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 Ferdinand
recovers his
capital.

The French, however, though excluded from the city, by making a circuit effected an entrance into the fortresses which commanded it. From these posts, Montpensier sorely annoyed the town, making frequent attacks on it, day and night, at the head of his gendarmerie, until they were at length checked in every direction by barricades which the citizens hastily constructed with wagons, casks of stones, bags of sand, and whatever came most readily to hand. At the same time, the windows, balconies, and house-tops were crowded with combatants, who poured down such a deadly shower of missiles on the heads of the French as finally compelled them to take shelter in their defences. Montpensier was now closely besieged, till at length, reduced by famine, he was compelled to capitulate. Before the term prescribed for his surrender had arrived, however, he effected his escape at night, by water, to Salerno, at the head of twenty-five hundred men. The remaining garrison, with the fortresses, submitted to the victorious Ferdinand, the beginning of the following year. And thus, by one of those sudden turns which belong to the game of war, the exiled prince, whose fortunes a few weeks before appeared perfectly desperate, was again established in the palace of his ancestors.²¹

Montpensier did not long remain in his new quarters. He saw the necessity of immediate ac-

²¹ Gioivo, *Hist. sui Temporis*, -117.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, tom. vi. pp. 520, 521.
lib. 3, pp. 88-90, 114-119.—
Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 2, pp. 114

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tion, to counteract the alarming progress of the enemy. He quitted Salerno before the end of winter, strengthening his army by such reinforcements as he could collect from every quarter of the country. With this body, he directed his course towards Apulia, with the intention of bringing Ferdinand, who had already established his headquarters there, to a decisive engagement. Ferdinand's force, however, was so far inferior to that of his antagonist, as to compel him to act on the defensive, until he had been reinforced by a considerable body of troops from Venice. The two armies were then so equally matched, that neither cared to hazard all on the fate of a battle; and the campaign wasted away in languid operations, which led to no important result.

In the mean time, Gonsalvo de Cordova was slowly fighting his way up through southern Calabria. The character of the country, rough and mountainous, like the Alpuxarras, and thickly sprinkled with fortified places, enabled him to bring into play the tactics which he had learned in the war of Granada. He made little use of heavy-armed troops, relying on his *ginetes*, and still more on his foot; taking care, however, to avoid any direct encounter with the dreaded Swiss battalions. He made amends for paucity of numbers and want of real strength, by rapidity of movement and the wily tactics of Moorish warfare; darting on the enemy where least expected, surprising his strongholds at dead of night, entangling him in ambuscades, and desolating the country with those



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terrible forays, whose effects he had so often witnessed on the fair vegas of Granada. He adopted the policy practised by his master Ferdinand the Catholic in the Moorish war, lenient to the submissive foe, but wreaking terrible vengeance on such as resisted.²²

The French were sorely disconcerted by these irregular operations, so unlike any thing to which they were accustomed in European warfare. They were further disheartened by the continued illness of D'Aubigny, and by the growing disaffection of the Calabrians, who in the southern provinces contiguous to Sicily were particularly well inclined to Spain.

Gonsalvo, availing himself of these friendly dispositions, pushed forward his successes, carrying one strong-hold after another, until by the end of the year he had overrun the whole of Lower Calabria. His progress would have been still more rapid but for the serious embarrassments which he experienced from want of supplies. He had received some reinforcements from Sicily, but very few from Spain; while the boasted Galician levies, instead of fifteen hundred, had dwindled to scarcely three hundred men; who arrived in the most miserable plight, destitute of clothing and munitions of every kind. He was compelled to weaken still further his inadequate force by garrisoning the conquered places, most of which, however, he was

His suc-
cesses.

²² Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, lib. 3, pp. 173, 174. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 26. — *Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, p. 218. — Villeneuve, *Mémoires*, p. 313. — Sismondi, *Républiques Italiennes*, tom. xii. p. 386.

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obliged to leave without any defence at all. In addition to this, he was so destitute of the necessary funds for the payment of his troops, that he was detained nearly two months at Nicastro, until February, 1496, when he received a remittance from Spain. After this, he resumed operations with such vigor, that by the end of the following spring he had reduced all Upper Calabria, with the exception of a small corner of the province, in which D'Aubigny still maintained himself. At this crisis, he was summoned from the scene of his conquests to the support of the king of Naples, who lay encamped before Atella, a town intrenched among the Apennines, on the western borders of the Basilicate.²³

The campaign of the preceding winter had terminated without any decisive results, the two armies of Montpensier and King Ferdinand having continued in sight of each other, without ever coming to action. These protracted operations were fatal to the French. Their few supplies were intercepted by the peasantry of the country; their Swiss and German mercenaries mutinied and deserted for want of pay; and the Neapolitans in their service went off in great numbers, disgusted with the insolent and overbearing manners of their new allies. Charles the Eighth, in the mean while, was wasting his hours and health in the usual round of profligate pleasures. From the moment

²³ Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 11, 20. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 2, p. 140. — Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, pp. 219, 220. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 25, 26.

of recrossing the Alps he seemed to have shut out Italy from his thoughts. He was equally insensible to the supplications of the few Italians at his court, and the remonstrances of his French nobles, many of whom, although opposed to the first expedition, would willingly have undertaken a second to support their brave comrades, whom the heedless young monarch now abandoned to their fate.²⁴

At length Montpensier, finding no prospect of relief from home, and straitened by the want of provisions, determined to draw off from the neighbourhood of Benevento, where the two armies lay encamped, and retreat to the fruitful province of Apulia, whose principal places were still garrisoned by the French. He broke up his camp secretly at dead of night, and gained a day's march on his enemy, before the latter began his pursuit. This Ferdinand pushed with such vigor, however, that he overtook the retreating army at the town of Atella, and completely intercepted its further progress. This town, which, as already noticed, is situated on the western skirts of the Basilicate, lies in a broad valley encompassed by a lofty amphitheatre of hills, through which flows a little river,

²⁴ Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 3, pp. 140, 157, 158. — Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 23, 24. — Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 183.

