne of Naples, each of whom had received the solemn recognition of the people, might have healed any defects in their original title, however glaring. But it may be remarked, in extenuation of both the French and Spanish claims, that the principles of monarchical succession were but imperfectly settled in that day; that oaths of allegiance were tendered too lightly by the Neapolitans, to carry the same weight as in other nations; and that the prescriptive right derived from possession, necessarily indeterminate, was greatly weakened in this case by the comparatively few years, not more than

¹⁸ See Part II. Chapter 3, of this History.

¹⁹ Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 3.—Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 32.

PART
II.

forty, during which the bastard line of Aragon had occupied the throne, — a period much shorter than that, after which the house of York had in England, a few years before, successfully contested the validity of the Lancastrian title. It should be added, that Ferdinand's views appear to have perfectly corresponded with those of the Spanish nation at large; not one writer of the time, whom I have met with, intimating the slightest doubt of his title to Naples, while not a few insist on it with unnecessary emphasis.²⁰ It is but fair to state, however, that foreigners, who contemplated the transaction with a more impartial eye, condemned it as inflicting a deep stain on the characters of both potentates. Indeed, something like an apprehension of this, in the parties themselves, may be inferred from their solicitude to deprecate public censure by masking their designs under a pretended zeal for religion.

Before the conferences respecting the treaty were brought to a close, the Spanish armada under Gonsalvo, after a brief detention in Sicily, where it was reinforced by two thousand recruits, who had been serving as mercenaries in Italy, held its course for the Morea. The Turkish squadron, lying before Napoli di Romania, without waiting Gonsalvo's approach, raised the siege, and retreated precipitately to Constantinople. The Spanish general, then uniting his forces with the Venetians,

Gonsalvo
sails against
the Turks.

1500.
July 15.

²⁰ See, in particular, the Doctor Salazar de Mendoza, who exhausts the subject, — and the reader's patience, — in discussing the multi-
farious grounds of the incontrovertible title of the house of Aragon to Naples. Monarquia, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 12-15.

stationed at Corfu, proceeded at once against the fortified place of St. George, in Cephalonia, which the Turks had lately wrested from the republic.²¹

CHAPTER
X

The town stood high on a rock, in an impregnable position, and was garrisoned by four hundred Turks, all veteran soldiers, prepared to die in its defence. We have not room for the details of this siege, in which both parties displayed unbounded courage and resources, and which was protracted nearly two months under all the privations of famine, and the inclemencies of a cold and stormy winter.²²

At length, weary with this fatal procrastination, Gonsalvo and the Venetian admiral, Pesaro, resolved on a simultaneous attack on separate quarters of the town. The ramparts had been already shaken by the mining operations of Pedro Navarro, who, in the Italian wars, acquired such terrible celebrity in this department, till then little understood. The Venetian cannon, larger and better served than that of the Spaniards, had opened a practicable breach in the works, which the besieged repaired with such temporary defences, as they could. The signal being given at the appointed hour, the two armies made a desperate assault on different quarters of the town, under cover of a murderous fire of artillery. The Turks supported the attack with dauntless resolution, stopping up

Storming of
St. George.

²¹ *Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, tom. i. p. 226. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 9. — *Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 19.

²² *Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, ubi supra. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 14.

PART
II.

1501.
January.

the breach with the bodies of their dead and dying comrades, and pouring down volleys of shot, arrows, burning oil and sulphur, and missiles of every kind, on the heads of the assailants. But the desperate energy, as well as numbers of the latter, proved too strong for them. Some forced the breach, others scaled the ramparts; and, after a short and deadly struggle within the walls, the brave garrison, four fifths of whom with their commander had fallen, were overpowered, and the victorious banners of St. Jago and St. Mark were planted side by side triumphantly on the towers.²³

The capture of this place, although accomplished at considerable loss, and after a most gallant resistance by a mere handful of men, was of great service to the Venetian cause; since it was the first check given to the arms of Bajazet, who had filched one place after another from the republic, menacing its whole colonial territory in the Levant. The promptness and efficiency of King Ferdinand's succour to the Venetians gained him high reputation throughout Europe, and precisely of the kind which he most coveted, that of being the zealous defender of the faith; while it formed a favorable contrast to the cold supineness of the other powers of Christendom.

Honors paid
to Gonsalvo.

The capture of St. George restored to Venice the possession of Cephalonias; and the Great Captain, having accomplished this important object,

²³ *Gioio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, ubi supra. — Crónica del Gran cap. 25. — Bernaldez, Reyes Capitan, cap. 10. — Zurita, Hist. tólicos, MS., cap. 167.*

returned in the beginning of the following year, 1501, to Sicily. Soon after his arrival there, an embassy waited on him from the Venetian senate, to express their grateful sense of his services; which they testified by enrolling his name on the golden book, as a nobleman of Venice, and by a magnificent present of plate, curious silks and velvets, and a stud of beautiful Turkish horses. Gonsalvo courteously accepted the proffered honors, but distributed the whole of the costly largess, with the exception of a few pieces of plate, among his friends and soldiers.²⁴

CHAPTER
X.

