

extreme example of the demoralizing effect of the possession of despotic power upon minds of ordinary mould. As a simple janissary, he might possibly have passed through life unstained by any especial disgrace; as Sultan, he was one of the vilest occupants of an Oriental throne. One of the outrages recorded of him is that, having conceived a passion for the beautiful wife of an ex-beglierbei of Anatolia, he caused a pretended invitation to be sent to her from his own wives, an invitation which the husband gladly permitted her to accept. The result was that the lady passed twelve days alone with Selim, and was then sent back to her husband. The poor man set off to Constantinople to complain to the Sultan, but was waylaid by the emissaries of Selim and compelled to return, on which he poisoned himself for grief and shame.¹ Previous to his accession he had been the nominal governor of a Province of Asia Minor, the real business of his life being gluttony, drunkenness, and every other form, natural and unnatural, of sensual indulgence, sometimes varied by the sports of the field. In character, as well as in person, he even then presented, in the estimation of the Turks, a very unfavourable contrast to his unfortunate brothers Mustafa and Bajazet. Although averse to exertion, he had commanded his father's troops against Bajazet on the plains of Koniah. But even his success there lent no lustre to his unpopular name. The old soldiers attributed the victory, not to Selim, but to his tutor Mustafa Pasha, who, observing his hopeful pupil about to ride away from the field, seized his rein and led him back to see the battle won;² and they openly preferred Bajazet vanquished and fugitive to Selim victorious. From his father Solyman,³ whom the Christians surnamed the Magnificent, and the Turks the Legislator, Selim inherited none of the qualities which had entitled that great Prince to either of these designations. Holding himself aloof from the real business of government, he rarely presided over his council, and never approached the green curtain, from behind which wiser Sultans had been wont to watch their judges dispensing justice to their people. Hardly able to read or write, he was as incapable of understanding as of directing the complicated affairs of his vast empire. Next to his women and boys, his favourite companions were a few Jewish parasites, some of whom invented dishes to please his palate, while others

¹ *Relazione* of Marc Ant. Domini, 1562. Alberi: *Relazioni Veneti*, Serie III. vol. iii. p. 180.

² *Relazione anonima*, 1579, p. 445.

³ Hammer: *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*. Paris, 1836, 8vo, tom. vi. p. 238.

amused him with the news which their commercial relations with their widely-spread people enabled them to supply from all parts of the world.¹ Yet in the conduct of his affairs, his ministers were never sure that their master might not suddenly interfere,



MAHOMET SOKOLLI.

by giving some absurd and extravagant order, which it was dangerous to dispute and impossible to obey. In these cases it was necessary to affect compliance, humouring him like a spoiled child, until the fancy had passed into oblivion. Even Mahomet

Andrea Badoaro : *Relazione*, 1573, p. 361.

Sokolli, the trusted counsellor of Solyman, to whose prudent management of the army at Szigeth Selim owed his peaceable accession to the Crown, used to say that he would on no account openly oppose any of the Sultan's wishes, and that if he were to order him instantly to fit out two thousand galleys, he would by no means tell him that the thing could not be done.¹ The trembling servants of Selim could not forget how, in a fit of drunken fury, he shot dead with an arrow one of his most favourite minions.²

In person he was said to have resembled in early life his Russian mother, the famous Roxalana, whose imperious temper he had inherited without her vigorous understanding. His disorderly life had, however, long ago effaced all traces of her transmitted beauty. Excess, both in eating and drinking (for he was said to remain sometimes for whole days and nights at table, and to drink a bottle of spirits every morning by way of aiding his digestion), had bloated his cheek and dulled his eye.³ He was, however, not a little proud of his crimson complexion, and dyed his hands and face to a blood colour. To the western stranger, who was led through the wide courts of the Seraglio, between long ranks of janissaries, terrible and silent as death, to the barbaric pomp of his presence-chamber, or who beheld him riding at noon to mosque, glittering with gems, amongst his gilded and jewelled cavaliers, the little fiery-faced infidel with his beard dyed jet, his blackened eyelids, and his huge turban, must have appeared the very personification of the fierce and wicked heathen tyrant of chivalrous romance.

If his brief reign belong to the splendid period of Turkish history; if it produced some of the chief monuments of Mahometan legislation, and added several Arabian Provinces and the royal isle of Cyprus to the dominions of the Crown; if the Selimye mosque, whose airy domes and delicate spires so nobly crown the city of Adrian, equals or perhaps excels the temples left to Constantinople by Solyman and Justinian, the glory of these achievements is due not to the indolent monarch who soiled the throne with the foulest vices, but to the unexhausted impulse of a better time, and to that able band of renegades and soldiers of fortune trained in the school of Solyman—quick-witted Greeks and Italians, bold Albanians, patient Bosnians and Croats—who bartered their genius and valour for the gold of the slothful Turk.

¹ Constantino Garzoni : *Relazione*, 1573, pp. 405-6.

² *Ibid.* p. 402.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 401-2.

With the sceptre of his father Selim inherited a war with the Emperor Maximilian. This war had been undertaken by Solyman in the hope of conquering Germany, by Maximilian in the hope of recovering his Hungarian dominions. No substantial advantage having been gained on either side, both the Christian Emperor and the Turk were glad to seize the occasion of Solyman's death to make peace, each belligerent maintaining the ground held by him before the war. An outbreak among the Arab



THE EMPEROR MAXIMILIAN II.

tribes on the eastern frontiers, a war with Persia, and a revolt in Yemen, engaged the attention and the arms of Selim for the first years of his reign. It was not until 1569-70 that he was at leisure again to employ his powers against a Christian foe.

Selim was generally supposed to be unwarlike and personally timid. Of this, indeed, he had given various proofs when informed that his brother was coming to attack him. But he nevertheless seemed to consider that it would become him as an Ottoman Prince to distinguish his reign by some feat of arms and some

addition to the territory of the empire; and even before his father's death he had fixed upon the island of Cyprus as the scene of his future conquests. He was fond of talking of the island with Cypriot renegades or exiles, asking about its position, fortresses, and ports, the strength of the Venetian garrison, the places most favourable for disembarking an invading army, the manner in which Venice would be able to send effective aid in case of a siege, the length of time such aid would take in arriving, and other questions bearing on the design attributed to him. It was therefore suspected by some of those about him that although by his father's policy he was not entrusted with any part of the business of the State, yet on his accession he would revive the warlike name of his grandfather, Selim I.¹

In his father's time Selim had been suspected of bearing no good-will to Venice. But on his accession to the Crown he at once confirmed the peace which had so long existed between Solyman and the Republic, and he appeared entirely to acquiesce in the friendly policy which had always been maintained towards her by the Grand Vizier, Mahomet Sokolli. Venetian agents at Constantinople reported that the navy of the Sultan was receiving additions, and that it was less powerful than it had been some years before. The traders of Venice, on the contrary, were unusually active, and were extending their relations with the seaports and marts of Turkey.² The general aspect of public affairs in the Levant tended to encourage commercial confidence and to lull the Republic into complete security. When the bad harvest of 1569, almost universal in Italy and Dalmatia, and the destruction, in September of that year, of part of the arsenal of Venice by the explosion of a powder magazine, were followed by a warning from the minister at Constantinople to arm for a war with Turkey, the catastrophe at the arsenal was hardly a greater surprise than the news from the Levant.

The rich and beautiful island of Cyprus, lying almost within sight of the shores of Syria, had long been coveted by the Sultans. Before his accession to the throne Selim had taken into his especial favour a Portuguese adventurer of Jewish origin, who had married at Constantinople a rich Jewess, and had returned to the faith of his fathers. On his marriage and conversion the Portuguese exchanged his European surname of Miguez for that of Nassy. To this man, who had supplied him with wine of Cyprus

¹ *Relazione* of Marc Ant. Domini, 1562. Alberi: *Relazioni Veneti*, Serie III. vol. iii. p. 182.

² Paruta: *Guerra di Cipro*, 8vo, Vinetia, 1645, p. 9.

and sequins of Venice, the Turkish Prince, in a moment of drunken fondness, had promised the sovereignty of the fair isle which provided the vintage and the gold. Intoxicated like his master with the prospect, Nassy hung up in his house the arms of the royal island with the inscription,—“Joseph, King of Cyprus.” On the death of Solyman he took care that Selim should not forget his promise. A foretaste of his high fortune was soon given to him in the Duchy of Naxos and the Cyclades, a principality which was violently taken for that purpose from a Greek of the Fanar, who held it under the protectorate of Venice. When peace was established in Hungary and Arabia he again pressed his claims upon Cyprus, and lost no opportunity of stirring up strife between Venice and the Porte.

He was supported by the Grand Mufti, Ebou Sououd, and by the Viziers Piali Pasha, a Hungarian renegade, and Lala Mustafa Pasha, formerly tutor of Selim, both of whom had commanded at the famous siege of Malta in 1565, and who were burning for an occasion of effacing by some brilliant feat of arms the stigma of their repulse by La Valette and his gallant knights of St. John. They asserted, with some truth, that Venice was suffering severely from the late bad harvest; that withholding or cutting off the supplies of corn which she drew from the East would reduce her to the depths of famine; and, with gross exaggeration, that the recent fire in the arsenal had destroyed the greatest part of her naval armament and munitions. They likewise argued that the Christian powers had always regarded Venice with distrust, and that they were now so deeply engaged in foreign wars or civil discords—England and France being torn with religious factions, Spain occupied in quelling risings in Granada and the Netherlands, Poland at war with Russia, Italy agitated by the feuds of the Pope and the Princes of Savoy, Florence, Mantua, and Ferrara,—that a league amongst them for her protection was impossible; and that now was the time to snatch from her the prize, her possession of which was a reproach and a menace to Turkey. The enterprise, they said, was so easy that the risk bore an insignificant proportion to the gain.