Du Bos discriminates between the character of the German levies or *landsknechts* and the Swiss, in the following terms. "Les lansquenets étoient même de beaucoup mieux faits, généralement parlant, et de bien meilleure mine sous les armes, que les fantassins Suisses; mais ils

étoient incapables de discipline. Au contraire des Suisses, ils étoient sans obéissance pour leur chefs, et sans amitié pour leurs camarades."

(*Ligue de Cambray*, tom. i. dissert. prélim. p. 66.) Comines confirms the distinction with a high tribute to the loyalty of the Swiss, which has continued their honorable characteristic to the present day. *Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 21.

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tributary to the Ofanto, watering the town, and turning several mills which supplied it with flour. At a few miles' distance was the strong place of Ripa Candida, garrisoned by the French, through which Montpensier hoped to maintain his communications with the fertile regions of the interior.

Besieged in
Atella.

Ferdinand, desirous if possible to bring the war to a close, by the capture of the whole French army, prepared for a vigorous blockade. He disposed his forces so as to intercept supplies by commanding the avenues to the town in every direction. He soon found, however, that his army, though considerably stronger than his rival's, was incompetent to this without further aid. He accordingly resolved to summon to his support Gonsalvo de Cordova, the fame of whose exploits now resounded through every part of the kingdom.²⁵

The Spanish general received Ferdinand's summons while encamped with his army at Castrovillari, in the north of Upper Calabria. If he complied with it, he saw himself in danger of losing all the fruits of his long campaign of victories; for his active enemy would not fail to profit by his absence to repair his losses. If he refused obedience, however, it might defeat the most favorable opportunity which had yet presented itself for bringing the war to a close. He resolved, therefore, at once to quit the field of his triumphs, and march to King Ferdinand's relief. But, before his

²⁵ Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, pp. 218, 219. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 28. — *Quintana, Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. p.

226. — Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, lib. 3, p. 184. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 3, p. 158.

departure, he prepared to strike such a blow as should, if possible, incapacitate his enemy for any effectual movement during his absence. CHAPTER
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He received intelligence that a considerable number of Angevin lords, mostly of the powerful house of San Severino, with their vassals and a reinforcement of French troops, were assembled at the little town of Laino, on the northwestern borders of Upper Calabria; where they lay awaiting a junction with D'Aubigny. Gonsalvo determined to surprise this place, and capture the rich spoils which it contained, before his departure. His road lay through a wild and mountainous country. The passes were occupied by the Calabrian peasantry in the interest of the Angevin party. The Spanish general, however, found no difficulty in forcing a way through this undisciplined rabble, a large body of whom he surrounded and cut to pieces, as they lay in ambush for him in the valley of Murano. Laino, whose base is washed by the waters of the Lao, was defended by a strong castle built on the opposite side of the river, and connected by a bridge with the town. All approach to the place by the high road was commanded by this fortress. Gonsalvo obviated this difficulty, however, by a circuitous route across the mountains. He marched all night, and fording the waters of the Lao about two miles above the town, entered it with his little army before break of day, having previously detached a small corps to take possession of the bridge. The inhabitants, startled from their slumbers by the unexpected appearance of the enemy in

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their streets, hastily seized their arms and made for the castle on the other side of the river. The pass, however, was occupied by the Spaniards; and the Neapolitans and French, hemmed in on every side, began a desperate resistance, which terminated with the death of their chief, Americo San Severino, and the capture of such of his followers as did not fall in the *mêlée*. A rich booty fell into the hands of the victors. The most glorious prize, however, was the Angevin barons, twenty in number, whom Gonsalvo, after the action, sent prisoners to Naples. This decisive blow, whose tidings spread like wild-fire throughout the country, settled the fate of Calabria. It struck terror into the hearts of the French, and crippled them so far as to leave Gonsalvo little cause for anxiety during his proposed absence.²⁶

The Spanish general lost no time in pressing forward on his march towards Atella. Before quitting Calabria he had received a reinforcement of five hundred soldiers from Spain, and his whole Spanish forces, according to Giovio, amounted to one hundred men-at-arms, five hundred light cavalry, and two thousand foot, picked men, and well schooled in the hardy service of the late campaign.²⁷ Although a great part of his march lay through a hostile country, he encountered little opposition; for the terror of his name, says the writer last quoted, had everywhere gone before him. He arrived be-

²⁶ Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, pp. 219, 220. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 27. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, tom. i. lib. 2, cap. 26. — Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. pp. 227, 228. — Guic-

ciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 3, pp. 158, 159. — Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 26, cap. 12.

²⁷ Giovio, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 4, p. 132.