In the mean while, Louis the Twelfth having completed his preparations for the invasion of Naples, an army, consisting of one thousand lances and ten thousand Swiss and Gascon foot, crossed the Alps, and directed its march towards the south. At the same time a powerful armament, under Philip de Ravenstein, with six thousand five hundred additional troops on board, quitted Genoa for the Neapolitan capital. The command of the land forces was given to the Sire d'Aubigny, the same brave and experienced officer who had formerly coped with Gonsalvo in the campaigns of Calabria.²⁵

1501.
June 1.

No sooner had D'Aubigny crossed the papal borders, than the French and Spanish ambassadors announced to Alexander the Sixth and the college

The pope
confirms the
partition.

²⁴ Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 167. — Quintana, Españoles Célebres, tom. i. p. 246. — Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, p. 228. — Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 4.

Louys XII., (Paris, 1622,) part. I, chap. 44, 45, 48. — Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. p. 265. — Sainet Gelais, Histoire de Louys XII., (Paris, 1622,) p. 163. — Buonacorsi, Diario, p. 46.

²⁵ Jean d'Auton, Histoire de

PART
II.

of cardinals the existence of the treaty for the partition of the kingdom between the sovereigns, their masters, requesting his Holiness to confirm it, and grant them the investiture of their respective shares. In this very reasonable petition his Holiness, well drilled in the part he was to play, acquiesced without difficulty; declaring himself moved thereto solely by his consideration of the pious intentions of the parties, and the unworthiness of King Frederic, whose treachery to the Christian commonwealth had forfeited all right (if he ever possessed any) to the crown of Naples.²⁶

Astonish-
ment of
Italy.

From the moment that the French forces had descended into Lombardy, the eyes of all Italy were turned with breathless expectation on Gonsalvo, and his army in Sicily. The bustling preparations of the French monarch had diffused the knowledge of his designs throughout Europe. Those of the king of Spain, on the contrary, remained enveloped in profound secrecy. Few doubted, that Ferdinand would step forward to shield his kinsman from the invasion which menaced him, and, it might be, his own dominions in Sicily; and they looked to the immediate junction of Gonsalvo with King Frederic, in order that their combined strength might overpower the enemy before he had gained a footing in the kingdom. Great was their astonishment, when the scales dropped from their eyes, and they beheld the movements of Spain in perfect accordance with those of France, and direct-

²⁶ Zurita, Hist. del Rey Her- Lanuza, Historias, tom. i. lib. 1,
nando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 43.— cap. 14.

ed to crush their common victim between them. They could scarcely credit, says Guicciardini, that Louis the Twelfth could be so blind as to reject the proffered vassalage and substantial sovereignty of Naples, in order to share it with so artful and dangerous a rival as Ferdinand.²⁷

CHAPTER
X.

The unfortunate Frederic, who had been advised for some time past of the unfriendly dispositions of the Spanish government,²⁸ saw no refuge from the dark tempest mustering against him on the opposite quarters of his kingdom. He collected such troops as he could, however, in order to make battle with the nearest enemy, before he should cross the threshold. On the 28th of June, the French army resumed its march. Before quitting Rome, a brawl arose between some French soldiers and Spaniards resident in the capital; each party asserting the paramount right of its own sovereign to the crown of Naples. From words they soon came to blows, and many lives were lost before the fray could be quelled; a melancholy augury for the permanence of the concord so unrighteously established between the two governments.²⁹

On the 8th of July, the French crossed the Neapolitan frontier. Frederic, who had taken post at

Success and
cruelties of
the French.

²⁷ Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 5, p. 266. — Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, fol. 8.

²⁸ In the month of April the king of Naples received letters from his envoys in Spain, written by command of King Ferdinand, informing him that he had nothing to expect from that monarch in case of an invasion of his territories by France. Frederic bitterly com-

plained of the late hour at which this intelligence was given, which effectually prevented an accommodation he might otherwise have made with King Louis. Lanuza, *Historias*, lib. 1, cap. 14. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 37.

²⁹ D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.*, part. 1, chap. 48.

PART
II.