The Grand Vizier, Mahomet Sokolli, who had commanded the army of Hungary after the death of Solyman, and of whom he had been the most trusted counsellor, held a different opinion. The sworn enemy of Nassy, whose promotion and whose projects he steadily opposed, he was extremely averse to war for the sake of gratifying the ambition of a minion whose favour with the

Sultan he considered a disgrace to the Crown. It was still, however, an axiom of Turkish policy that to preserve the empire was to extend it; and the janissary and his captain looked upon war on one or other of the frontiers as a necessary condition of national prosperity. The Grand Vizier therefore did not directly advocate peace; but as he combated the proposed expedition by suggesting another much more hazardous and far less promising, it is probable that to gain time was his immediate object, and to preserve peace his ultimate end. He maintained the propriety and the policy of observing the treaty with Venice. Admitting the jealousy with which she was regarded by the Christian powers, he held it to be no less certain that they would, for their own sakes, combine to protect her from so serious a blow as the loss of Cyprus, while their united armaments would exceed the forces that the Sultan could at present command. The commerce of Venice rendered her so dependent on the good-will of the Porte that, in spite of whatever offence she might have given, she was most sincerely anxious to retain it; and, being the Sultan's nearest neighbour, she was also his natural ally in the Mediterranean. The House of Austria was, on the contrary, his natural enemy. Let them therefore attack that house in its most vulnerable part by assisting the Moriscos of Granada. The cause was the holy cause of the Prophet; the rich Provinces of Granada and Valencia would easily defray the expense of the war; and the powers of Christendom, although they would deem it necessary to unite for the defence of Venice, would leave the mighty monarch of Spain to fight his own battles.

The arguments of Nassy and his party prevailed, being seconded not only by the inclinations of Selim, but by a maritime achievement of the knights of Malta. Three galleys of St. John had waylaid three Turkish treasure-ships on their voyage from Alexandria to Constantinople, and captured two of them; an insult which touched the Sultan the more keenly because the Maltese cruisers had watched for their prey in one of the harbours of Cyprus. Barbaro, the Venetian ambassador, was informed that the ports of Venice could no longer be suffered to protect pirates, and he was put under arrest in his house at Pera. The question whether it was lawful to break the treaty with the Republic was submitted to the Grand Mufti, and was resolved by him, in terms frequently used by Christian doctors in like emergencies, by the assurance that the true believer was never bound to keep faith with infidels.

The winter of 1569-70 was spent in vigorous preparation for war. The Grand Vizier, Mahomet Sokolli, the good and faithful servant of an unworthy master, was unwearied in fitting out an expedition, the object of which he disapproved, and the glory of which he was not to share. To the last he appears to have indulged a hope of being able to change its destination, and to preserve peace with Venice. While the dockyards and arsenals rang day and night with the sound of tools, the capital was thronged by volunteers, far beyond the numbers wanted, for enlistment in the fleet and army of the Sultan. Although it was not concealed that further conquests from the Christians were to be made, the precise point of attack was kept secret as long as possible. It was given out that the forces were to be sent against Spain; and the Morisco envoys, who came to represent to the Commander of the Faithful the perilous condition of the rebels in the Alpuxarras, were comforted with promises which were in truth intended to mislead the Venetians.

Venice, however, was not so easily hoodwinked. Her shrewd envoy Barbaro, although a prisoner, contrived to keep his eye on the warlike preparations, to penetrate the counsels of the Divan, and to send notices of both to his Government, who nevertheless received his communications with considerable incredulity.

In March the armament was almost ready to sail. The Pashas, who advocated the war policy, were for striking an unexpected blow and seizing Cyprus by a surprise. Mahomet the Vizier, however, having more of the instincts of civilization, overruled this course, and obtained the Sultan's leave to despatch an envoy to Venice formally to demand the surrender of the island. Cubat Ciaus set out for this purpose in April 1570. While they were waiting for his return with the reply of the Republic, the indefatigable Barbaro made a last effort, and succeeded in bringing over to the Venetian interest no less a personage than the Grand Mufti,¹ who had lately pronounced the rupture with Venice just and holy. After due deliberation, this shameless priest repaired to the Sultan, and told him that he had indeed encouraged the attack upon Cyprus, but it was because he was ignorant of the rising of the Moriscos in Spain; that as Commander of the Faithful, it was His Majesty's first duty to assist these unhappy people; and he impudently added that if he

¹ M. A. Barbaro: *Relazione*, 1573, p. 325, where this piece of bribery is narrated with some humour. "Aspettandosi *Cubat-Ciaus*," says Barbaro, "feci io con destri ed opportuni mezzi buoni uffici con esso *mufti*," etc.

neglected this duty all good Moslems, his subjects, might compel him to fulfil it. Whatever effect this surprising advice may have had upon the fiery-faced Selim was entirely dissipated on the



PIETRO LOREDANO, DOGE OF VENICE FROM OCTOBER 1568 TO MAY 1570.

return of the envoy from Venice. In the hall of the Great Council Cubat had had an audience of the Doge and Senate, and had called upon them to relinquish Cyprus, as a part of the territories which belonged of right to the lord of Egypt and Jerusalem. From the aged Doge, Pietro Loredano, he had received a brief

and dignified refusal, and a letter for his master, in which that refusal was repeated and some of the pompous Oriental titles of Selim were retrenched. Contrary to all usage, the Sultan sent for his emissary in order to hear from his own lips the insolence of the Republic. His red face burned yet more fiercely; he ordered the immediate departure of the expedition; and he himself talked of moving down to the Syrian coast to superintend its operations and share its triumphs.

When it was plain that war was inevitable, Venice naturally turned for aid with great anxiety to the Christian powers. The experience of the last hundred and twenty years had taught her that she was unable to sustain, single-handed, a struggle with the Great Turk. Thrice she had tried her strength with him, since the crescent had supplanted the cross on the dome of St. Sophia. In these wars, or by her dexterous diplomacy, she had gained Cyprus, Zante, and Cephalonia. But she had lost Negropont, her best towns in the Morea and Albania, and nearly all the islands of the Archipelago. Her losses were far greater than her gains. The Ottoman, on the other hand, had aggrandized his house with conquests, compared with which the considerable territories wrested from him were of small account. Selim I. had added to his empire the splendid Provinces of Syria and Egypt, and Solyman II. had driven back the outpost of Christendom from Rhodes, and had extended his power far along the African shore. Her recent history therefore warned Venice that a war with the Porte was full of peril; and that if she had been worsted by Mahomet II. it was probable that she would fare no better in a struggle with his more powerful descendant.

But while she was constrained by necessity to seek the aid of her Christian neighbours against the Turk, her past relations both with the Turk and the Christians rendered it doubtful whether efficient aid would be accorded.

The Venetian minister whose duty it was, in the winter of 1569-70, to endeavour to avert the hostility of a Sultan resolved upon war was indeed engaged in a task hopeless of accomplishment. But the position of those Venetian envoys, who were seeking for aid at other courts, was hardly less discouraging. The proud Republic was hated by Kings as a Republic, by the maritime powers as a rival, and by fanatics as the ally of the infidel. It was true that most of the Mediterranean States had, at one time or another, been on friendly terms with the Turk; that his flag had often been united with that of the Most Chris-

tian King ; that the King of France owed Corsica to the aid of a Turkish fleet ; and that a vicar of Christ had even invited the soldiers of Mahomet to invade Italy.¹ It was also true that Venice had been engaged in long and bloody conflicts with Turkey. Still her neighbours, who hoped to profit by her losses, had some ground for the charge against her that she was neither Turk nor Christian, but something between both. She had often been at peace with the Sultan when they had been at war. To her neutrality might be attributed some of the most signal triumphs of the Turk. She had even aided him in driving the unhappy Greek fugitives from the rocky islets in which they had fixed their home. Her shores had been respected when Calabria and the march of Ancona had been ravaged by Turkish cruisers. The banner of St. John went down at Rhodes, while Venetian war-galleys lay idle in the harbours of Cyprus and Candia. The knights of Malta stood at bay against the whole power of Solyman, unaided by a gun from the arsenal or a ducat from the treasury of Venice. While the Christian faith was sustaining these shocks, the ambassadors of Venice were assuring the Sultan of her friendship.

It was in vain that the Venetian envoys pleaded the difficulties which beset the Republic, dangers and difficulties which had been increasing every year since the fall of Constantinople. The Turk was her nearest and most powerful neighbour, and the long and intricate frontier of their dominions exposed her to constant disputes, insults, and attacks. Her commerce, so important to all Europe, was in many of its principal seats at his mercy. Her position therefore demanded the exercise of the greatest prudence and forbearance, and the maintenance towards the Turk of a cautious and pacific policy, which sometimes, perhaps, might be unfavourably regarded, and was always liable to misconstruction by those Christian powers who looked on from a secure distance.

