

The advance of the party was not conducted so cautiously, but that it reached the ear of Don Diego Fernandez de Cordova, *alcayde de los donzeles*, or captain of the royal pages, who commanded in the town of Lucena, which he rightly judged was to be the principal object of attack. He transmitted the intelligence to his uncle the count of Cabra, a nobleman of the same name with himself, who was posted at his own town of Baena, requesting his support. He used all diligence in repairing the fortifications of the city, which, although extensive and originally strong, had fallen somewhat into decay; and, having caused such of the population as were rendered helpless by age or infirmity to withdraw into the interior defences of the place, he coolly waited the approach of the enemy.³

The Moorish army, after crossing the borders, began to mark its career through the Christian territory with the usual traces of devastation, and, sweeping across the environs of Lucena, poured a marauding foray into the rich *campiña* of Cordova, as far as the walls of Aguilar; whence it returned, gluttoned with spoil, to lay siege to Lucena about the 21st of April.

Marches on
Lucena.

Arabes, tom. iii. cap. 36. — Cardonne, Hist. d'Afrique et d'Espagne, tom. iii. pp. 267-271. — Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 60. — Pedraza, Antigüedad de Granada, fol. 10. — Marmol, Rebellion de Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 12.

³ Pulgar, Reyes Católicos, part. 3, cap. 20.

The *donzeles*, of which Diego de Cordova was *alcayde*, or captain, were a body of young cavaliers, originally brought up as pages in the royal household, and organized as a separate corps of the militia. Salazar de Mendoza, Dignidades, p. 259. — See also Morales, Obras, tom. xiv. p. 80.

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I.Battle of
Lucena.

The count of Cabra, in the mean while, who had lost no time in mustering his levies, set forward at the head of a small but well-appointed force, consisting of both horse and foot, to the relief of his nephew. He advanced with such celerity that he had wellnigh surprised the beleaguering army. As he traversed the sierra, which covered the Moorish flank, his numbers were partially concealed by the inequalities of the ground; while the clash of arms and the shrill music, reverberating among the hills, exaggerated their real magnitude in the apprehension of the enemy. At the same time the *alcayde de los donzeles* supported his uncle's advance by a vigorous sally from the city. The Granadine infantry, anxious only for the preservation of their valuable booty, scarcely waited for the encounter, before they began a dastardly retreat, and left the battle to the cavalry. The latter, composed, as has been said, of the strength of the Moorish chivalry, men accustomed in many a border foray to cross lances with the best knights of Andalusia, kept their ground with their wonted gallantry. The conflict, so well disputed, remained doubtful for some time, until it was determined by the death of the veteran chieftain Ali Atar, "the best lance," as a Castilian writer has styled him, "of all Morisma," who was brought to the ground after receiving two wounds, and thus escaped by an honorable death the melancholy spectacle of his country's humiliation. ⁴

⁴ Conde, *Dominacion de los Reyes de Aragon*, tom. ii. fol. abes, tom. iii. cap. 36. — Abarca, 302. — Carbajal, *Anales*, MS.,

The enemy, disheartened by this loss, soon began to give ground. But, though hard pressed by the Spaniards, they retreated in some order, until they reached the borders of the Xenil, which were thronged with the infantry, vainly attempting a passage across the stream, swollen by excessive rains to a height much above its ordinary level. The confusion now became universal, horse and foot mingling together; each one, heedful only of life, no longer thought of his booty. Many, attempting to swim the stream, were borne down, steed and rider, promiscuously in its waters. Many more, scarcely making show of resistance, were cut down on the banks by the pitiless Spaniards. The young king Abdallah, who had been conspicuous during that day in the hottest of the fight, mounted on a milk-white charger richly caparisoned, saw fifty of his loyal guard fall around him. Finding his steed too much jaded to stem the current of the river, he quietly dismounted and sought a shelter among the reedy thickets that fringed its margin, until the storm of battle should have passed over. In this lurking place, however, he was discovered by a common soldier named Martin Hurtado, who, without recognising his person, instantly attacked him. The prince defended himself with his scimitar, until Hurtado, being joined by two of his countrymen, succeeded in making him prisoner. The men, overjoyed at their prize (for Abdallah had revealed his rank, in order to secure his person from violence),

Capture of
Abdallah.

año 1483. — Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 61.—Pulgar, Crónica, cap. 20.—Marmol, Rebelion de Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 12.

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conducted him to their general, the count of Cabra. The latter received the royal captive with a generous courtesy, the best sign of noble breeding, and which, recognised as a feature of chivalry, affords a pleasing contrast to the ferocious spirit of ancient warfare. The good count administered to the unfortunate prince all the consolations which his state would admit; and subsequently lodged him in his castle of Baena, where he was entertained with the most delicate and courtly hospitality.⁵

Losses of the
Moors.