St. Germano, found himself so weak, that he was compelled to give way on its approach, and retreat on his capital. The invaders went forward, occupying one place after another with little resistance till they came before Capua, where they received a temporary check. During a parley for the surrender of that place, they burst into the town, and giving free scope to their fiendish passions, butchered seven thousand citizens in the streets, and perpetrated outrages worse than death on their defenceless wives and daughters. It was on this occasion that Alexander the Sixth's son, the infamous Cæsar Borgia, selected forty of the most beautiful from the principal ladies of the place, and sent them back to Rome to swell the complement of his seraglio. The dreadful doom of Capua intimidated further resistance, but inspired such detestation of the French throughout the country, as proved of infinite prejudice to their cause in their subsequent struggle with the Spaniards.³⁰

Fate of
Frederic.1501.
October.

King Frederic, shocked at bringing such calamities on his subjects, resigned his capital without a blow in its defence, and, retreating to the isle of Ischia, soon after embraced the counsel of the French admiral Ravenstein, to accept a safe-conduct into France, and throw himself on the generosity of Louis the Twelfth. The latter received him courteously, and assigned him the duchy of Anjou

³⁰ Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii. lib. 6, cap. 4. — D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.*, part. 1, chap. 51 — 54. — Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, fol. 8. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 5, pp. 268, 269. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 41. — Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 3.

with an ample revenue for his maintenance, which, to the credit of the French king, was continued after he had lost all hope of recovering the crown of Naples.³¹ With this show of magnanimity, however, he kept a jealous eye on his royal guest; under pretence of paying him the greatest respect, he placed a guard over his person, and thus detained him in a sort of honorable captivity to the day of his death, which occurred soon after, in 1504.

Frederic was the last of the illegitimate branch of Aragon, who held the Neapolitan sceptre; a line of princes, who, whatever might be their characters in other respects, accorded that munificent patronage to letters which sheds a ray of glory over the roughest and most turbulent reign. It might have been expected, that an amiable and accomplished prince, like Frederic, would have done still more towards the moral developement of his people, by healing the animosities which had so long festered in their bosoms. His gentle character, however, was ill suited to the evil times on which he had fallen; and it is not improbable, that he found greater contentment in the calm and cultivated retirement of his latter years, sweetened by the sympathies of friendship which adversity had provided,³² than when placed on the dazzling heights

³¹ St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.*, p. 163. — D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.*, part. 1, ch. 56. — Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. iii. p. 541.

³² The reader will readily call to mind the Neapolitan poet Sannazaro, whose fidelity to his royal mas-

ter forms so beautiful a contrast with the conduct of Pontano, and indeed of too many of his tribe, whose gratitude is of that sort that will only rise above zero in the sunshine of a court. His various poetical effusions afford a noble testimony to the virtues of his un-

PART
II.

which attract the admiration and envy of mankind.³³

Early in March, Gonsalvo of Cordova had received his first official intelligence of the partition treaty, and of his own appointment to the post of lieutenant-general of Calabria and Apulia. He felt natural regret at being called to act against a prince, whose character he esteemed, and with whom he had once been placed in the most intimate and friendly relations. In the true spirit of chivalry, he returned to Frederic, before taking up arms against him, the duchy of St. Angel and the other large domains, with which that monarch had requited his services in the late war, requesting at the same time to be released from his obligations of homage and fealty. The generous monarch readily complied with the latter part of his request, but insisted on his retaining the grant, which he declared an inadequate compensation, after all, for the benefits the Great Captain had once rendered him.³⁴

The levies assembled at Messina amounted to three hundred heavy-armed, three hundred light horse, and three thousand eight hundred infantry, together with a small body of Spanish veterans, which the Castilian ambassador had collected in

Gonsalvo invades Calabria.

fortunate sovereign, the more unsuspecting as many of them were produced in the days of his adversity.

³³ "Neque mala vel bona," says the philosophic Roman, "quæ vulgus putet; multos, qui confictari adversis videantur, beatos; ac pleerosque, quamquam magnas peropes, miserrimos; si illi gravem for-

tunam constanter tolerant, hi prospera inconsultè utantur." Tacitus, *Annales*, lib. 6, sect. 22.

³⁴ Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 35. — Giovinio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 230. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 21. — Lanuza, *Historias*, tom. i. lib. 1, cap. 14.

Italy. The number of the forces was inconsiderable, but they were in excellent condition, well disciplined, and seasoned to all the toils and difficulties of war. On the 5th of July, the Great Captain landed at Tropea, and commenced the conquest of Calabria, ordering the fleet to keep along the coast, in order to furnish whatever supplies he might need. The ground was familiar to him, and his progress was facilitated by the old relations he had formed there, as well as by the important posts which the Spanish government had retained in its hands, as an indemnification for the expenses of the late war. Notwithstanding the opposition or coldness of the great Angevin lords who resided in this quarter, the entire occupation of the two Calabrias, with the exception of Tarento, was effected in less than a month.³⁵

This city, remarkable in ancient times for its defence against Hannibal, was of the last importance. King Frederic had sent thither his eldest son, the duke of Calabria, a youth about fourteen years of age, under the care of Juan de Guevara, count of Potenza, with a strong body of troops, considering it the place of greatest security in his dominions. Independently of the strength of its works, it was rendered nearly inaccessible by its natural position; having no communication with the main land except by two bridges, at opposite

Invests Tarento.