Such were the arguments urged by the Venetian ministers at the various courts of Christendom from Cracow to Lisbon. The aid even of Persia was invoked at Teheran. But the success of the representatives of the Republic by no means equalled their zeal and eloquence. Their appeals were for the most part addressed to unwilling ears, and elicited little beyond words, sometimes fair words, and sometimes words tinged with irony. The Princes who were most capable of rendering efficient aid were

¹ Alexander VI., alarmed by the approach of Charles VIII., invited Bajazet II. to do this.

also those who stood aloof with the most marked coldness. The Shah, from whom indeed but little had been expected, while bountifully dispensing through his ministers empty compliments and barren promises, eluded the personal importunities of the ambassador, who had to retrace his toilsome steps without gaining access to the royal presence.¹ Sigismund, King of Poland, was too much exhausted by recent war to enter the lists against Turkey. The Emperor Maximilian had but lately concluded a peace with the Sultan, and he naturally preferred the friendship of a powerful neighbour and the safety of his own territories to the interests of another neighbour against whose encroachments on his Sclavonian frontier he was always exercising extreme vigilance. The Italian powers were somewhat better disposed. Pope Pius V., although Venice was less obedient to pontifical authority than any other Catholic State, though she allowed no churchman to hold a civil office under her rule, and although she held in a curb of iron his favourite Inquisition, placed at her disposal two galleys, and offered to fit out twelve for her service. The Duke of Savoy also offered some ships, and the Dukes of Florence and Urbino some troops. Charles IX., King of France, was too distant to afford any military aid, and he had no navy; he was unwilling to disturb the ties of friendship with the Porte which he had inherited, and he was, besides, at war with half his subjects,—the worse than heathen heretics. The King of Spain, whose dominions embraced so much of the Mediterranean shore, and who wielded so large a share of the naval power of Europe, was the natural protector of Christendom, and the natural enemy of the Turk. But the jealousy with which he regarded Venice was almost as strong as his fear and hatred of the infidel, and he received her overtures with marked coldness and reserve. Don Sebastian, the young King of Portugal, was friendly, but declined lending active aid, pleading the plague which had lately wasted his realm, and the drain of that constant warfare which he was waging with the infidel in the eastern seas. Elizabeth of England, although on good terms with the Republic, could not be expected to take any prominent part in any league between the Catholic States of the South, headed by the Pope, who had pronounced her excommunicate, had deposed her from the throne, and was plotting to take her life. Venice was therefore compelled to begin the war without the cordial alliance or efficient co-operation of any one of the first-rate powers.

¹ Paruta : *Hist. della Guerra di Cipro*, large 8vo, Venetia, 1645, p. 25.

But in this her hour of need she found help where she had been but little accustomed to find or to seek it—in the chair of St. Peter. Of all the States which adhered to Roman dogma, Venice was perhaps the least submissive to pontifical authority or influence. Of all Pontiffs, Pius V. was perhaps the most disposed to magnify his office. Yet Turkish ambition had brought these uncongenial powers into close and intimate relations. In the dangers of the Republic the Pope saw a means of realizing his fondest hope; and, master of two worn-out galleys, he conceived the plan of placing himself at the head of a maritime league, and a new crusade against the infidel.

While negotiating with the Turk for the preservation of peace, and with the Christians for support in war, the Republic was also arming and preparing herself for the conflict. The fire at the arsenal had, happily, not crippled her maritime resources, and a considerable fleet was soon ready for sea. The exchequer was replenished by some additional taxation, by loans which the richer citizens were induced to advance by the admission of every lender of twenty thousand ducats to the coveted dignity of Procurator of St. Mark's and by the sale of some public posts, and of the right of sitting in the Great Council before the legal age.¹ There was no lack of volunteers either from the city itself or from the provinces on the mainland. The garrisons of the Dalmatian coast and the Greek islands were strengthened and victualled, and large reinforcements both of men and munitions were despatched to Cyprus.

In the midst of these preparations, and only a few days after the dismissal of the Turkish envoy, the Doge Pietro Loredano died. He was already oppressed with the weight of eighty-five years when he crept up the giant's stairs to receive the horned cap of the Ducal dignity. That cap now passed to the head of Luigi Mocenigo, a man of greater bodily vigour and intellectual capacity. His eloquence was so remarkable that when ambassador, or orator, as ambassadors were then frequently called, to the Emperor Charles V., that monarch gracefully told him that he esteemed himself more fortunate than Philip of Macedon in his opportunities of listening to an orator greater than Demosthenes.

The events of the war in 1570 do not concern this history, except in so far as they affected the political and military combinations of the year following. They shall therefore be but briefly narrated.

¹ Paruta : *Guerra di Cipro*, Vinetia, 1654, p. 35.

Hostilities were commenced by the Turks in a few unimportant attacks by sea and land on the Venetian towns of Dalmatia. The isle of Tino was next ravaged, but the assailants were repulsed from the fortress by the valour of Geronimo Paruta. The main armament of the Sultan, after cruising in various directions through the Archipelago, assembled at Rhodes in June. Some time was spent in collecting men and supplies from the adjacent coasts of Asia Minor; and the sun of July had embrowned the pastures of Mount Olympus ere the shepherds who kept their flocks near the ancient haunts of Venus and the Muses descried the Ottoman fleet of upwards of three hundred sail bearing down upon Cyprus.¹ Piali Pasha commanded the fleet, Mustafa Pasha the troops. Landing without hindrance at Limasol, the army soon overran the flat country, and halted beneath the walls of Nicosia, the capital, and almost the central point of the island. Here Mustafa found himself at the head of fifty thousand regular infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and irregular troops who swelled his total numbers to one hundred thousand men. The place had been strengthened with great care by the Venetians. Its once vast area had been reduced by the destruction of many of its three hundred churches, amongst which was the great temple of St. Dominic, rich with the monuments of the crusading Kings. It was well supplied with artillery and ammunition; and it was garrisoned by ten thousand fighting men. The civil governor, Nicolas Dandolo, was, however, unworthy of his post, of the great occasion, and of his great name. Having rashly dismissed a considerable number of the militia forces of the island just before the Turks landed, he had great difficulty in recalling them to their standards; and his neglect to victual the place when there was yet time produced the double evil of great scarcity in the city and great plenty in the camp of the invader. His military associates, brave but inexperienced, had little more capacity than himself; and the chief of his artillery hardly knew the sound or use of a cannon. But in spite of incompetent leaders the garrison of Nicosia repulsed several assaults, and held out until the 9th of September, when the place was taken partly by surprise and partly by storm, and all within its walls were butchered.

The whole island immediately submitted to the Turks, except

¹ There is some discrepancy between the numbers as stated by different historians. J. de Hammer (*Hist. de l'Empire Ottoman*, tom. vi. p. 399), following Turkish authorities, states it at three hundred and sixty; Contarini (*Historia della Guerra contra Turchi*, 4to, Venetia, 1645, fol. 9) at three hundred and forty; Paruta calls it more than three hundred.

the last stronghold of the Venetians, the small city and seaport of Famagosta. Thither Mustafa immediately marched his victorious army, hoping for a more speedy and easy victory. But in Marc Antonio Bragadino, the civil governor, and Astor Baglione, the military chief, he found foemen of sterner stuff than the defenders of Nicosia. In the hands of these gallant men, a garrison numbering seven thousand, and fortifications of no great strength, cut off from all succour from without, were sufficient to bar the progress of the Sultan's mighty host. In vain Turkish horsemen rode in view of the walls, bearing on the points of their lances the heads of the principal citizens and soldiers of Nicosia; in vain the fleet of Piali Pasha cruised off the harbour; in vain Mustafa Pasha opened his trenches and armed his batteries on



land, and sent into the city continual warnings of the hopelessness of relief. The stout hearts, skilful dispositions, and bold sallies of the besieged kept one leader at bay, while the approach of the autumnal gales and the dangers of a havenless shore compelled the other to steer for a safer anchorage. The siege was turned into a blockade, and active operations were postponed until the spring.

Cosimo, Duke of Florence, went to Rome in February 1568 to receive the Grand-Ducal Crown bestowed on him by Pius V., and during that visit he is said to have pointed out to the Pope that the only way in which Christendom could make head against the Turk was by a League between the Pope, Venice, and the King of Spain; and he is also said to have been mainly instrumental in bringing about that alliance. When its forces began to be raised, the Grand Duke, between Pisa and Leghorn, caused

to be fitted out twelve galleys, a royal gallcon, a small "*galconcello*," and a frigate, and equipped them with everything needful for naval warfare. Of these vessels the Pope paid only six galleys, the rest being sent to the aid of the League at the expense of the Grand Duke himself. While these galleys were being built and fitted out the Grand Duke took great interest in the work, and resided at Pisa, and often visited Leghorn, and by exposure to cold contracted a disorder which confined him to bed for forty days, and which is supposed to have been the beginning of the disorder which carried him off on 21st April 1574.¹

The command of the naval armament of Venice was conferred upon Girolamo Zanne, a citizen of great wealth, who had held various public posts with credit, which he was not destined to increase at sea. Under him Francesco Duodo had eleven heavy ships of war, while Pietro Trono had charge of the frigates and lighter vessels. Marco Quirini, a gallant and skilful officer, was ordered to repair to the Adriatic with twenty galleys from Candia. The Dalmatian port of Zara was the point at which Zanne was directed to collect his forces.

The twelve galleys of the Pope were the only addition to the armament furnished by the Italian Princes. The vessels themselves were lent by the Republic, and were fitted out and armed at the Pope's expense, eight of them at Ancona, and four at Venice. They were commanded by Marc Antonio Colonna, Duke of Pagliano. This squadron was not the only aid for which Venice was indebted to the Pontiff; for Pius, by means of a special mission, had so far thawed the temper of the King of Spain that his Viceroys were allowed to supply provisions to the Venetian authorities, and his Sicilian fleet of forty-nine galleys received orders to act in concert with the fleets of the Church and the Republic.