Arrives before Atella.

fore Atella at the beginning of July. The king of Naples was no sooner advised of his approach, than he marched out of the camp, attended by the Venetian general, the marquis of Mantua, and the papal legate, Cæsar Borgia, to receive him. All were eager to do honor to the man, who had achieved such brilliant exploits; who, in less than a year, had made himself master of the larger part of the kingdom of Naples, and that, with the most limited resources, in defiance of the bravest and best disciplined soldiery in Europe. It was then, according to the Spanish writers, that he was by general consent greeted with the title of the Great Captain; by which he is much more familiarly known in Spanish, and, it may be added, in most histories of the period, than by his own name.²⁸

Receives the
title of
Great Cap-
tain.

²⁸ Quintana, Españoles Célebres, tom. i. p. 228. — Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, p. 220.

The Aragonese historians are much ruffled by the irreverent manner in which Guicciardini notices the origin of the cognomen of the Great Captain; which even his subsequent panegyric cannot atone for. "Era capitano Gonsalvo Ernandes, di casa d' Aghilar, di patria Cordovese, uomo di molto valore, ed esercitato lungamente nelle guerre di Granata, il quale nel principio della venuta sua in Italia, cognominato *dalla jattanza Spagnuola* il Gran Capitano, per significare con questo titolo la suprema podestà sopra loro, meritò per le preclare vittorie che ebbe dipoi, che per consentimento universale gli fosse confermato e perpetuato questo soprannome, per significazione di virtù grande, e di grande eccellenza nella disciplina militare." (Istoria, tom. i. p. 112.) According

to Zurita, the title was not conferred till the Spanish general's appearance before Atella, and the first example of its formal recognition was in the instrument of capitulation at that place. (Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 27.) This seems to derive support from the fact that Gonsalvo's biographer and contemporary, Giovio, begins to distinguish him by that epithet from this period. Abarca, however, if his authenticity can be relied on, establishes a higher antiquity for it, even, than that claimed by Guicciardini; since he quotes a passage from the grant, made some time after by Ferdinand the Catholic, of the dukedom of Sessa to Gonsalvo, which expressly notices the title of Great Captain, as having been bestowed by the army on their commander, on his first embarkation at the head of the Italian army. Reyes de Aragon, rey 39, cap. 9.

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Beats a detachment of Swiss.

Gonsalvo found the French sorely distressed by the blockade, which was so strictly maintained as to allow few supplies from abroad to pass into the town. His quick eye discovered, at once, however, that in order to render it perfectly effectual, it would be necessary to destroy the mills in the vicinity, which supplied Atella with flour. He undertook this, on the day of his arrival, at the head of his own corps. Montpensier, aware of the importance of these mills, had stationed a strong guard for their defence, consisting of a body of Gascon archers, and the Swiss pikemen. Although the Spaniards had never been brought into direct collision with any large masses of this formidable infantry, yet occasional rencontres with small detachments, and increased familiarity with its tactics, had stripped it of much of its terrors. Gonsalvo had even so far profited by the example of the Swiss, as to strengthen his infantry by mingling the long pikes with the short swords and bucklers of the Spaniards.²⁹

He made two divisions of his cavalry, posting his handful of heavy-armed, with some of the light horse, so as to check any sally from the town, while he destined the remainder to support the infantry in the attack upon the enemy. Having made these arrangements, the Spanish chieftain led on his men confidently to the charge. The Gascon archery, however, seized with a panic, scarcely

²⁹ This was improving on the somewhat similar expedient ascribed by Polybius to King Pyrrhus, who mingled alternate cohorts, armed with short weapons after the Roman fashion, with those of his Macedonian spearmen. Lib. 17, sec. 24.

awaited his approach, but fled shamefully, before they had time to discharge a second volley of arrows, leaving the battle to the Swiss. These latter, exhausted by the sufferings of the siege, and dispirited by long reverses, and by the presence of a new and victorious foe, did not behave with their wonted intrepidity, but, after a feeble resistance, abandoned their position, and retreated towards the city. Gonsalvo, having gained his object, did not care to pursue the fugitives, but instantly set about demolishing the mills, every vestige of which, in a few hours, was swept from the ground. Three days after, he supported the Neapolitan troops in an assault on Ripa Candida, and carried that important post, by means of which Atella maintained a communication with the interior.³⁰

Thus cut off from all their resources, and no longer cheered by hopes of succour from their own country, the French, after suffering the severest privations, and being reduced to the most loathsome aliment for subsistence, made overtures for a capitulation. The terms were soon arranged with the king of Naples, who had no desire but to rid his country of the invaders. It was agreed, that, if the French commander did not receive assistance in thirty days, he should evacuate Atella, and cause every place holding under him in the kingdom of Naples, with all its artillery, to be sur-

Capitulation
of Montpen-
sier.

³⁰ Gioivo, *Hist. sui Temporis*, lib. 4, p. 133. — *Idem*, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, pp. 220, 221. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 27. — *Crónica del Gran Cap-*

itan, cap. 28. — Quintana, *Espanoles Célebres*, tom. i. p. 229. — Abarca, *Reyes de Aragon*, rey 30, cap. 9.

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rendered to King Ferdinand; and that, on these conditions, his soldiers should be furnished with vessels to transport them back to France; that the foreign mercenaries should be permitted to return to their own homes; and that a general amnesty should be extended to such Neapolitans as returned to their allegiance in fifteen days.³¹

Such were the articles of capitulation, signed on the 21st of July, 1496, which Comines, who received the tidings at the court of France, does not hesitate to denounce as "a most disgraceful treaty, without parallel, save in that made by the Roman consuls at the Caudine Forks, which was too dishonorable to be sanctioned by their countrymen." The reproach is certainly unmerited; and comes with ill grace from a court, which was wasting in riotous indulgence the very resources indispensable to the brave and loyal subjects, who were endeavouring to maintain its honor in a foreign land.³²

Miserable
state of the
French.