³⁵ Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 44. — Mariana, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 11, sec. 8. — Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 9.

PART
II.

quarters of the town, commanded by strong towers, while its exposure to the sea made it easily open to supplies from abroad.

Gonsalvo saw that the only method of reducing the place must be by blockade. Disagreeable as the delay was, he prepared to lay regular siege to it, ordering the fleet to sail round the southern point of Calabria, and blockade the port of Tarento, while he threw up works on the land side, which commanded the passes to the town, and cut off its communications with the neighbouring country. The place, however, was well victualled, and the garrison prepared to maintain it to the last.³⁶

Discontents
in the army.

Nothing tries more severely the patience and discipline of the soldier, than a life of sluggish inaction, unenlivened, as in the present instance, by any of the rencontres, or feats of arms, which keep up military excitement, and gratify the cupidity or ambition of the warrior. The Spanish troops, cooped up within their intrenchments, and disgusted with the languid monotony of their life, cast many a wistful glance to the stirring scenes of war in the centre of Italy, where Cæsar Borgia held out magnificent promises of pay and plunder to all who embarked in his adventurous enterprises. He courted the aid, in particular, of the Spanish veterans, whose worth he well understood, for they had often served under his banner, in his

³⁶ *Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum,* p. 231. — *Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V.,* fol. 9. — *Giannone, Istoria di Na-*

poli, lib. 29, cap. 3. — *Chronica del Gran Capitan,* cap. 31.

feuds with the Italian princes. In consequence of these inducements, some of Gonsalvo's men were found to desert every day; while those who remained were becoming hourly more discontented, from the large arrears due from the government; for Ferdinand, as already remarked, conducted his operations with a stinted economy, very different from the prompt and liberal expenditure of the queen, always competent to its object.³⁷

CHAPTER
X.

A trivial incident, at this time, swelled the popular discontent into mutiny. The French fleet, after the capture of Naples, was ordered to the Levant to assist the Venetians against the Turks. Ravenstein, ambitious of eclipsing the exploits of the Great Captain, turned his arms against Mitilene, with the design of recovering it for the republic. He totally failed in the attack, and his fleet was soon after scattered by a tempest, and his own ship wrecked on the isle of Cerigo. He subsequently found his way, with several of his principal officers, to the shores of Calabria, where he landed in the most forlorn and desperate plight. Gonsalvo, touched with his misfortunes, no sooner learned his necessities, than he sent him abundant supplies of provisions, adding a service of plate, and a variety of elegant apparel for himself and followers; consulting his own munificent spirit

Munificence
of Gonsalvo.

³⁷ Don Juan Manuel, the Spanish minister at Vienna, seems to have been fully sensible of this trait of his master. He told the emperor Maximilian, who had requested the loan of 300,000 ducats

from Spain, that it was as much money as would suffice King Ferdinand for the conquest, not merely of Italy, but Africa into the bargain. Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Her- nando*, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 42.

PART
II.

in this, much more than the limited state of his finances.³⁸

He punishes
a mutiny.

This excessive liberality was very inopportune. The soldiers loudly complained that their general found treasures to squander on foreigners, while his own troops were defrauded of their pay. The Biscayans, a people of whom Gonsalvo used to say, "he had rather be a lion-keeper, than undertake to govern them," took the lead in the tumult. It soon swelled into open insurrection; and the men, forming themselves into regular companies, marched to the general's quarters and demanded payment of their arrears. One fellow, more insolent than the rest, levelled a pike at his breast with the most angry and menacing looks. Gonsalvo, however, retaining his self-possession, gently put it aside, saying, with a good-natured smile, "Higher, you careless knave, lift your lance higher, or you will run me through in your jesting." As he was reiterating his assurances of the want of funds, and his confident expectation of speedily obtaining them, a Biscayan captain called out, "Send your daughter to the brothel, and that will soon put you in funds!" This was a favorite daughter named Elvira, whom Gonsalvo loved so tenderly, that he would not part with her, even in his campaigns. Although stung to the heart by this audacious taunt, he made no reply; but, without changing a muscle of his countenance, continued, in the same tone as before, to expostulate with the insurgents,

³⁸ Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, tom. III. lib. 6, p. 368. — *Virorum*, p. 232. — *D'Au-*
ton, part. I, chap. 71, 72.

who at length were prevailed on to draw off, and disperse to their quarters. The next morning, the appalling spectacle of the lifeless body of the Biscayan, suspended by the neck from a window of the house in which he had been quartered, admonished the army that there were limits to the general's forbearance it was not prudent to overstep.³⁹