In spite of this promised support, the naval operations of Venice were carried on in a spirit of languor and procrastination which, at this distance of time, are inexplicable. The Doge and Senate, after their scornful reply to the insolent demand of Selim, can hardly have believed in the possibility of peace, or have doubted that the infuriated Sultan would throw his whole available force upon Cyprus. Yet some such lingering belief or doubt appears the sole key to their policy. While the different divisions of the Turkish fleet, each heavily burdened with men, horses, and

¹ B. Baldini: *Vita di Cosimo Primo Gr. D. di Toscano*, Firenze, 1578, fol., pp. 76, 77, 78.

stores, were threading their way through the Archipelago, any one of them might have been attacked at great advantage' even by an inferior force if boldly led, and the destruction of any one of them might have marred the whole expedition. Nevertheless, Zanne with his seventy galleys lay first at Zara and afterwards at Corfu, either wholly inactive, or engaged in paltry enterprises against Albanian strongholds, in which little credit was to be gained and some disgrace was actually incurred. Celsi with forty-eight galleys, and four thousand troops under Sforza Pallavicino, were sent against Margariti; but they effected nothing except a fruitless landing and an ignominious retreat.¹ Misfortune, as so often happens, came in the train of mismanagement. The scurvy broke out in the fleet and amongst the troops with such violence that no less than twenty thousand men met a useless and inglorious death. Amongst these were a large proportion of two thousand infantry, a fine body of men, whose complete equipment and martial bearing had excited great popular enthusiasm when they were paraded, but a few weeks before, in St. Mark's Place.² The only events in favour of Venice worthy of note during this disastrous summer were the defence of Tino, the capture of Sopoto in Albania by Veniero, and the destruction of Maina in the Morea by Quirini. The sole but insufficient excuse for the lingering of the Venetian fleet in the Adriatic was the delay of the Papal and Sicilian squadrons in joining it. It was at last compelled to sail without them. At the end of July, about the time when Mustafa had securely landed his army in Cyprus, and had opened his works before Nicosia, Zanne steered for the Levant, not to attempt the relief of the devoted island, but to enjoy change of air in the secure haven of Candia.

The Papal admiral, Marc Antonio Colonna, Duke of Pagliano, and head of the great Roman House of Colonna, played so considerable a part in the political and military affairs of this war, that to him may be ascribed no small share of the Christian success. From his youth he had followed the profession of arms, both by land and sea. He took an active part on the Spanish side in the war of 1557 with Paul IV.; and he led three galleys of his own in the expedition to Africa, in which Peñon de Velez was won for the Spanish Crown. As hereditary Grand Constable of Naples, he was one of the great Italian vassals of the King of Spain, who had rewarded his services with the Golden Fleece, and with whom he enjoyed considerable credit. At Venice,

¹ Paruta: *Guerra di Cipro*, lib. i. pp. 42-44.

² *Ibid.* p. 17.

where he also enjoyed rights of nobility, he was likewise very popular.

Four of the twelve galleys which the Republic had promised to lend to the Pope not being forthcoming even in July, Colonna repaired to Venice to expedite the affair. He had had cause to complain that the vessels already sent to Ancona were very old and nearly worn out; and he was now offered the mere refuse of the arsenal. But he was so ready to make allowance on the part of the Pope for the pressure of a great emergency, and so liberal



MARC ANTONIO COLONNA, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE PAPAL FLEET AT LEPANTO.

in agreeing to defray certain expenses over and above the bargain, that the Venetians on their side determined to be generous, and supplied him with a quantity of victuals and arms not required by the contract. Having by his temper and tact acquired the confidence and good-will of the statesmen of the Republic, he very soon had the satisfaction of seeing his squadron complete at Ancona. He was now in his thirty-fifth year; tall, and dignified, somewhat bald, with large fine eyes and a fresh complexion; very courteous in manner, of a cool temper, and ready and eloquent in speech; brave and loyal; skilful in his profession and in the ways of the world; and thoroughly in earnest in the work on which he had entered.

The commander of the Sicilian fleet, Giovanni Andrea (or more commonly called Gianandrea) Doria, the nephew and heir of the great Andrea, was one of the chiefs of the nobles of Genoa, and probably the principal private shipowner of his time. Twelve galleys, his private property, but in the pay of the King of Spain, formed part of the Sicilian fleet. He had been all his life engaged in the seafaring profession, and he was now in his thirty-first year. In person he was eminently disagreeable, being lean and ungraceful in figure, with a high sharp head, swarthy complexion, sunken eyes, and a swollen pendulous nether lip, which may account for the rare occurrence of his portraits amongst either the pictures or engravings of his time. But in this ugly body was lodged a keen and penetrating intellect, a firm will, and great knowledge of mankind. A bold and skilful seaman, Doria knew also how to steer his course both at the Court of Spain and in the public councils and private cabals of Genoa, and wielded great influence both at Madrid and at home.

But Philip II. could hardly have found in his whole service, naval or military, a man less suited for duties which involved active and friendly co-operation with a Venetian admiral and a Venetian armament. For centuries, the very name of Doria had been enough to arouse the resentment of Venice. Although Genoa was, in all but name, a dependency of the Spanish Crown, there was no Genoese eye but kindled at the recollection of those bloody victories which the proud Republic had, in old days, won from Venice, in the Adriatic, the Levant, or the Euxine; and in almost every one of these encounters it was a Doria whose flag had led the battle-line of St. George, or whose sword had guided the stormers into the Venetian stronghold. If Venice had forgotten these old stories, she had certainly not forgotten how Andrea Doria, the Imperial admiral, little more than thirty years before, by his crafty tactics, plucked victory from the banner of St. Mark, saved the fleet of Barbarossa, and exposed Venice to the fury of Solyman. In the mind of every Venetian sailor, with the name of Doria was linked the ill-omened name of Prevesa.

Whatever the grudge or distrust with which Doria was regarded by the Republic or her officers, he repaid their ill-will in full; and it was impossible for any Spaniard to take a more entirely Spanish view of the alliance of the Pope, Spain, and Venice, than was taken by the powerful Genoese.

The three powers had agreed that their combined fleet was to be commanded by the Papal admiral. Venice specially in-

structed Zanne to treat Doria with all deference, and to yield him the second place. But while Philip II. wrote to Colonna that Doria was to obey him and follow the Papal standard, he added the significant words: "I charge and entreat you that you avail yourself during the expedition in all things of the advice of Gianandrea," words which, addressed to one of the King's



GIOVANNI ANDREA DORIA, COMMANDER OF THE SQUADRON OF SICILY AT LEPANTO.

own vassals, went far towards investing Doria with co-ordinate authority.

The Papal and Spanish squadrons were to meet at Otranto. Colonna anchored there on the 7th of August. Doria, who had been employed in revictualling and reinforcing the Goletta and some of the African possessions of the Spanish Crown, did not sail from Messina till the 14th, nor appear at Otranto until the

21st. Nor did he then report his arrival, as he ought to have done, to his superior officer, but waited until Colonna visited him on board his galley. Of this slight the Roman leader took no notice, but loaded Doria with courtesies, until he had shamed or coaxed him into better manners. From the first the Genoese made no secret of his dislike to the service on which he was about to be employed, and was never weary of dilating on the insufficient preparations of Venice, and the invincible power of the Turk. On the 23d the united squadrons sailed for Candia, and on the last day of August entered the Gulf of Suda, sailing in between the red Venetian galleys drawn up in two lines to receive them with all demonstrations of joy and honour.

Colonna found himself at the head of twelve Papal, forty-nine Spanish, and one hundred and fifty-four Venetian vessels—in all two hundred and five sail. He held his first council on the 1st of September. Zanne, who had recent accounts of the desperate condition of Cyprus, urged that they should immediately sail thither, and either make a descent on the island to relieve Nicosia, or attack the Turkish fleet while stripped of the troops employed on the siege. Colonna warmly supported the proposal. Doria as resolutely opposed it, on the ground that the Venetians were weakened by their late losses by the scurvy, that the Turks were strong, and that the destruction, or serious damage, or even the repulse of the allied fleet, would be a heavy disaster for all Christendom. He professed his willingness to fight, if the Venetians could show that they were prepared; but he hoped they would decide quickly. To the consultation he himself contributed no fresh proposition; nothing, in fact, beyond the announcement that he must return to Sicily by the end of the month. The Spanish officers were somewhat divided in opinion. Don Juan de Cardona sided with Doria; but Don Alvaro Bazan, Marquess of Santa Cruz, espoused the cause of Zanne, and declared for immediately sailing for Cyprus.

The discussion lasted several days, and tasked to the utmost the conciliatory skill of Colonna. The arguments of Doria were very weak, but his determination was evidently very strong. Zanne and the Venetians therefore concluded that his real motive for counselling inaction was unwillingness to risk his own twelve galleys in a battle. They accordingly privately told Colonna that they were ready to deposit two hundred thousand Venetian sequins in security for those vessels, and to bind themselves to defray the cost of repairs; and they entreated him to press this

offer on Doria's acceptance. The Papal admiral refused to convey to a colleague a proposal which he would himself have resented in his own case as an insult; but he used all his influence to effect a compromise. Doria at last consented to sail, on certain conditions. His duty to his sovereign, he said, required him to be satisfied that the armament of the allies was in decent fighting condition, and he therefore demanded that a review of the whole fleet should be held at Sitia. He was to be furnished with biscuit for the voyage; he was to be excused from doing rear-guard duty; and he was to be allowed to sail with his squadron in a separate body, and on the left or seaward wing of the fleet. These demands were conceded, with the exception of the last, the Spanish contingent being placed on the right or shoreward wing; and, after a loss of ten days, the allies anchored in the waters of Sitia.