Unfortunately Montpensier was unable to enforce the full performance of his own treaty; as many of the French refused to deliver up the places intrusted to them, under the pretence that their authority was derived, not from the viceroy, but from the king himself. During the discussion of this point, the French troops were removed to Baia and Pozzuolo, and the adjacent places on the coast. The unhealthiness of the situation, together with

³¹ Villeneuve, Mémoires, p. 318.
— Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap.
21. — Giovio, Hist. sui Temporis,
lib. 4, p. 136.

³² Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8
chap. 21.

that of the autumnal season, and an intemperate indulgence in fruits and wine, soon brought on an epidemic among the soldiers, which swept them off in great numbers. The gallant Montpensier was one of the first victims. He refused the earnest solicitations of his brother-in-law, the marquis of Mantua, to quit his unfortunate companions, and retire to a place of safety in the interior. The shore was literally strewed with the bodies of the dying and the dead. Of the whole number of Frenchmen, amounting to not less than five thousand, who marched out of Atella, not more than five hundred ever reached their native country. The Swiss and other mercenaries were scarcely more fortunate. "They made their way back as they could through Italy," says a writer of the period, "in the most deplorable state of destitution and suffering, the gaze of all, and a sad example of the caprice of fortune."³³ Such was the miserable fate of that brilliant and formidable array, which scarcely two years before had poured down on the fair fields of Italy in all the insolence of expected conquest. Well would it be, if the name of every conqueror, whose successes, though built on human misery, are so dazzling to the imagination, could be made to point a moral for the instruction of his species, as effectually as that of Charles the Eighth.

The young king of Naples did not live long to enjoy his triumphs. On his return from Atella, he

Death of
Ferdinand
of Naples.

³³ Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, p. 137. — Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 21. — Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 1, p. 221. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 3, p. 160. — Ville-neuve, *Mémoires*, apud Petitot, tom. xiv. p. 318.

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contracted an inauspicious marriage with his aunt, a lady nearly of his own age, to whom he had been long attached. A careless and somewhat intemperate indulgence in pleasure, succeeding the hardy life which he had been lately leading, brought on a flux which carried him off in the twenty-eighth year of his age, and second of his reign. He was the fifth monarch, who, in the brief compass of three years, had sat on the disastrous throne of Naples.

Ferdinand possessed many qualities suited to the turbulent times in which he lived. He was vigorous and prompt in action, and naturally of a high and generous spirit. Still, however, he exhibited glimpses, even in his last hours, of an obliquity, not to say ferocity of temper, which characterized many of his line, and which led to ominous conjectures as to what would have been his future policy.³⁴ He was succeeded on the throne by his uncle Frederic, a prince of a gentle disposition, endeared to the Neapolitans by repeated acts of benevolence, and by a magnanimous regard for justice, of which the remarkable fluctuations of his fortune had elicited more than one example. His amiable virtues, however, required a kindlier soil and season for their expansion; and, as the event proved, made him no

³⁴ Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, lib. 29, cap. 2. — Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, lib. 6, cap. 2. — Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 188.

While stretched on his deathbed, Ferdinand, according to Bembo, caused the head of his prisoner,

the Bishop of Teano, to be brought to him, and laid at the foot of his couch, that he might be assured with his own eyes of the execution of the sentence. *Istoria Viniziana*, lib. 3, p. 189.

match for the subtile and unscrupulous politicians of the age.

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His first act was a general amnesty to the disaffected Neapolitans, who felt such confidence in his good faith, that they returned, with scarcely an exception, to their allegiance. His next measure was to request the aid of Gonsalvo de Cordova in suppressing the hostile movements made by the French during his absence from Calabria. At the name of the Great Captain, the Italians flocked from all quarters, to serve without pay under a banner, which was sure to lead them to victory. Tower and town, as he advanced, went down before him; and the French general, D'Aubigny, soon saw himself reduced to the necessity of making the best terms he could with his conqueror, and evacuating the province altogether. The submission of Calabria was speedily followed by that of the few remaining cities in other quarters, still garrisoned by the French; comprehending the last rood of territory possessed by Charles the Eighth in the kingdom of Naples.³⁵

Total expulsion of the French.

³⁵ Giovio, *Hist. sui Temporis*, lib. 4, p. 139. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 30, 33. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 3, p. 160. — Giannone, *Istoria di Napoli*, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 3.

Our narrative now leads us on the beaten track of Italian history. I have endeavoured to make the reader acquainted with the peculiar character and pretensions of the principal Spanish authorities, on whom I have relied in the progress of the work. This would be superfluous in regard to the Italian,

who enjoy the rank of classics, not only in their own country, but throughout Europe, and have furnished the earliest models among the moderns of historic composition. Fortunately, two of the most eminent of them, Guicciardini and Paolo Giovio, lived at the period of our narrative, and have

Remarks on Guicciardini and Giovio.