An unexpected event, which took place at this juncture, contributed even more than this monitory lesson to restore subordination to the army. This was the capture of a Genoese galleon with a valuable freight, chiefly iron, bound to some Turkish port, as it was said, in the Levant, which Gonsalvo, moved no doubt by his zeal for the Christian cause, ordered to be seized by the Spanish cruisers; and the cargo to be disposed of for the satisfaction of his troops. Giovio charitably excuses this act of hostility against a friendly power with the remark, that "when the Great Captain did any thing contrary to law, he was wont to say, 'A general must secure the victory at all hazards, right or wrong; and, when he has done this, he can compensate those whom he has injured with tenfold benefits.'"⁴⁰

The unexpected length of the siege of Tarento, determined Gonsalvo, at length, to adopt bolder measures for quickening its termination. The city, whose insulated position has been noticed, was bounded on the north by a lake, or rather arm of

Bolder plan
of attack.

³⁹ *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 34. — Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. pp. 252, 253. — Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, p. 232.

⁴⁰ Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, p. 233.

PART
II.

the sea, forming an excellent interior harbour, about eighteen miles in circumference. The inhabitants, trusting to the natural defences of this quarter, had omitted to protect it by fortifications, and the houses rose abruptly from the margin of the basin. Into this reservoir, the Spanish commander resolved to transport such of his vessels then riding in the outer bay, as from their size could be conveyed across the narrow isthmus, which divided it from the inner.

After incredible toil, twenty of the smallest craft were moved on huge cars and rollers across the intervening land, and safely launched on the bosom of the lake. The whole operation was performed amid the exciting accompaniments of discharges of ordnance, strains of martial music, and loud acclamations of the soldiery. The inhabitants of Tarento saw with consternation the fleet so lately floating in the open ocean under their impregnable walls, now quitting its native element, and moving, as it were by magic, across the land, to assault them on the quarter where they were the least defended.⁴¹

Tarento sur-
renders.

The Neapolitan commander perceived it would be impossible to hold out longer, without compromising the personal safety of the young prince under his care. He accordingly entered into negotiations for a truce with the Great Captain, during which articles of capitulation were arranged, guaranteeing to the duke of Calabria and his followers the right of evacuating the place and going wherever they listed. The Spanish general, in order to

⁴¹ Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, ubi supra. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 33.

give greater solemnity to these engagements, bound himself to observe them by an oath on the sacrament.⁴²

CHAPTER
X.

On the 1st of March, 1502, the Spanish army took possession, according to agreement, of the city of Tarento; and the duke of Calabria with his suite was permitted to leave it, in order to rejoin his father in France. In the mean time, advices were received from Ferdinand the Catholic, instructing Gonsalvo on no account to suffer the young prince to escape from his hands, as he was a pledge of too great importance for the Spanish government to relinquish. The general in consequence sent after the duke, who had proceeded in company with the count of Potenza as far as Bitonto, on his way to the north, and commanded him to be arrested and brought back to Tarento. Not long after, he caused him to be conveyed on board one of the men-of-war in the harbour, and, in contempt of his solemn engagements, sent a prisoner to Spain.⁴³

⁴² Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 52, 53. — Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 5, p. 270. — Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 3. — Muratori, Annali d' Italia, tom. xiv. p. 14.

The various authorities differ more irreconcilably than usual in the details of the siege. I have followed Paolo Giovio, a contemporary, and personally acquainted with the principal actors. All agree in the only fact, in which one would willingly see some discrepancy, Gonsalvo's breach of faith to the young duke of Calabria.

⁴³ Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 56. — Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 11, sec. 10-12. — Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 9. — Lanuza, Historias, lib. 1, cap. 14.

Martyr, who was present on the young prince's arrival at court, where he experienced the most honorable reception, speaks of him in the highest terms. "Adolescens namque est et regno et regio sanguine dignus, miræ indolis, formæ egregius."⁵ (See Opus Epist., epist. 252.) He survived to the year 1550, but without ever quitting Spain, contrary to the fond

PART
II.Perjury of
Gonsalvo.

The national writers have made many awkward attempts to varnish over this atrocious act of perjury in their favorite hero. Zurita vindicates it by a letter from the Neapolitan prince to Gonsalvo, requesting the latter to take this step, since he preferred a residence in Spain to one in France, but could not with decency appear to act in opposition to his father's wishes on the subject. If such a letter, however, were really obtained from the prince, his tender years would entitle it to little weight, and of course it would afford no substantial ground for justification. Another explanation is offered by Paolo Giovio, who states that the Great Captain, undetermined what course to adopt, took the opinion of certain learned jurists. This sage body decided, that Gonsalvo was not bound by his oath, since it was repugnant to his paramount obligations to his master; and that the latter was not bound by it, since it was made without his privity! ⁴⁴ The man who trusts his honor to the tampering of casuists, has parted with it already.