The review took place on the 11th September. Colonna and Zanne took care that their vessels should be anchored at a considerable distance from each other, that the jealous and suspicious Spaniards should have no cause to complain that men were passed from galley to galley to swell the apparent complement of each. The royal galleys showed, each of them, a force of one hundred soldiers; those of the Pope a somewhat larger number; but the Venetian only eighty. Doria at once renewed his objections against the voyage to Cyprus, especially urging the want of force in the Venetian contingent. Zanne replied that according to the practice of the Republic his oarsmen were all Christians, and would be armed in case of a battle, and that therefore his fighting power was greater than at first sight it appeared, and that he and his officers were well content to meet the enemy. But the Genoese remaining unconvinced, the Commander-in-Chief requested him to state his views in writing. The result was a long paper, dated the 16th September, in which Doria brought forward imputations more offensive than any which had escaped him in the heat of debate. No confidence, he asserted, was to be placed in the declared Venetian force, because during the review, deliberate deception had been practised by passing men from galley to galley or bringing them from the shore to swell the muster. He would not be responsible for the issue of an expedition against a formidable enemy with a force so insufficient; and in his opinion the voyage to Cyprus would be of no use except in case of one or other of two improbable events, either that they should be able to intimidate the Turk

by offering him battle, or that they should fall in with him at sea and surprise him when enfeebled or unprepared. He had nothing to advise but that the Venetians should immediately increase their strength by three thousand men, and he repeated his warning that his squadron must be in Sicily by the end of the month. To this document Colonna made a reply, also in writing, at once temperate and spirited. War, he argued, involved danger and damage; the risk was, after all, not so great, seeing that the fighting portion of the Turkish fleet was estimated at only one hundred and sixty-five galleys. Their orders were to co-operate with and assist the Venetians. The Venetians were eager for battle; and if they were ready to risk their large fleet manned as it was, it was not for the honour of the King that his admiral should refuse to risk his smaller and better-manned squadron; and, above all, the return to Europe of so large a Christian force without striking a blow would be a triumph to the Turk and a disgrace to Christendom.

These two papers seem to have been circulated amongst the officers who sat in the council, and a council was again summoned. Doria's opinion was overborne, and the fleet sailed on the 17th September for Cyprus. During the voyage Doria affected to assume an equality with his Commander-in-Chief by lighting at night three great lanthorns at the stern of his ship,—a grave infringement of discipline, which Colonna, determined not to quarrel, passed over in silence. On the 21st they were off the isle of Castelrosso, on the shore of Asia Minor. Here they were overtaken by a south-eastern gale, which drove the Papal and Venetian leaders into Camacco and other harbours, while Doria kept the sea, in order, as he said, to avoid the greater danger of an overcrowded haven, or, as the Venetians said, to take his chance of being blown homewards. On the night of the 21st Zanne received intelligence of the fall of Nicosia. It had succumbed to the overwhelming force of Mustafa on the 9th, not too late for relief had the allies, on their junction in Candia, instead of debating and reviewing, steered at once for Cyprus.

Thus far it seems fair to hold Doria responsible for the fate of the island. But this responsibility Zanne, for some unaccountable reason, now took upon his own shoulders. Instead of availing himself of the decision already taken, on which he and his allies were now acting, and leading the way alongside of the Turkish fleet, he desired that another council might be called, and announced to his colleagues, assembled in the Papal flagship

on the 22d, that the loss of the capital appeared to him to demand a change of plan. It was hopeless, he said, to recover Nicosia. Famagosta could be relieved and revictualled at any time, and he hoped therefore that his colleagues would join him in some enterprise against the territories of the Turk. It was proposed to attack Negropont, various places in the Morea, and various islands of the Archipelago. Doria thought all these points too near Constantinople and too far from Italy to be successfully attacked so late in the autumn. But he suggested Durazzo and Vallona in Dalmatia, and was willing to join in any enterprise against them. Zanne at once assented; Colonna considered himself bound to follow the wishes of the Venetian leader; and the fleet steered for the west.

They sailed on the evening of the 22d September. Dispersed by stormy weather, the three leaders met on the 25th in the harbour of Tristamo, in the island of Scarpanto. Here Doria, after a conference with his chief officers, sent one of them to beg the Commander-in-Chief to mediate between him and the Venetians, and obtain leave for him to return home. Although justly indignant, Colonna answered that he and Zanne desired to have Doria's aid in any enterprise that might be resolved upon, and that at least they hoped for his company as far as Zante, where, if he were still unwilling to stay, he might have leave to withdraw. Not content with this reasonable reply, Doria went on board Colonna's flagship to urge his request, and was by him taken on board the flagship of the Venetian admiral. Several officers were present at the meeting of the three chiefs. Their conference was long and somewhat stormy, and closed with a scene which forcibly illustrated the unpleasant relations between the Spanish leader and his colleagues. Neither Doria nor Zanne could succeed in convincing the other that his own views were just, and each endeavoured to enlist the aid of Colonna. Colonna supported the Venetian, and at last said to Doria: "If I order you to remain, will you remain?" Doria made answer: "If it would not do harm to His Majesty's service, if I had a right to do as I pleased, if it were not a mere trifle whether I accompanied those who are quite able to go alone, and if you had the powers of Don John of Austria, then I would obey." Colonna rejoined that he possessed for present purposes all the power of the admiral of Spain, and that in Don John's absence he had equal right to command. "You know, sir," he added, "that you have orders to follow my flag." Doria sought to engage him in

argument as to the nature and extent of his powers, and the dispute grew warm. At last Colonna said: "You have seen my orders from the King; if you have contrary orders, show them." Doria made an evasive reply, not choosing to produce the secret authority under which he was doubtless acting. "I know His Majesty's orders," he said, "and I know that I am sole commander of the royal fleet, as my lieutenants Cardona and Santa Cruz will tell you." "I am quite content," returned Colonna, "to command your Excellency, and the others through you; but if you wish to call for other evidence, send for the Marquess of Torremaggiore, and let him say what were the orders he received from the Viceroy of Naples." Torremaggiore was a captain of infantry serving on board the Spanish squadron. Don Carlos Davalos, another captain of the same troops, thinking himself slighted by this appeal to an absent brother-officer of the same rank, here rudely interposed, saying: "I too command the royal troops, and I have had no orders to obey any one but Signor Gianandrea." Nettled by this insolence from a subordinate and a cousin, Colonna told him that he had commanded better men than he. "Never," cried Davalos, springing to his feet. Doria here placed himself between the two angry relatives, and, turning on Davalos, said: "If you obey me, be silent and begone." The young man bowed to his chief and withdrew; Colonna, who seemed to have already regretted his warmth, calling after him in a friendly tone: "I wonder, Don Carlos, you can speak with so little respect to an elder brother." But the incident had filled up the measure of the Papal admiral's endurance. When Doria resumed the argument by which he hoped to extract from Colonna and Zanne permission to depart, Colonna cut the matter short by declaring, in the presence of the assembled officers, that from that day forth he would meddle no more in the concerns of the King's squadron, and that its chief might go or stay as he pleased. Zanne, who had no power to refuse, said nothing. Colonna's last act of authority over the Spanish armament was a note addressed that afternoon to Doria, in which he requested him to place Davalos in arrest for his improper language, until the King's pleasure should be known.

Doria took his leave of the Venetian flagship with a profusion of salutations and courtesies, apparently pleased with his success in gaining his point. Amongst his own officers he was heard to say: "Marc Antonio thought to do himself honour in Cyprus at my expense, but he was mistaken." Next day, the 27th

September, he sailed for Candia, where, in spite of his impatience to return home, he remained for five days, taking in a cargo of choice wines ere he steered for Messina.

The Roman and Venetian admirals sailed in company to Candia, touching at Sitia and Canea. Thence Colonna returned to Italy, while Zanne proceeded to Cyprus and reinforced Famagosta with fifteen hundred men.

The close of this ignoble and fruitless expedition was disastrous to all concerned. Doria lost four galleys in a storm before he reached Sicily. Zanne lost thirteen of his vessels on the voyage from Cyprus to Corfu. Recalled from his command, he was subjected to a State prosecution, in the midst of which, two years afterwards, he died. Of the Papal squadron, in its passage to Corfu, two galleys went to the bottom. Shortly afterwards, at Cattaro, the flagship was struck with lightning, took fire, and blew up; the crew, however, being saved, and Colonna carrying off his papers and flag. On his way to Ragusa he was again wrecked, and narrowly escaped capture by a troop of Turkish horse. Leaving his shattered force at Ancona, he hastened to Rome, where, in spite of all disasters and disappointments, he was received with the joy which usually awaits a conqueror.

At Venice the inglorious return of the combined fleet from a cruise from which so much had been expected caused universal discontent and dismay. Angry with her own admiral, the Republic was still more angry with the Spanish leader. A new alliance with the Pope and the House of Austria had led to the old result, humiliation for the banner of St. Mark and a fresh betrayal of the common cause by the hands of another Doria. The new treachery at Castelrosso was worse than the old treason at Prevesa, for the escape of Barbarossa's fleet, important as it was, was less grave than the prolonged peril and possible loss of Cyprus. Men began to think and to say that it would be better to trust to the mercy of the Turk than the help of the Catholic King.

At Rome also Doria was generally condemned. Colonna, in sending to the King of Spain the papers which had passed at Sitia between the Spanish leader and himself, had the courage to write that he differed with His Majesty's admiral on two points, inasmuch as he had held, and continued to hold, that it was impossible for the King to have issued contradictory instructions, and that it was of no less importance to his service to maintain the reputation than to take care of the galleys of the royal fleet. The Pope was loud in his condemnation of Doria's disobedience,

of which he complained both in writing to Philip II. and by verbal instructions conveyed through Pompeo Colonna, the lieutenant of Marc Antonio, who was sent to Madrid during the winter. Doria despatched Marcello Doria to the Vatican to offer explanations, but Pius refused to hear or even to see him. Few even of the representatives or partisans of Spain at the pontifical court ventured to defend Doria. Cardinal Pacheco himself said that the King would never be well served at sea so long as his fleet was commanded by a shipowner; for how could the owner of galleys, upon which his bread depended, be expected to destroy the Turkish navy?