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embraced the whole extent of it in their histories. These two writers, besides the attractions of elegant scholarship, and talent, occupied a position which enabled them to take a clear view of all the principal political movements of their age; circumstances, which have made their accounts of infinite value in respect to foreign transactions, as well as domestic. Guicciardini was a conspicuous actor in the scenes he describes: and a long residence at the court of Ferdinand the Catholic opened to him the most authentic sources of information in regard to Spain. Giovio, from his intimate relations with the principal persons of his time, had also access to the best sources of knowledge, while in the notice of foreign transactions he was but little exposed to those venal influences, which led him too often to employ the golden or iron pen of history as interest dictated. Unfortunately, a lamentable hiatus occurs in his greatest work, "*Historiæ sui Temporis*," embracing the whole period intervening between the end of Charles VIII.'s expedition and the accession of Leo X., in 1513. At the time of the memorable sack of Rome by the Duke of Bourbon, in 1527, Giovio deposited his manuscript, with a quantity of plate, in an iron chest, which he hid in an obscure corner of the church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva. The treasure, however, did not escape the searching eyes of two Spanish soldiers, who broke open the chest, and one of them seized on the plate, regarding the papers as of no value. The other, not being quite such a fool, says Giovio, preserved such of the manuscripts as were on vellum, and ornamented with rich bindings, but threw away what was written on paper.

The part thus thrown away contained six books, relating to the period above mentioned, which were never afterwards recovered. The soldier brought the remainder to

their author, who bought them at the price of a vacant benefice, which he persuaded the pope to confer on the freebooter, in his native land of Cordova. It is not often that simony has found so good an apology. The deficiency, although never repaired by Giovio, was in some degree supplied by his biographies of eminent men, and, among others, by that of Gonsalvo de Cordova, in which he has collected with great industry all the events of any interest in the life of this great commander. The narrative is in general corroborated by the Spanish authorities, and contains some additional particulars, especially respecting his early life, which Giovio's personal intimacy with the principal characters of the period might easily have furnished.

This portion of our story is, moreover, illustrated by the labors of M. Sismondi, in his "*Républiques Italiennes*," which may undoubtedly claim to be ranked among the most remarkable historical achievements of our time; whether we consider the dexterous management of the narrative, or the admirable spirit of philosophy by which it is illumined. It must be admitted, that he has perfectly succeeded in unravelling the intricate web of Italian politics; and, notwithstanding the complicated, and, indeed, motley character of his subject, the historian has left a uniform and harmonious impression on the mind of the reader. This he has accomplished, by keeping constantly in view the principle which regulated all the various movements of the complex machinery; so that his narrative becomes, what he terms it in his English abridgment, a history of Italian liberty. By keeping this principle steadily before him, he has been able to solve much that hitherto was dark and problematical in his subject; and, if he has occasionally sacrificed something to theory, he has, on the whole, pursued the investigation in a truly philosophical manner, and

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arrived at results the most honorable and cheering to humanity.

Fortunately, his own mind was deeply penetrated with reverence for the free institutions, which he has analyzed. If it is too much to say, that the historian of republics should be himself a republican, it is at least true, that his soul should be penetrated to its very depths with the spirit which animates them. No one, who is not smitten with the love of freedom, can furnish the key to much that is enigmatical in her character, and reconcile his readers to the harsh and repulsive features, that she sometimes wears, by revealing the

beauty and grandeur of the soul within.

That portion of our narrative which is incorporated with Italian story, is too small to occupy much space on Sismondi's plan. He has discussed it, moreover, in a manner not very favorable to the Spaniards, whom he seems to have regarded with somewhat of the aversion, with which an Italian of the sixteenth century viewed the ultramontane barbarians of Europe. Perhaps the reader may find some advantage in contemplating another side of the picture, and studying the less familiar details presented by the Spanish authorities.



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CHAPTER III.

ITALIAN WARS.—GONSALVO SUCCOURS THE POPE.—TREATY WITH FRANCE.—ORGANIZATION OF THE SPANISH MILITIA.

1496 — 1498.

Gonsalvo Succours the Pope.—Storms Ostia.—Reception in Rome.—Peace with France.—Ferdinand's Reputation advanced by his Conduct in the War.—Organization of the Militia.

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War on the
side of
Roussillon.

It had been arranged by the treaty of Venice, that, while the allies were carrying on the war in Naples, the emperor elect and the king of Spain should make a diversion in their favor, by invading the French frontiers. Ferdinand had performed his part of the engagement. Ever since the beginning of the war, he had maintained a large force along the borders from Fontarabia to Perpignan. In 1496, the regular army kept in pay amounted to ten thousand horse and fifteen thousand foot; which, together with the Sicilian armament, necessarily involved an expenditure exceedingly heavy under the financial pressure occasioned by the Moorish war. The command of the levies in Roussillon was given to Don Enrique Enriquez de Guzman, who, far from acting on the defensive, carried his men repeatedly over the border, sweeping off fifteen or twenty thousand head of cattle in

a single foray, and ravaging the country as far as Carcassona and Narbonne.¹ The French, who had concentrated a considerable force in the south, retaliated by similar inroads, in one of which they succeeded in surprising the fortified town of Salsas. The works, however, were in so dilapidated a state, that the place was scarcely tenable, and it was abandoned on the approach of the Spanish army. A truce soon followed, which put an end to further operations in that quarter.²

The submission of Calabria seemed to leave no further occupation for the arms of the Great Captain in Italy. Before quitting that country, however, he engaged in an adventure, which, as narrated by his biographers, forms a brilliant episode to his regular campaigns. Ostia, the seaport of Rome, was, among the places in the papal territory, forcibly occupied by Charles the Eighth, and on his retreat had been left to a French garrison under the command of a Biscayan adventurer named Menaldo Guerri. The place was so situated as entirely to command the mouth of the Tiber, enabling the piratical horde who garrisoned it almost wholly to destroy the commerce of Rome, and even to reduce the city to great distress for want of provis-

¹Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 12-14, 16, 24.