The only palliation of the act must be sought in the prevalent laxity and corruption of the period, which is rife with examples of the most flagrant violation of both public and private faith. Had this been the act of a Sforza, indeed, or a Borgia,

prediction of his friend Sannazaro;
"Nam mihi, nam tempus veniet, cum red-
dita sceptrā
Parthenopes, fractosque tuā sub cuspide
reges
Ipsē canam."

Opera Latina, Ecloga 4.

⁴⁴ Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 4, cap. 58. — Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, lib. 1, p. 234.

Mariana coolly disposes of Gonsalvo's treachery with the remark, "No parece se le guardo lo que tenían asentado. En la guerra quien hay que de todo punto lo guarde?" (Hist. de España, tom. ii. p. 675.)

— "Dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?"

it could not reasonably have excited surprise. But coming from one of a noble, magnanimous nature, like Gonsalvo, exemplary in his private life, and unstained with any of the grosser vices of the age, it excited general astonishment and reprobation, even among his contemporaries. It has left a reproach on his name, which the historian may regret, but cannot wipe away.

CHAPTER
XP.C. Monumental de la Alhambra y Generalife
CONSEJERÍA DE CULTURA

CHAPTER XI.

ITALIAN WARS.—RUPTURE WITH FRANCE.—GONSALVO BESIEGED IN BARLETA.

1502, 1503.

Rupture between the French and Spaniards.—Gonsalvo retires to Barleta.—Chivalrous Character of the War.—Tourney near Trani.—Duel between Bayard and Sotomayor.—Distress of Barleta.—Constancy of the Spaniards.—Gonsalvo storms and takes Ruvo.—Prepares to leave Barleta.

PART II.

Mutual distrust of the French and Spaniards.

It was hardly to be expected that the partition treaty between France and Spain, made so manifestly in contempt of all good faith, would be maintained any longer than suited the convenience of the respective parties. The French monarch, indeed, seems to have prepared, from the first, to dispense with it, so soon as he had secured his own moiety of the kingdom;¹ and sagacious men at the Spanish court inferred, that King Ferdinand would

¹ Peter Martyr, in a letter written from Venice, while detained there on his way to Alexandria, speaks of the efforts made by the French emissaries to induce the republic to break with Spain, and support their master in his designs on Naples. "Adsunt namque a Ludovico rege Gallorum oratores, qui omni nixu conantur a vobis

Venetorum animos avertere. Fremere dentibus aiunt oratorem primarium Gallum, quia nequeat per Venetorum suffragia consequi, ut aperte vobis hostilitatem edicant, utque velint Gallis regno Parthenopeo contra vestra presidia ferre suppetias." The letter is dated October 1st, 1501. Opus Epist., epist. 231.

do as much, when he should be in a situation to assert his claims with success.²

CHAPTER
XI.

It was altogether improbable, whatever might be the good faith of the parties, that an arrangement could long subsist, which so rudely rent asunder the members of this ancient monarchy; or that a thousand points of collision should not arise between rival hosts, lying as it were on their arms within bowshot of each other, and in view of the rich spoil which each regarded as its own. Such grounds for rupture did occur, sooner probably than either party had foreseen, and certainly before the king of Aragon was prepared to meet it.

The immediate cause was the extremely loose language of the partition treaty, which assumed such a geographical division of the kingdom into four provinces, as did not correspond with any ancient division, and still less with the modern, by which the number was multiplied to twelve.³ The central portion, comprehending the Capitanate, the Basilicate, and the Principality, became debatable ground between the parties, each of whom insisted

Cause of
rupture.

² Martyr, after noticing the grounds of the partition treaty, comments with his usual shrewdness on the politic views of the Spanish sovereigns. "Facilius namque se sperant, eam partem, quam sibi Galli sortiti sunt, habituros aliquando, quam si univsum regnum occuparint." *Opus Epist.*, epist. 218.

³ The Italian historians, who have investigated the subject with some parade of erudition, treat it so vaguely, as to leave it after all nearly as perplexed as they found it. Giovio includes the Capitanate

in Apulia, according to the ancient division; Guicciardini according to the modern; and the Spanish historian Mariana, according to both. The last writer, it may be observed, discusses the matter with equal learning and candor, and more perspicuity than either of the preceding. He admits reasonable grounds for doubt to which moiety of the kingdom the Basilicate and Principality should be assigned. Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. p. 670. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. i. lib. 5, pp. 274, 275. — Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, pp. 234, 235.