Spanish contemporary writers, unable to defend, seek to suppress or slur over those acts of Doria which the Italians denounce. By them the unsatisfactory issue of the cruise of the fleet is imputed, with convenient vagueness, to conflicting counsels instead of the true cause, the determination of Doria neither to obey his chief nor to yield to the opinion of his colleagues. Later Spanish historians have been more candid in admitting the fact; but they excuse Doria, as he would have excused himself, by pleading the orders of the King. If Philip II. did not in set terms instruct Doria to thwart, as far as possible, the policy, and procrastinate the action of his colleagues, and to take care that his fleet should do Venice no good and the Turk no harm, he certainly evinced no disapproval of these results. Doria was neither removed from his command, nor rebuked, nor treated with the least coldness or disfavour; and Davalos not only escaped without reprimand, but received promotion in the following year.¹

At the close of the disastrous year 1570, it was well for Venice that her quarrel with the Porte, and the progress of the struggle between them, had engaged the serious attention of a neighbouring Prince, more sagacious, or at least more helpful in his views and schemes, than the eloquent Doge and the counsellors who surrounded the Ducal chair. That friend in need was the Pope, whom we have already seen interesting himself in the affairs of the Republic, and obtaining for her from Philip II. assistance which had not been conceded to her own importunities. As author of the Christian League, the chief doings of which belong to this history, the life and character of this Pontiff here deserve examination.

¹ The cruise of the combined fleets in 1570 is very fully related by Guglielmotti (pp. 56, 100), with citations from original documents, several of which will be found in the *Appendices* to Sereno.

As promoter of the alliance which, in 1571, became famous as the Holy League, and by his own personal character, Pius V. is one of the most memorable of the Popes of the sixteenth century. Had he attained the tiara fifty years earlier, it is possible that he might have greatly changed the aspect of the subsequent history of the struggle between Rome and the Reformation. The Reformation owed its popular character as much



perhaps to the Popes who at first despised, neglected, and misunderstood it, and at last, when it was too late, learned to fear and vainly endeavoured to crush it, as to the holy enthusiasm, the enlightened patriotism, and the selfish policy, which combined to steer and protect its course. The polite and scholarly Leo, busy with his architects and his librarians, his huntsmen and his falconers, regarded the movement with the contempt with which he might have glanced at a street brawl from a window of the

Quirinal. In the early struggles of Luther the ascetic Pius would have at once recognised not only wrongs to be redressed, but a kindred spirit to be enlisted; and, fighting under the banner of the reforming Pontiff against ecclesiastical abuses, the stout Saxon monk might have spent in the service of the Church those energies which the blind policy of Rome drove at last to that nobler battlefield where the Church was vanquished and thought set free.

Michael Ghislieri, or Pius V., was now in the sixty-eighth year of his age, and had filled the pontifical throne for about five years. Born of an ancient but decayed family, at Bosco in the Milanese, he assisted his father, a corn-dealer, in that calling, and followed the mules that carried the grain of Lombardy across the Ligurian Alps to the marts of the Mediterranean. While thus employed, he attracted the notice of some Dominican monks, who engaged him at the age of fourteen to serve in their sacristy. From this humble beginning he rose to the habit of St. Dominic in the convent at Voghera, to great scholastic distinction in the seminary of Vigevano, to professorial chairs in the universities of Bologna and Pavia, and to the dignity of Prior of various Dominican houses in Lombardy. In these positions his force of character made itself strongly felt by all who came within the sphere of its influence. When he was Prior of Alva, war and famine were desolating Northern Italy, and his convent was one day beset by three hundred hungry soldiers demanding bread and threatening pillage. The Prior came to the gate and told them that he knew their necessities, and that if they would be peaceable and orderly, they should be furnished with both food and shelter. The offer was accepted; and the Prior obtained so complete a control over his military guests, that they conformed themselves to his will, protected the house from the insults of other bands, and, after some weeks' stay, departed, leaving behind them an offering in acknowledgment of the hospitality of St. Dominic. Alonso de Avalos, Marquess of Vasto, chose him for his confessor; and the Inquisition, enlisting him under its banner, appointed him Inquisitor of Como. In this office the nobleness and chivalry of the man gave a certain dignity to his debasing calling. Friar Michael was ever ready for the post of difficulty and danger, to track out heresy in the hostile valleys of the Grisons, to test the orthodoxy of the high-born Prelate in his own episcopal halls, or to maintain the prerogatives of the Holy Office against municipal power or popular indignation. His courage and conduct in difficult and

dangerous duties attracted the notice of the Court of Rome. The friendship of Cardinal Caraffa ensured his elevation to the purple, when that fierce Inquisitor himself attained the Papal throne. He was also made Supreme Inquisitor and invested with some extraordinary powers, which have never since been conferred. In the next reign, in spite of the disgrace of the Caraffas, he maintained his credit. As Cardinal, he not only refused to use his influence for the promotion of his relatives, but in the presence of the whole college he uttered a manly protest against the proposal of Pius IV. to confer the purple upon two young Princes of the Houses of Gonzaga and Medici in violation of a recent canon of the Council of Trent. Transported with rage at this rebuke, which was administered at the pontifical table, the Pope bade him be silent, calling him a low and ignorant friar; but some of the cardinals long remembered that, amongst many noble and princely churchmen, a poor friar alone had had the courage to defend the honour of the college and the Church. On the death of Pius IV. Ghislieri was placed in the Chair of St. Peter.

There he continued to fulfil, with energy which appeared to increase with increased cares and decaying health, the functions of an Inquisitor. To search out and reform abuses in the Church, and to check the career of Lutheran heresy and Turkish conquest, were the aims of his policy and his life.¹ Ecclesiastics of a kindred spirit were sure of his protection and support. Over the ill-fated Archbishop Carranza of Toledo, one of the few Prelates who sought to adhere to the reforms of the Council of Trent, and on that account was branded by ingenious malice with suspicion of heresy, he at once threw his shield; and had he lived he would have cut short the cruel persecution which the Spanish Primate endured from the hate of corrupt rivals and the timidity of his feeble sovereign. In Pius V. the Protestants of the north soon recognised their most dangerous foe and the soul of the political combinations against them. He sent three thousand troops to France to fight against the Huguenots; nor was it unreasonable that it should have been over the banner emblazoned with his keys that the Huguenot horsemen at Moncontour descried the

¹ Reflexions on a bull of Pius V. condemning one Baius constituted one of the faults in the *Augustinus* of Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, which aroused the Jesuits against his once celebrated propositions, and produced the condemnation of them by Innocent X. Hallam characterises Pius V. as "a man too zealous by character to regard prudence," and recommends the history of Jansenism as told in the *Bibliothèque Universelle*, xiv. pp. 139-398 (probably by Le Clerc?). Hallam: *Hist. of the Literature of Europe*, London, 1860, 4 vols., iv. pp. 29-30.

phantom warriors in the air, brandishing bloody swords and presaging victory to the Catholic arms. He pursued these objects with a self-devotion which commands the highest admiration, and with a ferocity of zeal at which humanity shudders.

As sovereign Pontiff, Pius V., like other Popes of strong character, desired to reassert the political powers of the keys; and, as an Italian Prince, he chafed against the great predominance of Spain, which paralysed the national life of all the Italian States except Venice. It seems to have been under the influence of these feelings that he conferred upon Cosimo I. Duke of Florence, the title of Grand Duke of Tuscany, sending him at the same time a crown bearing an inscription which said that the gift was bestowed on account of Cosimo's love and zeal for the Catholic religion and of his remarkable care for justice. The crown was designed and the legend was written by the Pope's own hand.¹ The Duke's zeal for religion had been evinced by the creation of an order of knighthood, that of St. Stephen, to fight the Turk by sea; his care for justice, by his alacrity in surrendering victims claimed by the Inquisition. This Grand-Ducal title gave a great deal of trouble to both Pope and Duke. The other Italian Dukes, especially those of Savoy and Ferrara, protested against the Medici being placed in rank before their own old and princely houses; the King of Spain was displeased that his vassal of Florence should be aggrandized without permission having been obtained at Madrid; the Emperor alleged that the creation was an infringement of the rights of the Holy Roman Empire; and the recognition of the title, at first generally refused by the other Courts and Princes, was for several years a bone of contention between the Courts of Rome and Florence and the rest of Europe.

In Pius V. we may perhaps find one of the best specimens which history affords of that terrible creature, a perfect priest, a man seriously believing himself invested with mysterious power from above, resigned, in all singleness of heart, to follow the behests of his religion wherever they may lead, and ready actually to do that which most of its votaries are content merely to say ought to be done. Seldom has a better nature been marred by the evil touch of fanaticism. Brave, just, and gentle, he might as

¹ G. Catena: *Vita di Pio V.*, p. 132. The inscription was PIVS V. PONT. MAX. OB EXIMIAM DILECTIONEM AC CATHOLICÆ RELIGIONIS ZELVM PRÆCIPVVM . Q . IVSTITIÆ STVDIVM DONAVIT. A woodcut of the crown, which consisted of a golden circlet with the above inscription, from which rose twelve rays and two Florentine lilies, will be found in Aldo Mannucci: *Vita di Cosimo de' Medici primo G. D. di Toscana*, Bologna, 1586, sm. fol. p. 156.

a layman have led a life wholly blameless and beneficent. Even as a churchman he remained unspotted from the world of corruption wherein he dwelt and, as Pope, for six years bore chief rule. His dealings with the property and patronage of the Roman See contrasted strangely with the shameless nepotism of other Pontiffs and of his immediate predecessor. On a sister's grandson, once a tailor's runaway apprentice, he, no doubt, bestowed a red hat; but the provision made for the youth was modest indeed compared with the splendid endowments which generally fell to Papal nephews.¹ In the service of God and the Church, of course, Pius shrank from no atrocity and no absurdity. He praised and rewarded the massacres of Alba; he was an active member of the Ridolfi conspiracy against the life of Queen Elizabeth; and he was ready, as he wrote to Philip II.,² to give his last shirt and last chalice to compass her assassination. He forbade medical aid to be given to those of his sick soldiers who had neglected their religious duties, although on their bodily vigour in some measure depended their efficient slaughter of Huguenots. But his career affords no evidence that he ever stooped to that which he himself believed to be base. In the service of his religion he did much wrong; but he was at all times ready to die for that which his conscience, such as his religion had made it, told him was right. While other Popes, superior to him in intellectual ability and political skill, were absorbed in the aggrandizement of nephews, or at best of the papacy, Pius V. conceived a nobler policy, and, looking beyond the Italian peninsula and the Roman Church, laboured for what he believed to be the interests of Christianity and civilization.