Giovinio says, in allusion to King Ferdinand's show of preparation on the frontier, "Ferdinandus, maxime cautus et pecuniæ tenax, speciem ingentis coacti exercitûs ad deterrendos hostes præbere, quam bellum gerere mallet, quum id sine ingenti pecuniâ administrari non

posse intelligeret." Hist. sui Temporis, p. 140.

²Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 35, 36. — Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, rey 30, cap. 9. — Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, cap. 5. — Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 23. — Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 169.

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The pope
asks the aid
of Gonsalvo.

ions. The imbecile government, incapable of defending itself, implored Gonsalvo's aid in dislodging this nest of formidable freebooters. The Spanish general, who was now at leisure, complied with the pontiff's solicitations, and soon after presented himself before Ostia with his little corps of troops, amounting in all to three hundred horse and fifteen hundred foot.³

Storming
and capture
of Ostia.

Guerri, trusting to the strength of his defences, refused to surrender. Gonsalvo, after coolly preparing his batteries, opened a heavy cannonade on the place, which at the end of five days effected a practicable breach in the walls. In the mean time, Garcilasso de la Vega, the Castilian ambassador at the papal court, who could not bear to remain inactive so near the field where laurels were to be won, arrived to Gonsalvo's support, with a handful of his own countrymen resident in Rome. This gallant little band, scaling the walls on the opposite side to that assailed by Gonsalvo, effected an entrance into the town, while the garrison was occupied with maintaining the breach against the main body of the Spaniards. Thus surprised, and hemmed in on both sides, Guerri and his associates made no further resistance, but surrendered themselves prisoners of war; and Gonsalvo, with more clemency than was usually shown on such occasions, stopped the carnage, and reserved his captives to grace his entry into the capital.⁴

³ Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, p. 221. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, cap. 30. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 3, cap. 1.

— Villeneuve, *Mémoires*, p. 317.
⁴ Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, p. 222. — Quintana, *Españoles Célebres*, tom. i. p. 234.

This was made a few days after, with all the pomp of a Roman triumph. The Spanish general entered by the gate of Ostia, at the head of his martial squadrons in battle array, with colors flying and music playing, while the rear was brought up by the captive chief and his confederates, so long the terror, now the derision of the populace. The balconies and windows were crowded with spectators, and the streets lined with multitudes, who shouted forth the name of Gonsalvo de Cordova, the "deliverer of Rome!" The procession took its way through the principal streets of the city towards the Vatican, where Alexander the Sixth awaited its approach, seated under a canopy of state in the chief saloon of the palace, surrounded by his great ecclesiastics and nobility. On Gonsalvo's entrance, the cardinals rose to receive him. The Spanish general knelt down to receive the benediction of the pope; but the latter, raising him up, kissed him on the forehead, and complimented him with the golden rose, which the Holy See was accustomed to dispense as the reward of its most devoted champions.

In the conversation which ensued, Gonsalvo obtained the pardon of Guerri and his associates, and an exemption from taxes for the oppressed inhabitants of Ostia. In a subsequent part of the discourse, the pope taking occasion most inopportunistically to accuse the Spanish sovereigns of unfavorable dispositions towards himself, Gonsalvo replied with much warmth, enumerating the various good offices rendered by them to the church; and, roundly

CHAPTER
III.

Gonsalvo enters Rome.

His reception by the pope.

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taxing the pope with ingratitude, somewhat bluntly advised him to reform his life and conversation, which brought scandal on all Christendom. His Holiness testified no indignation at this unsavoury rebuke of the Great Captain, though, as the historians with some *naïveté* inform us, he was greatly surprised to find the latter so fluent in discourse, and so well instructed in matters foreign to his profession.⁵

Returns to
Spain.

Gonsalvo experienced the most honorable reception from King Frederic on his return to Naples. During his continuance there, he was lodged and sumptuously entertained in one of the royal fortresses; and the grateful monarch requited his services with the title of Duke of St. Angelo, and an estate, in Abruzzo, containing three thousand vassals. He had before pressed these honors on the victor, who declined accepting them till he had obtained the consent of his own sovereigns. Soon after, Gonsalvo, quitting Naples, revisited Sicily, where he adjusted certain differences which had arisen betwixt the viceroy and the inhabitants respecting the revenues of the island. Then embarking with his whole force, he reached the shores of Spain in the month of August, 1498. His return to his native land was greeted with a general enthusiasm far more grateful to his patriotic heart, than any homage or honors conferred by foreign princes. Isabella welcomed him with pride and satisfaction, as

⁵ Giovinetti, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, p. 222. — Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 1. — Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 3, p. 175. — Chronica del Gran Capitan, cap. 30.

having fully vindicated her preference of him to his more experienced rivals for the difficult post of Italy; and Ferdinand did not hesitate to declare, that the Calabrian campaigns reflected more lustre on his crown, than the conquest of Granada.⁶

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The total expulsion of the French from Naples brought hostilities between that nation and Spain to a close. The latter had gained her point, and the former had little heart to resume so disastrous an enterprise. Before this event, indeed, overtures had been made by the French court for a separate treaty with Spain. The latter, however, was unwilling to enter into any compact, without the participation of her allies. After the total abandonment of the French enterprise, there seemed to exist no further pretext for prolonging the war. The Spanish government, moreover, had little cause for satisfaction with its confederates. The emperor had not coöperated in the descent on the enemy's frontier, according to agreement; nor had the allies ever reimbursed Spain for the heavy charges incurred in fulfilling her part of the engagements. The Venetians were taken up with securing to themselves as much of the Neapolitan territory as they could, by way of indemnification for their own expenses.⁷ The duke of Milan had already made a separate treaty with King Charles.