PART
II.

on these as forming an integral part of its own moiety. The French had no ground whatever for contesting the possession of the Capitanate, the first of these provinces, and by far the most important, on account of the tolls paid by the numerous flocks which descended every winter into its sheltered valleys from the snow-covered mountains of Abruzzo.⁴ There was more uncertainty to which of the parties the two other provinces were meant to be assigned. It is scarcely possible that language so loose, in a matter requiring mathematical precision, should have been unintentional.

Before Gonsalvo de Cordova had completed the conquest of the southern moiety of the kingdom, and while lying before Tarento, he received intelligence of the occupation by the French of several places, both in the Capitanate and Basilicate. He detached a body of troops for the protection of these countries, and, after the surrender of Tarento, marched towards the north to cover them with his whole army. As he was not in a condition for immediate hostilities, however, he entered into negotiations, which, if attended with no other advantage, would at least gain him time.⁵

1502.
April 1.

The pretensions of the two parties, as might have been expected, were too irreconcilable to admit of

⁴ The provision of the partition treaty, that the Spaniards should collect the tolls paid by the flocks on their descent from the French district of Abruzzo into the Capitanate, is conclusive evidence of the intention of the contracting parties to assign the latter to Spain.

See the treaty apud Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iii. pp. 445, 446.

⁵ Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 52. — Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 12. — Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, fol. 10.

compromise; and a personal conference between the respective commanders-in-chief led to no better arrangement, than that each should retain his present acquisitions, till explicit instructions could be received from their respective courts.

CHAPTER
XI.

But neither of the two monarchs had further instructions to give; and the Catholic king contented himself with admonishing his general to postpone an open rupture as long as possible, that the government might have time to provide more effectually for his support, and strengthen itself by alliance with other European powers. But, however pacific may have been the disposition of the generals, they had no power to control the passions of their soldiers, who, thus brought into immediate contact, glared on each other with the ferocity of bloodhounds, ready to slip the leash which held them in temporary check. Hostilities soon broke out along the lines of the two armies, the blame of which each nation charged on its opponent. There seems good ground, however, for imputing it to the French; since they were altogether better prepared for war than the Spaniards, and entered into it so heartily as not only to assail places in the debatable ground, but in Apulia, which had been unequivocally assigned to their rivals.⁶

The French
begin hostilities.

⁶ D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys XII.*, part. 2, chap. 3-7. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 60, 62, 64, 65. — Giovio, *Vitæ Illust. Virorum*, tom. i. p. 236. — Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 4.

Bernaldez states, that the Great

Captain, finding his conference with the French general ineffectual, proposed to the latter to decide the quarrel between their respective nations by single combat. (*Reyes, Católicos*, MS., cap. 167.) We should require some other authority, however, than that of the good

PART
II.

The Italians
favor them.

In the mean while, the Spanish court fruitlessly endeavoured to interest the other powers of Europe in its cause. The Emperor Maximilian, although dissatisfied with the occupation of Milan by the French, appeared wholly engrossed with the frivolous ambition of a Roman coronation. The pontiff and his son, Cæsar Borgia, were closely bound to King Louis by the assistance which he had rendered them in their marauding enterprises against the neighbouring chiefs of Romagna. The other Italian princes, although deeply incensed and disgusted by this infamous alliance, stood too much in awe of the colossal power, which had planted its foot so firmly on their territory, to offer any resistance. Venice alone, surveying from her distant watch-tower, to borrow the words of Peter Martyr, the whole extent of the political horizon, appeared to hesitate. The French ambassadors loudly called on her to fulfil the terms of her late treaty with their master, and support him in his approaching quarrel; but that wily republic saw with distrust the encroaching ambition of her powerful neighbour, and secretly wished that a counterpoise might be found in the success of Aragon. Martyr, who stopped at Venice on his return from Egypt, appeared before the senate, and employed all his eloquence in supporting his master's cause in opposition to the French envoys; but his pressing entrea-

1501.
October.

Curate to vouch for this romantic flight, so entirely out of keeping with the Spanish general's charac-

ter, in which prudence was probably the most conspicuous attribute.

ties to the Spanish sovereigns to send thither some competent person, as a resident minister, show his own conviction of the critical position in which their affairs stood.⁷

The letters of the same intelligent individual, during his journey through the Milanese,⁸ are filled with the most gloomy forebodings of the termination of a contest, for which the Spaniards were so indifferently provided; while the whole north of Italy was alive with the bustling preparations of the French, who loudly vaunted their intention of driving their enemy not merely out of Naples, but Sicily itself.⁹

Louis the Twelfth superintended these prepara-

⁷ Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. p. 345. — Bembo, *Istoria Vini-ziana*, tom. i. lib. 6. — Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 238, 240, 252. — This may appear strange, considering that Lorenzo Suarez de la Vega was there, a person of whom Gonzalo de Oviedo writes, "Fué gentil caballero, é sabio, é de gran prudencia; ***** muy entendido é de mucho reposo é honesto é afable é de linda conversacion;" and again, more explicitly, "Embaxador á Venecia, en el qual oficio sirvio muy bien, é como prudente varon." (*Quincuagenas*, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 44.) Martyr admits his prudence, but objects his ignorance of Latin, a deficiency, however heinous in the worthy tutor's eyes, probably of no rare occurrence among the elder Castilian nobles.