When it was seen that war was imminent between Venice and the Turk, the Pope determined to seize the opportunity, so long desired, of forming a Christian League against the infidel. The Venetians were assured of all the aid that he could give, as soon as they asked for it. He had no navy; but he offered to fit out and man and maintain twelve galleys, if they would furnish him with the vessels. He promised to second their appeals for assistance to the courts of Europe; and in his own name he invited all the Catholic powers to join a confederation, with himself at its head. For the reasons already given to Venice, all of these sovereigns declined except the King of Spain. From him Pius

¹ *Relatione de Roma in tempo di Pio IV. e Pio V. di Paolo Tiepolo in Li Tesori della Corte di Roma*, Bruxelles, 1672, 12mo, p. 52.

² Gachard: *Corr. de Philippe II.*, ii. p. 185, No. 1038.

obtained a hesitating and reluctant consent to send plenipotentiaries to confer at Rome with those of Venice and the Holy See. The interests of Venice were entrusted to her ordinary ambassador, Michele Suriano, with whom was afterwards conjoined Giovanni Soranzo. Philip II. was represented by his ambassador Don Juan de Zuñiga, Cardinal Granvelle, and Cardinal Pacheco, Archbishop of Burgos.¹ To treat with these statesmen Pius V. named no less than seven Cardinals—Alessandrino² his own nephew, Morone,³ Aldobrandini,⁴ Rusticucci,⁵ Cesi,⁶ Santacroce,⁷ and Grassi,⁸ the place of the last, who died during the negotiations, being supplied by Cardinal Chiesa.⁹

These personages assembled at Rome in June 1570. On the 1st of July the Pope received them in solemn audience, and addressed to them a speech, in which he urged them to arrange as speedily as possible the terms of a Christian alliance against the enemy who was menacing all Christendom. After a dutiful reply, the ministers retired to hold their first conference at the house of Cardinal Alessandrino.

The Spaniards, from the outset, began to suggest difficulties

¹ Francisco Pacheco y Toledo, son of the Marquess of Cerralvo, was born at Ciudad Rodrigo. He went to Italy with his uncle, Cardinal Pedro Pacheco, and was employed by the Duke of Alba in the negotiations for peace after the war between Philippe II. and Paul IV. in 1556. In 1560 he was made a Cardinal by Pius IV., and in 1567 he was appointed to the See of Burgos, of which he was the first Archbishop. He died at Burgos in 1579.

² Michele Bonelli, son of Gardina Ghislieri, sister of Pius V., born at Bosco near Tortona in the Milanese in 1541. He began life as apprentice to a tailor, but, like his uncle, he soon entered the Dominican order, and was made Bishop of Alba, and Cardinal in 1566, assuming his uncle's old Cardinal's title of Alessandrino from the district of Alessandria, in which Bosco lies. He was chief minister to Pius V., and his nuncio to various courts, and he died in April 1598.

³ Giovanni Morone, Milanese, born 1509, made Bishop of Modena by Clement VII., a Cardinal by Paul III. in 1548, President of the Council of Trent by Pius IV. in 1563, and much employed in foreign missions. He died in 1580.

⁴ Giovanni Aldobrandini, a Florentine, made Bishop of Imola in 1569, and Cardinal in 1570 by Pius V. He died in September 1573.

⁵ Hieronimo Rusticucci, born 1537 at Fano, long private secretary to Pius V. when a Cardinal, and afterwards made by him Cardinal and Bishop of Sinigaglia. He died 14th June 1604.

⁶ Pietro Donato Cesi, a Roman, born 1522, made Governor of Ravenna by Paul III., Vice-Legate of Bologna by Pius IV., Cardinal by Pius V. in 1570, and died 1586.

⁷ Prospero Santacroce, a Roman, born 1523, was a jurist of considerable learning, sent as nuncio by Paul III. to Ferdinand, King of the Romans, and to Spain and Portugal by Pius IV., who made him a Cardinal in 1565. He died in 1589.

⁸ Carlo Grassi, a Bolognese, born 1519, chamberlain to Julius III., who made him Bishop of Corneto. By Pius V. he was made Governor of Rome, and Cardinal in 1570. He died 23d March 1571.

⁹ Giovanni Paolo Chiesa, born at Tortona 1521, a learned jurist, and long a practising lawyer. Sent by the municipality of Milan to plead its cause against the Archbishop Carlo Borromeo before Pius V., he attracted the Pope's notice, and was made Apostolic Prothonotary, and, in 1568, Cardinal. He died 9th January 1575.

and interpose delay. Granvelle, who was their spokesman, asked for some petition or proposal on the part of the Republic, as the power most interested in the war, that he and his colleagues might consider it, and lay it before the King. Suriano replied that Venice did not appear there as a suppliant, and that he had nothing to ask beyond that which had already been asked by the Pope. Appealing to the seven Cardinals, he inquired why they might not adopt the chief points of the League of 1537, formed against the late Sultan, between Charles V., Pius III., and the Republic, and leaving the details to be adjusted afterwards, announce, as the ministers of that day announced at the end of their first day's sitting, the formation of the alliance? They were agreed on the main point, resistance to the Turk, and they ought not to waste in useless debate the time which was required for preparing and organizing that resistance. Cardinal Pacheco, on the part of Spain, seemed favourably inclined to Suriano's proposal, but Granvelle overruled him. The year 1570, he argued, was not 1537; times had changed, and the facts of the two cases were different; they had not met to-day as their predecessors had met, with a clear understanding as to certain vital matters. Besides, there was no need for haste. The naval forces of the Pope, the Republic, and the King, were already strong enough to maintain an attitude of defence; and before next year's campaign there was ample time to consider whether and when, and on what conditions, it would be advisable to assume the offensive. Suriano observed that whatever they might do, the Turk would assuredly not defer his offensive operations till next year; even now his fleet was approaching Cyprus, and perhaps his troops were already before its capital. Was it reasonable to stand by and do nothing when possessions of the Republic were attacked, and when, on account of the magnitude of the Sultan's armaments now concentrated at Cyprus, his own territories lay at the mercy of any invader?

The question thus raised was referred to the Pope, who sent down to the conference, at its next meeting on the 3d of July, the heads of a treaty sketched by himself. Had the Spaniards been as anxious as were Pius and the Venetians to bring the affair to a conclusion, a treaty might have been made in a few days. But Philip II. thought he had done quite enough in promising Venice the co-operation of his Italian fleet; and he now, as ever, chiefly desired to avoid a conclusion, and, as he called it, to gain time; or, as the Venetians said, to waste a year.

So zealous was Granvelle in pursuing this great object, that all concerned said he had a personal ill-will to the scheme of a league. If one of his questions was answered or set aside, he had two more ready to ask. Through the summer, through the autumn, and through the winter, the conferences dragged their slow length along, and the spring of 1571 found the Roman and Venetian plenipotentiaries still languidly seated round their table, affecting to remove the objections, solve the doubts, and weigh the scruples of the most hesitating and scrupulous of cardinals. Was the League to be perpetual or temporary? If temporary, of what duration? for ten years or for twelve? Was it to be against the Turk alone, or against the Turk and the Moors, or against all infidels whatsoever? If not against all infidels, might the Shah of Persia join it? Might it not be offensive against the Moors, defensive against the Turk? Could it be concluded without the participation of the Emperor, of each of the Catholic powers, named one after another? Might the Republic of Ragusa stand neuter? What were to be the forces contributed by each confederation? How were the common expenses, the conquests, the booty, to be apportioned? Supposing one of the confederates to quit the League and make a separate peace with the common enemy, ought that treaty to provide that the seceder should be punished by Papal excommunication? These were a few of the questions which were proposed by Granvelle, and discussed at great length, and over and over again. The points upon which the Spaniards insisted most strongly, and against which the Venetians stood out most inflexibly, were, that the League should be offensive against the Moors of Barbary, and only defensive against the Turk, and that seceders should be excommunicated. More than once Suriano and Soranzo signified their intention of withdrawing from the conferences if these points were not given up. The Pope supported them in their opposition; he insisted upon attacking the Turk, and he did not insist on striking the seceder from the alliance with his spiritual thunderbolts; and so the negotiation continued to creep on, to the vexation of Pius, the despair of Venice, and the satisfaction of the jealous procrastinating King.

The unrevenged fall of Nicosia, and the wretched result of the cruise of the allied fleet, deeply affected Pius V. He saw that his favourite scheme of a Holy League, more important than it had ever been to the welfare of menaced Christendom, must either be accomplished in the next spring or altogether abandoned.

He saw that Venice, unless earnestly and effectually supported by the Christian powers, must and would make what terms she could with the victorious Turk. The favourable disposition towards the Republic attributed to the Grand Vizier gave her the hope of obtaining a peace at least as tolerable as she was likely to gain by the force of her arms, even with the aid of lukewarm allies. The Vizier might have his way, and grant peace, or the janisseries of Mustafa might succeed in crushing Bragadino and his gallant band at Famagosta; but in either case the end of the war seemed inevitable. The Republic would then have little interest in renewing a struggle in which she might again be left to fight single-handed, and she would probably not be altogether displeased to see the King of Spain alone bearing the brunt of the fleets and armies of the Turk. In the winter of 1570-71, therefore, the Pope instructed his ministers to urge once more upon the sovereigns of Europe, with all the weight of his pontifical authority, the necessity of forming a Christian League.