Peace with
France.

⁶ Giovo, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, p. 223. — *Crónica del Gran Capitán*, cap. 31, 32. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 3, cap. 38.

⁷ Comines says, with some *naveté*, in reference to the places in Naples which the Venetians had

got into their possession, "Je croy que leur intention n'est point de les rendre; car ils ne l'ont point de coutume quand elles leur sont bienséantes comme sont cellescy, qui sont du costé de leur goufre de Venise." *Mémoires*, p. 194.

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In short, every member of the league, after the first alarm subsided, had shown itself ready to sacrifice the common weal to its own private ends. With these causes of disgust, the Spanish government consented to a truce with France, to begin for itself on the 5th of March, and for the allies, if they chose to be included in it, seven weeks later, and to continue till the end of October, 1497. This truce was subsequently prolonged, and, after the death of Charles the Eighth, terminated in a definitive treaty of peace, signed at Marcoussi, August 5th, 1498.⁸

Ferdinand's
views re-
specting
Naples.

In the discussions to which these arrangements gave rise, the project is said to have been broached for the conquest and division of the kingdom of Naples by the combined powers of France and Spain, which was carried into effect some years later. According to Comines, the proposition originated with the Spanish court, although it saw fit, in a subsequent period of the negotiations, to disavow the fact.⁹ The Spanish writers, on the other hand, impute the first suggestion of it to the French, who, they say, went so far as to specify the details of the partition subsequently adopted; according to which the two Calabrias were assigned to Spain. However this may be, there is little

⁸ Guicciardini, *Istoria*, lib. 3, p. 178. — Zurita, *Hist. del Rey Hernando*, lib. 2, cap. 44; lib. 3, cap. 13, 19, 21, 26. — Comines, *Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 23.

⁹ Comines gives some curious details respecting the French embassy, which he considers to have been

completely outwitted by the superior management of the Spanish government; who intended nothing further at this time by the proposal of a division, than to amuse the French court until the fate of Naples should be decided. *Mémoires*, liv. 8, chap. 23.

doubt that Ferdinand had long since entertained the idea of asserting his claim, at some time or other, to the crown of Naples. He, as well as his father, and indeed the whole nation, had beheld with dissatisfaction the transfer of what they deemed their rightful inheritance, purchased by the blood and treasure of Aragon, to an illegitimate branch of the family. The accession of Frederic, in particular, who came to the throne with the support of the Angevin party, the old enemies of Aragon, had given great umbrage to the Spanish monarch.

The Castilian envoy, Garcilasso de la Vega, agreeably to the instructions of his court, urged Alexander the Sixth to withhold the investiture of the kingdom from Frederic, but unavailingly, as the pope's interests were too closely connected, by marriage, with those of the royal family of Naples. Under these circumstances, it was somewhat doubtful what course Gonsalvo should be directed to pursue in the present exigency. That prudent commander, however, found the new monarch too strong in the affections of his people to be disturbed at present. All that now remained for Ferdinand, therefore, was to rest contented with the possession of the strong posts pledged for the reimbursement of his expenses in the war, and to make such use of the correspondence which the late campaigns had opened to him in Calabria, that, when the time arrived for action, he might act with effect.¹⁰

¹⁰ Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 2, cap. 26, 33.— Mariana, Hist. de España, lib. 26, cap.

16.— Salazar de Mendoza, Monarquía, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 10.

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His fame ac-
quired by
the war.

Ferdinand's conduct through the whole of the Italian war had greatly enhanced his reputation throughout Europe for sagacity and prudence. It afforded a most advantageous comparison with that of his rival, Charles the Eighth, whose very first act had been the surrender of so important a territory as Roussillon. The construction of the treaty relating to this, indeed, laid the Spanish monarch open to the imputation of artifice. But this, at least, did no violence to the political maxims of the age, and only made him regarded as the more shrewd and subtle diplomatist; while, on the other hand, he appeared before the world in the imposing attitude of the defender of the church, and of the rights of his injured kinsman. His influence had been clearly discernible in every operation of moment, whether civil or military. He had been most active, through his ambassadors at Genoa, Venice, and Rome, in stirring up the great Italian confederacy, which eventually broke the power of King Charles; and his representations had tended, as much as any other cause, to alarm the jealousy of Sforza, to fix the vacillating politics of Alexander, and to quicken the cautious and dilatory movements of Venice. He had shown equal vigor in action; and contributed mainly to the success of the war by his operations on the side of Roussillon, and still more in Calabria. On the latter, indeed, he had not lavished any extraordinary expenditure; a circumstance partly attributable to the state of his finances, severely taxed, as already noticed, by the Granadine war, as well as by the operations in

Roussillon, but in part, also, to his habitual frugality, which, with a very different spirit from that of his illustrious consort, always stinted the measure of his supplies to the bare exigency of the occasion. Fortunately the genius of the Great Captain was so fruitful in resources, as to supply every deficiency; enabling him to accomplish such brilliant results, as effectually concealed any poverty of preparation on the part of his master.

The Italian wars were of signal importance to the Spanish nation. Until that time, they had been cooped up within the narrow limits of the Peninsula, uninstructed and taking little interest in the concerns of the rest of Europe. A new world was now opened to them. They were taught to measure their own strength by collision with other powers on a common scene of action; and, success inspiring them with greater confidence, seemed to beckon them on towards the field, where they were destined to achieve still more splendid triumphs.