⁸ Many of Martyr's letters were addressed to both Ferdinand and Isabella. The former, however, was ignorant of the Latin language, in which they were written. Martyr playfully alludes to this in one of his epistles, reminding the queen

of her promise to interpret them faithfully to her husband. The unconstrained and familiar tone of his correspondence affords a pleasing example of the personal intimacy to which the sovereigns, so contrary to the usual stiffness of Spanish etiquette, admitted men of learning and probity at their court, without distinction of rank. *Opus Epist.*, epist. 230.

⁹ "Galli," says Martyr, in a letter more remarkable for strength of expression, than elegance of Latinity, "furunt, sæviunt, interne-cionem nostris minantur, putantque id sibi fore facillimum. Regem eorum esse in itinere, inquit, ut ipse cum duplicato exercitu Alpes trajiciat in Italiam. Vestro nomini insurgunt. Cristas erigunt in vos superbissimè. Provinciam hanc, veluti rem humilem, parvique momenti, se aggressuros præconantur. Nihil esse negotii eradicare exterminareque vestra præsidia ex utrâque Sicilia blacterant. Insolenter nimis expuendo insultant." *Opus Epist.*, epist. 241.

PART
II.1502.
July.

tions in person, and, to be near the theatre of operations, crossed the Alps, and took up his quarters at Asti. At length, all being in readiness, he brought things to an immediate issue, by commanding his general to proclaim war at once against the Spaniards, unless they abandoned the Capitanate in four-and-twenty hours.¹⁰

The French
army.

The French forces in Naples amounted, according to their own statements, to one thousand men-at-arms, three thousand five hundred French and Lombard, and three thousand Swiss infantry, in addition to the Neapolitan levies raised by the Angevin lords throughout the kingdom. The command was intrusted to the duke of Nemours, a brave and chivalrous young nobleman of the ancient house of Armagnac, whom family connexions more than talents, had raised to the perilous post of viceroy over the head of the veteran D'Aubigny. The latter would have thrown up his commission in disgust, but for the remonstrances of his sovereign, who prevailed on him to remain where his counsels were more than ever necessary to supply the inexperience of the young commander. The jealousy and wilfulness of the latter, however, defeated these intentions; and the misunderstanding of the chiefs, extending to their followers, led to a fatal want of concert in their movements.

With these officers were united some of the best and bravest of the French chivalry; among whom

¹⁰ D'Auton, *Hist. de Louys Guicciardini*, Isteria, lib. 5, pp. 274, XII., part. 2, chap. 8. — Giannone, 274. — Buonaccorsi, *Diario*, p. 61. *Isteria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 4. —

may be noticed Jacques de Chabannes, more commonly known as the Sire de la Palice, a favorite of Louis the Twelfth, and well entitled to be so by his deserts; Louis d'Ars; Ives d'Alègre, brother of the Prècy who gained so much renown in the wars of Charles the Eighth; and Pierre de Bayard, the knight "sans peur et sans reproche," who was then entering on the honorable career in which he seemed to realize all the imaginary perfections of chivalry.¹¹

CHAPTER
XI.

Notwithstanding the small numbers of the French force, the Great Captain was in no condition to cope with them. He had received no reinforcements from home since he first landed in Calabria. His little corps of veterans was destitute of proper clothing and equipments, and the large arrears due them made the tenure of their obedience extremely precarious.¹² Since affairs began to assume their present menacing aspect, he had been busily occupied with drawing together the detachments posted in various parts of Calabria, and concentrating them on the town of Atella in the Basilicate, where he had established his own quarters. He had also opened a correspondence with the

Inferiority
of the Spaniards.

¹¹ Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 5, p. 265. — D'Anton, *Hist. de Louys XII.*, part. I, chap. 57. — Gaillard, *Rivalité*, tom. iv. pp. 221-233. — St. Gelais, *Hist. de Louys XII.*, p. 169.

Brantôme has introduced sketches of most of the French captains mentioned in the text into his admirable gallery of national portraits. See *Vies des Hommes Illustres*, Œuvres, tom. ii. and iii.

¹² Martyr's epistles at this crisis are filled with expostulation, argument, and entreaties to the sovereigns, begging them to rouse from their apathy, and take measures to secure the wavering affections of Venice, as well as to send more effectual aid to their Italian troops. Ferdinand listened to the first of these suggestions; but showed a strange insensibility to the last.