Nearly the whole of the Moslem cavalry were cut up, or captured, in this fatal action. Many of them were persons of rank, commanding high ransoms. The loss inflicted on the infantry was also severe, including the whole of their dear-bought plunder. Nine, or indeed, according to some accounts, two and twenty banners fell into the hands of the Christians in this action; in commemoration of which the Spanish sovereigns granted to the count of Cabra, and his nephew, the alcaide de los donzeles, the privilege of bearing the same number of banners on their escutcheon, together with the head of a Moorish king, encircled by a golden coronet, with a chain of the same metal around the neck.⁶

⁵ Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. p. 637. — Pulgar, Reyes Católicos, ubi supra. — Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 61. — Conde, Dominacion de los Arabes, tom. iii. cap. 36. — Cardonne, Hist. d'Afrique et d'Espagne, tom. iii. pp. 271-274.

The various details, even to the site of the battle, are told in the

usual confused and contradictory manner by the garrulous chroniclers of the period. All authorities, however, both Christian and Moorish, agree as to its general results.

⁶ Mendoza, Dignidades, p. 382. — Oviedo, Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 4, dial. 9.

Great was the consternation occasioned by the return of the Moorish fugitives to Granada, and loud was the lament through its populous streets; for the pride of many a noble house was laid low on that day, and their king (a thing unprecedented in the annals of the monarchy) was a prisoner in the land of the Christians. "The hostile star of Islam," exclaims an Arabian writer, "now scattered its malignant influences over Spain, and the downfall of the Mussulman empire was decreed."

The sultana Zoraya, however, was not of a temper to waste time in useless lamentation. She was aware that a captive king, who held his title by so precarious a tenure as did her son Abdallah, must soon cease to be a king even in name. She accordingly despatched a numerous embassy to Cordova, with proffers of such a ransom for the prince's liberation, as a despot only could offer, and few despots could have the authority to enforce.⁷

Moorish embassy to Cordova.

King Ferdinand, who was at Vitoria with the queen, when he received tidings of the victory of Lucena, hastened to the south to determine on the destination of his royal captive. With some show of magnanimity, he declined an interview with Abdallah, until he should have consented to his liberation. A debate of some warmth occurred in the royal council at Cordova, respecting the policy to be pursued; some contending that the Moorish monarch was too valuable a prize to be so readily relinquished, and that the enemy, broken by the loss

Debates in the Spanish Council.

⁷ Conde, *Dominacion de los Arabes*, tom. iii. cap. 36.—Cardonne, *Hist. d'Afrique et d'Espagne*, pp. 271-274.

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of their natural leader, would find it difficult to rally under one common head, or to concert any effective movement. Others, and especially the marquis of Cadiz, urged his release, and even the support of his pretensions against his competitor, the old king of Granada; insisting that the Moorish empire would be more effectually shaken by internal divisions, than by any pressure of its enemies from without. The various arguments were submitted to the queen, who still held her court in the north, and who decided for the release of Abdallah, as a measure best reconciling sound policy with generosity to the vanquished.⁸

Treaty with
Abdallah.

The terms of the treaty, although sufficiently humiliating to the Moslem prince, were not materially different from those proposed by the sultana Zoraya. It was agreed that a truce of two years should be extended to Abdallah, and to such places in Granada as acknowledged his authority. In consideration of which, he stipulated to surrender four hundred Christian captives without ransom, to pay twelve thousand doblas of gold annually to the Spanish sovereigns, and to permit a free passage, as well as furnish supplies, to their troops passing through his territories, for the purpose of carrying on the war against that portion of the kingdom which still adhered to his father. Abdallah moreover bound himself to appear when summoned by

⁸ Pulgar, Reyes Católicos, cap. 23. — Marmol, Rebelion de Moriscos, lib. 1, cap. 12.

Charles V. does not seem to have partaken of his grandfather's

delicacy in regard to an interview with his royal captive, or indeed to any part of his deportment towards him.