He himself used all his personal influence to quicken the proceedings of the conference which had been sitting from time to time since July, endeavouring to frame the conditions of the proposed confederation. The points discussed have been already indicated. Those who argued with so much keenness the merest preliminary questions were not likely to pass lightly over the chief practical details. The division of the expenses of the League was a point long debated; and it was with great difficulty that the representatives of the Republic were induced to consent to undertake one-third of the whole, instead of one-fourth as they originally proposed. The right of naming the Captain-General of the League was also keenly contested between the Republic and the King. The Venetians claimed it in virtue of their great influence in the Levant, especially with the Greek population, and of the personal influence and naval skill and experience of their commanders. The Spanish commissioners urged the dignity of their master, the princely rank of the commander whom he had appointed, and the King's munificence in engaging to defray half the cost of the expeditions. The Papal representatives made no claim for the Papal admiral, warned by the experience of last year, that the leader of the smallest contingent could hardly wield with efficient authority the chief command. To the Pope himself, therefore, the question was referred for final decision. He accordingly at first nominated Don John of Austria to the command of the fleets of the League, and the Duke of Savoy to

the command of its land forces ; but, as it appeared possible that the ancient pretensions of the House of Savoy to the Crown of Cyprus might occasion differences and difficulties, he finally declared Don John supreme on both elements. The second place was not awarded without some discussion. The Spaniards claimed the right of appointing to it for Don John, a claim which the Venetians strongly resisted, fearing that Giovanni Andrea Doria would be selected for the post. Don Luis de Requesens was then proposed by the Spaniards ; but the Pope now preferred his own claim to nominate, and was finally permitted to appoint Marc Antonio Colonna, his own admiral, to the second command.

After eight months of intermittent labour, the conferences were closed and the treaty of the Holy League was declared to be finished. Even the copious Granvelle had come to an end of his objections and his questions. The 7th of March, being the feast of St. Thomas Aquinas, and the great Dominican convent of Sta. Maria sopra Minerva, were chosen by the Dominican Pope as the time and place of its publication. After a splendid mass in the noble church, which was filled with all that was illustrious in Rome, Pius withdrew with the commissioners of the treaty to another apartment, where the paper was to be solemnly read, and then signed and sealed. The cardinal-datary had read the preamble, and had gone into the first article as far as the date 1571, when, to the astonishment of the whole society, he was interrupted by Granvelle. "It is impossible," said the Spanish plenipotentiary, "to do in this current year all that is provided in the treaty. It is now the 7th of March, and by the third article we are bound to have our fleets at Messina by the end of this month. We must either alter 1571 into 1572, or by a new article meet the circumstances of the present year." Various brief remarks having been made, Granvelle was asked what were the new provisions which he proposed to insert. He thereupon drew forth and read a paper containing the draft of a fresh article. It was mainly to this effect, that it being impossible to comply, in this year, with the conditions prescribed in the third article, and yet most necessary to act against the Turk with the utmost vigour, the King, on his part, would engage to have from seventy to eighty galleys ready at Messina, at latest by the end of May, while the Venetians, on theirs, would fit out the greatest number of galleys that their resources permitted, in order to raise the entire number to two hundred and fifty ; and that, in the settlement of the accounts, whatever sum should be found owing by the

King to the Venetians, should be payable either in money or in other values, as persons, victuals, or munitions. Here three points were raised: two upon which the past debates had largely turned—time, and the amount of contingent; and a third—the liquidation of debt, not touched on in the treaty, and capable, in jealous and dexterous hands, of furnishing material for weeks of further discussion. The Pope, one of the most testy of saints, had now lost all patience. He turned fiercely upon Granvelle, and ordered him to leave his presence. The rest of the company looked at each other in silent confusion. The Venetians asserted the ability and intention of their Government to fulfil the treaty as it stood, and they protested against the proposed addition. The Spaniards, on the contrary, were sure their King's forces could not be ready, and that offensive operations against the Turk were during this year impossible. The Venetians maintained that it was already agreed that the Turk should be attacked. Both insisted that the treaty should be signed, but the Spaniards would sign it only with the new article, and the Venetians would sign it only without it. Some of the plenipotentiaries rose from their seats and took each other aside, or left the room for private conference and came back: but neither party would give way. The Venetians said they could not sanction the admission of new matters of so much importance without special orders from home. The treaty remained unsigned, and the meeting broke up in the belief that eight months' labour had been thrown away. The Pontiff had come forth in the morning rejoicing, to put the last touch to this great work of his reign, the Holy League. As he drove home to the Vatican, the people in the streets observed that his fierce little eyes were red with weeping.

In the spring of 1571 he sent Marc Antonio Colonna to Venice to inform the Doge and Senate that if they would cordially cooperate with him in this pious scheme, he would concede certain boons regarding ecclesiastical rights and revenues for which the Republic had long been suing in vain at the footstool of St. Peter. Colonna was heard in the Senate in favour of the proposals of the Pontiff, which were finally accepted, though not without the opposition of a respectable minority, of which the leaders advocated negotiation with the Turk, and bade the assembly beware lest Spanish perfidy, sloth, and ambition, should bring upon the Republic disasters as great as those which followed the last abortive confederation against Solyman.¹ The Venetian ambassador

¹ Paruta: *Guerra di Cipro*, pp. 91-104.

at Rome was therefore instructed to treat with the representatives of the assenting powers for the formation of a League.

Don Luis de Torres, a Spanish Prelate of the pontifical chamber, and an acute negotiator, was despatched to Spain, on the part of Pius, to offer assurances of similar liberality to Philip II., to imbue his mind with the desires and feelings of the Pope, and to gain over his ministers to the Papal policy. Torres found the King much better disposed than formerly to that policy, and more keenly alive to the great danger and heavy cost to which he would himself be exposed were Venice compelled, for want of allies, to make an ignominious peace with the Turk. Philip therefore issued instructions which opened the ports and marts of both the Sicilies to the Venetian dealers in corn; and he referred the final adjustment, on his behalf, of a Christian League, to his ambassador at the Papal Court and two Spanish Cardinals.¹ Torres then went to Portugal on a similar mission, but with a less satisfactory result.

Pius had foreseen with perfect accuracy the policy of Venice as regarded peace or war with Turkey. The Doge and Senate put little faith in Christian Princes, and they knew that the Grand Vizier, Mahomet Sokolli, earnestly desired peace. That minister had not grown less averse to the war, undertaken upon the advice of his rivals, because it had been hitherto crowned with success. As the favourite of the Sultan, he had no desire to see fresh laurels upon the brows of the conqueror of Nicosia, and as a faithful servant of the Ottoman House he still less desired to hazard acquisitions already gained on the chances of war with a formidable league of the Christian powers. He had considerable confidence in the envoy of Venice, Antonio Barbaro, who, according to the diplomatic system of the Porte, was detained a prisoner while the Republic was at war with the Sultan. With Barbaro he entered into correspondence about the merchants of the two countries detained in the dominions of each respectively; and, in expressing his wish that a special emissary should be sent to treat for the exchange of these persons, he hinted that if the envoy were also empowered to sue for peace, reasonable terms might perhaps be obtained. Barbaro's communication to the Senate was brought from Constantinople by two confidential servants of the Grand Vizier's household.

¹ The despatch of Monsignor Don Luis de Torres to Cardinal Alessandrino, dated Seville, 16th May 1571, and giving an account of his mission, will be found in the *Lettere di Principe*, 3 vols. 4to, Venetia, 1851, iii. pp. 244-247.

Upon this hint Jacopo Ragazzoni was despatched from Venice on the 11th of March; on the 26th he landed at Ragusa, where a Turkish guide met him, and from whence, taking horse, he arrived on the 26th of April at Constantinople. He was compelled to enter the city in the gray of the morning, and he and his people were kept close prisoners in the lodging provided for them; but they were otherwise treated with kindness and consideration. By the Grand Vizier he was received with great affability. Mahomet made no secret of his dislike to the war, and he expressed his regret that the Doge and Senate had not taken his advice and surrendered Cyprus upon the first summons, and still more that they should have written a letter to the Sultan with a curtailment of his usual titles, an indignity which he said His Majesty would never forgive. He seemed to expect that Ragazzoni would at once enter upon the negotiations for the exchange of prisoners and for peace without reference to the incarcerated minister; and it was only upon the envoy's positive refusal to treat without free personal communication with Barbaro, to whom alone he was accredited, that Mahomet consented that they should see each other. Ragazzoni was accordingly put under the charge of Ibrahim Bey, an Italian renegade of noble blood noted for his enmity to the Christian name, who assisted the Grand Vizier in the conduct of foreign affairs, and who now conducted the stranger to Barbaro's quarters at Pera. As they crossed the Golden Horn the Turk pointed out the long array of galleys preparing for sea, saying that they were about to proceed against Venice. "They will be well met," replied the Venetian. From the 7th of May to the 10th of June the two Christians, the Vizier, and Ibrahim were closely engaged in negotiations. The business which gave rise to them, the exchange of prisoners and the treatment of trade during war, was disposed of with little difficulty or delay, excepting what was interposed, as the Venetians believed, by some meddling Jews who possessed influence in the Seraglio and were no friends to the Grand Vizier. It was agreed that the persons and property of all subjects of each nation trading in the territories of the other should be mutually set at liberty, and thenceforth be respected; that these traders should be allowed to return home or continue their business abroad at their own choice; and that the Turks who desired to quit Venice should be conveyed with their goods to Zara. But towards peace no advance was made. The Pasha demanded the unconditional surrender of Cyprus; Barbaro and Ragazzoni required its restitution.