Influence of
the war on
Spain.

This war afforded them also a most useful lesson of tactics. The war of Granada had insensibly trained up a hardy militia, patient and capable of every privation and fatigue, and brought under strict subordination. This was a great advance beyond the independent and disorderly habits of the feudal service. A most valuable corps of light troops had been formed, schooled in all the wild, irregular movements of guerrilla warfare. But the nation was still defective in that steady, well-disciplined infantry, which, in the improved condition

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of military science, seemed destined to decide the fate of battles in Europe thenceforward.

The Calabrian campaigns, which were suited in some degree to the display of their own tactics, fortunately gave the Spaniards opportunity for studying at leisure those of their adversaries. The lesson was not lost. Before the end of the war important innovations were made in the discipline and arms of the Spanish soldier. The Swiss pike, or lance, which, as has been already noticed, Gonsalvo de Cordova had mingled with the short sword of his own legions, now became the regular weapon of one third of the infantry. The division of the various corps in the cavalry and infantry services was arranged on more scientific principles, and the whole, in short, completely reorganized.¹¹

Before the end of the war, preparations were made for embodying a national militia, which should take the place of the ancient hermandad. Laws were passed regulating the equipment of every individual according to his property. A man's arms were declared not liable for debt, even to the crown; and smiths and other artificers were restricted, under severe penalties, from working them up into other articles.¹² In 1496, a census

¹¹ Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. Ilust. 6.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 6.

The ancient Spaniards, who were as noted as the modern, for the temper and finish of their blades, used short swords, in the management of which they were very adroit. "Hispano," says Livy, "punctim magis, quam cæsim, ad-suetu petere hostem, brevitare ha-

biles [gladii] et cum mucronibus." (Hist., lib. 23, cap. 47.) Sandoval notices the short sword, "cortas espadas," as the peculiar weapon of the Spanish soldier in the twelfth century. Historia de los Reyes de Castilla y de Leon, (Madrid, 1792,) tom. ii. p. 240.

¹² Pragmáticas del Reyno, fol. 83, 127, 129.

The former of these ordinances,

was taken of all persons capable of bearing arms; and by an ordinance, dated at Valladolid, February 22d, in the same year, it was provided that one out of every twelve inhabitants, between twenty and forty-five years of age, should be enlisted in the service of the state, whether for foreign war, or the suppression of disorders at home. The remaining eleven were liable to be called on in case of urgent necessity. These recruits were to be paid during actual service, and excused from taxes; the only legal exemptions were the clergy, hidalgos, and paupers. A general review and inspection of

dated Tاراçona, Sept. 18th, 1495, is extremely precise in specifying the appointments required for each individual.

Among other improvements, introduced somewhat earlier, may be mentioned that of organizing and thoroughly training a small corps of heavy-armed cavalry, amounting to twenty-five hundred. The number of men-at-arms had been greatly reduced in the kingdom of late years, in consequence of the exclusive demand for the *ginetes* in the Moorish war. Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS.

Ordinances were also passed for encouraging the breed of horses, which had suffered greatly from the preference very generally given by the Spaniards to mules. This had been carried to such a length, that, while it was nearly impossible, according to Bernaldez, to mount ten or twelve thousand cavalry on horses, ten times that number could be provided with mules. (Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 184.) "E por que si a esto se diese lugar," says one of the *pragmáticas*, adverting to this evil, "muy prestamente se perderia én nuestros reynos la nobleza de la cauelleria que en ellos

suele auer, e se oluidaria el exercicio militar de que en los tiempos passados nuestra nacion de España ha alcançado gran fama e loor;"

it was ordered that no person in the kingdom should be allowed to keep a mule, unless he owned a horse also; and that none but ecclesiastics and women should be allowed the use of mules in the saddle. These edicts were enforced with the utmost rigor, the king himself setting the example of conformity to them. By these seasonable precautions, the breed of Spanish horses, so long noted throughout Europe, was restored to its ancient credit, and the mule consigned to the humble and appropriate offices of drudgery, or raised only for exportation. For these and similar provisions, see *Pragmáticas del Reyno*, fol. 127-132.

Matéo Aleman's whimsical *picaresco* novel, *Guzman d'Alfarache*, contains a comic adventure, showing the excessive rigor with which the edict against mules was enforced, as late as the close of Philip II.'s reign. The passage is extracted in Roscoe's elegant version of the Spanish Novelists, Vol. I. p. 132.

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arms were to take place every year, in the months of March and September, when prizes were to be awarded to those best accoutred, and most expert in the use of their weapons. Such were the judicious regulations by which every citizen, without being withdrawn from his regular occupation, was gradually trained up for the national defence; and which, without the oppressive incumbrance of a numerous standing army, placed the whole effective force of the country, prompt and fit for action, at the disposal of the government, whenever the public good should call for it.¹³

¹³ See a copy of the ordinance taken from the Archives of Simancas; apud Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. apend. 13.

When Francis I., who was destined to feel the effects of this careful military discipline, beheld, during his detention in Spain in the beginning of the following century,

striplings with scarce down upon the chin, all armed with swords at their sides, he is said to have cried out, "O bienaventurada España, que pare y cria los hombres armados!" (L. Marineo, *Cosas Memorables*, lib. 5.) An exclamation not unworthy of a Napoleon, — or an Attila.