Ferdinand, and to surrender his own son, with the children of his principal nobility, as sureties for his fulfilment of the treaty. Thus did the unhappy prince barter away his honor and his country's freedom for the possession of immediate, but most precarious sovereignty; a sovereignty, which could scarcely be expected to survive the period when he could be useful to the master whose breath had made him.⁹

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The terms of the treaty being thus definitively settled, an interview was arranged to take place between the two monarchs at Cordova. The Castilian courtiers would have persuaded their master to offer his hand for Abdallah to salute, in token of his feudal supremacy; but Ferdinand replied, "Were the king of Granada in his own dominions, I might do this; but not while he is a prisoner in mine." The Moorish prince entered Cordova with an escort of his own knights, and a splendid throng of Spanish chivalry, who had marched out of the city to receive him. When Abdallah entered the royal presence, he would have prostrated himself on his knees; but Ferdinand, hastening to prevent him, embraced him with every demonstration of respect. An Arabic interpreter, who acted as orator, then expatiated, in florid hyperbole, on the magnanimity and princely qualities of the Spanish king, and the loyalty and good faith of his own master. But Ferdinand interrupted his

Interview
between
the two
kings.

⁹ Pulgar, Reyes Católicos, ubi supra. — Conde, Dominacion de los Arabes, cap. 36.

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eloquence, with the assurance that "his panegyric was superfluous, and that he had perfect confidence that the sovereign of Granada would keep his faith as became a true knight and a king." After ceremonies so humiliating to the Moorish prince, notwithstanding the veil of decorum studiously thrown over them, he set out with his attendants for his capital, escorted by a body of Andalusian horse to the frontier, and loaded with costly presents by the Spanish king, and the general contempt of his court.¹⁰

General policy of the war.

Notwithstanding the importance of the results in the war of Granada, a detail of the successive steps by which they were achieved would be most tedious and trifling. No siege or single military achievement of great moment occurred until nearly four years from this period, in 1487; although, in the intervening time, a large number of fortresses and petty towns, together with a very extensive tract of territory, were recovered from the enemy. Without pursuing the chronological order of events, it is probable that the end of history will be best attained by presenting a concise view of the general policy pursued by the sovereigns in the conduct of the war.

Incessant hostilities.

The Moorish wars under preceding monarchs had consisted of little else than *cavalgadas*, or inroads into the enemy's territory,¹¹ which, pouring like a torrent over the land, swept away whatever was

¹⁰ Pulgar, Reyes Católicos, loc. cit.—Conde, Dominación de los Arabes, cap. 36.

be used indifferently by the ancient Spanish writers to represent a marauding party, the foray itself, or the booty taken in it.

¹¹ The term *cavalgada* seems to

upon the surface, but left it in its essential resources wholly unimpaired. The bounty of nature soon repaired the ravages of man, and the ensuing harvest seemed to shoot up more abundantly from the soil, enriched by the blood of the husbandman. A more vigorous system of spoliation was now introduced. Instead of one campaign, the army took the field in spring and autumn, intermitting its efforts only during the intolerable heats of summer, so that the green crop had no time to ripen, ere it was trodden down under the iron heel of war.

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The apparatus for devastation was also on a much greater scale than had ever before been witnessed. From the second year of the war, thirty thousand foragers were reserved for this service, which they effected by demolishing farm-houses, granaries, and mills, (which last were exceedingly numerous in a land watered by many small streams,) by eradicating the vines, and laying waste the olive-gardens and plantations of oranges, almonds, mulberries, and all the rich varieties that grew luxuriant in this highly favored region. This merciless devastation extended for more than two leagues on either side of the line of march. At the same time, the Mediterranean fleet cut off all supplies from the Barbary coast, so that the whole kingdom might be said to be in a state of perpetual blockade. Such and so general was the scarcity occasioned by this system, that the Moors were glad to exchange their Christian captives for provisions, until such ransom was interdicted by the

Devastating
forays.

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sovereigns, as tending to defeat their own measures.¹²

Still there was many a green and sheltered valley in Granada, which yielded its returns unmolested to the Moorish husbandman; while his granaries were occasionally enriched with the produce of a border foray. The Moors too, although naturally a luxurious people, were patient of suffering, and capable of enduring great privation. Other measures, therefore, of a still more formidable character, became necessary in conjunction with this rigorous system of blockade.

Strength of
the Moorish
fortresses.

The Moorish towns were for the most part strongly defended, presenting within the limits of Granada, as has been said, more than ten times the number of fortified places that are now scattered over the whole extent of the Peninsula. They stood along the crest of some precipice, or bold sierra, whose natural strength was augmented by the solid masonry with which they were surrounded, and which, however insufficient to hold out against modern artillery, bade defiance to all the enginery of battering warfare known previously to the fifteenth century. It was this strength of fortification, combined with that of their local position, which frequently enabled a slender garrison in these places to laugh to scorn all the efforts of the proudest Castilian armies.

The Spanish sovereigns were convinced, that

¹² Pulgar, Reyes Católicos, cap. 22. — Mem. de la Acad. de Hist., tom. vi. Ilust. 6.